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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Puzzles 
Why do some autocratic countries actively participate in international human rights institutions 
while their autocratic peers prefer to keep their engagement to a minimum?  Most extant 
scholarship on human rights emphasizes the difference between the best human rights protectors, 
established democracies, and the worst human rights violators, autocracies (Hathaway 2002, 
2007; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Simmons 2009a).  A lack of accountability mechanisms in 
domestic institutions and civil societies – free and fair elections, effective judiciaries, media 
freedom, active and legalized civil societies – is often cited as the cause of poor human rights 
performance in autocratic states, particularly when compared to democracies.  Such studies tend 
to treat autocratic involvements with human rights as monolithic.  However, autocratic states are 
neither uniformly cynical about world human rights institutions (Glendon 2002; Waltz 2001, 
2004) nor equally oppressive (Conrad 2014), just as not all democratic states wholeheartedly 
supported the two Covenants without any qualification (Roberts 2015).   
Autocratic states are frequent participants in the United Nations human rights treaty 
system.  Around 60 percent of the 121 autocracies in my dataset are members of more than four 
core UN human rights treaties as of 2008.  Table 1.1 displays the rate of autocratic ratifications
!
!
2!
across the seven core UN human rights treaties.   
 
 
FIGURE 1.1: Autocratic ratifications of seven core UN human rights 
treaties, 1966-2008.  Data: Svolik (2012a) and UNTS (2016).  
 
 
First, 80 percent of 114 autocracies ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) from the year 1965 to 2008.  During the same time 
period, 68 percent and 72 percent of 117 non-democratic states ratified the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), respectively.  Out of 116 autocratic states, 78 percent 
ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) between 1979 to 2008.  Of 108 non-democratic states, 55 percent ratified the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT) from 1984 to 2008.  Finally, 76 percent of 102 autocracies ratified the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) from 1989 to 2008, and 16 percent of 102 autocracies ratified the 
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International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of the Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families (ICMWR) from 1990 to 2008.  Table 1A.1 in Appendix at the end of this 
chapter provides a full list of the nine core UN human rights instruments along with the dates on 
which they opened for signature. 
Recently, several scholars have examined autocratic states’ participations in international 
human rights institutions with a weighted focus on treaty commitment and compliance (Conrad 
2014; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011, 2012; von Stein 2014; Vreeland 2008).  These researchers 
have begun looking into the internal heterogeneity of autocracies.  Such studies have shown that 
differences in political institutions across regimes are key to explaining autocratic ratifications of 
human rights treaties.  Autocratic states with multiple parties tend to readily ratify international 
human rights treaties to placate domestic groups exerting pressures for openness (Vreeland 
2008).  Alternatively, autocratic states, such as personalist regimes, that need extra legitimacy 
due to the lack of institutionalized validation of power in their political system, tend to seek 
international human rights treaty memberships (von Stein 2014).  However, these regime-
centered accounts do not explain why autocratic states tend to ratify multiple human rights 
agreements simultaneously and why numerous ratifications occur under a particular autocrat 
within a country.   
 Figure 1.2 reveals that some autocrats seek legal memberships in multiple international 
human rights treaties, even concurrently.  The figure displays the ratification events of seven 
core UN human rights treaties in sixteen of the most active autocratic ratifiers from 1966 to 
2008.  Each treaty opened for signature at a different time (e.g., the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights opened for signature in 1966 while the Convention against Torture 
opened in 1984); thus, the number of human rights treaties available for ratification differs from 
!
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year to year.  In most cases, we observe either one or two spikes in ratification incidents or 
individual ratification events clustered around an adjacent period of time in a given autocratic 
country.  This pattern suggests that particular autocrats tend to ratify multiple human rights 
agreements either simultaneously or over the course of their tenure.  Current domestic 
institutional accounts do not sufficiently explain this pattern of ratification by different autocrats 
within one country, and no theory yet exists to account for autocratic ratification of multiple 
human rights treaties. 
 
FIGURE 1.2: Count of ratification events of seven core UN human rights treaties 
in sixteen of the most active autocratic ratifiers between 1966 and 2008.  
NOTE: Ecuador is excluded because four out of seven of its ratification incidents 
occurred during democratic leader tenures. Data: Svolik (2012a) and United 
Nations Treaty Series (UNTS, 2016). 
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decision of whether or not to ratify.  Once a state decides to join a main international human 
rights treaty, it needs to consider whether to accept the extra monitoring and/or enforcement 
mechanisms available under that treaty as well as which specific mechanisms, including  
individual complaints, inter-state complaints, inquiries, the ICJ jurisdiction, and regular visits, to 
accept.1    
Figure 1-3 briefly presents autocratic treaty member states’ acceptance of monitoring and 
enforcement procedures in each of five core UN human rights treaties.  These treaties allow 
ratifying states to opt in and out either when joining the main treaty or later in time.2  Each 
human rights treaty has a different configuration of optional monitoring/enforcement 
mechanisms, and autocratic states accept these mechanisms at a different rate, depending on the 
specific types of monitoring/enforcement procedures and on the breadth of the treaty’s rights 
beneficiaries.  Strikingly, autocratic member states overall tend to accept the ICJ compulsory 
jurisdictions from most human rights treaties by not attaching reservations to compromissory 
clauses.  Conversely, autocratic member states seem more cautious about accepting inter-state 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In addition to choosing among procedural obligations under main human rights treaties, states can also 
tailor their substantive treaty obligations.  Upon signature or ratification, states must decide whether to 
opt out of certain substantive treaty obligations from main human rights treaties by lodging reservations 
(Koremenos 2016, Chapter 6).  Once members of the main human rights treaties, states can also declare to 
accept extra substantive treaty obligations by accepting optional articles and optional protocols, 
expanding the scope of the treaty obligations in substantive ways.  For example, member states to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child can declare that the minimum age for recruitment into the armed 
forces of personnel called for military service is 18 years instead of 15 years under Article 38, paragraphs 
2 and 3.  Similarly, member states to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can commit 
to an extra substantive obligation to abolish the death penalty by ratifying the Second Optional Protocol 
to the ICCPR.  While I do not consider this substantive variation in state treaty commitment in the 
dissertation, I plan to explore the complete and exhaustive range of treaty commitment by states in a post-
dissertation project.  See Chapter 5 for more discussion.    
2 Due to the limited time coverage, I do not consider states’ acceptance of extra monitoring/enforcement 
mechanisms under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Convention on the Rights of the Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), and International Convention against Enforced Disappearance (ICED).  The corresponding 
monitoring mechanisms were open for signature in 2008, 2012, 2006, and 2006, respectively, while my 
dataset ends in 2008.  
!
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complaints, individual complaints, and regular visits from international monitoring bodies.  The 
data further shows that autocratic member states tend to accept monitoring and/or enforcement 
procedures from human rights treaties concerning general rights protections for all people, as 
indicated in bar graphs in blue on the left side of the panel, rather than from those concerning 
minority rights protections, described in bar graphs in gray on the right side of the panel.  
 
 
FIGURE 1.3: Autocratic acceptance of extra monitoring/enforcement mechanisms under 
five core UN human rights treaties, 1966-2008.  Data: Svolik (2012a) and UNTS (2016).  
NOTE: Columns (1) to (5) show that different treaties use different mechanisms for 
monitoring and/or enforcement.  Graphs with blue bars on the left concern human rights 
treaties benefitting the universe of all people while graphs with gray bars on the right 
concern those targeting specific groups of social minorities.  Inter-state complaints are 
mandatory for all member states to the ICERD under Articles 11-13, so the procedure is not 
considered here.   
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A few important empirical studies examine states’ acceptance of individual complaints 
(Smith-Cannoy 2012; c.f. Hill 2015 for reservations and also Cole 2009, Landman 2005, and 
Simmons 2009b); however, they do not explain what motivates states to accept some monitoring 
or enforcement procedures but not others.  Various monitoring and enforcement procedures have 
institutional differences in terms of the expected state control over the initiation and proceeding 
of mechanisms as well as the expected consequences of being caught as a rights violator.  In 
addition, each human rights treaty deals with different human rights issue areas, focusing on a 
varying range of rights beneficiaries on the ground, whose support autocratic leaders might value 
differently.  All decisions to ratify certain human rights treaties as well as to accept particular 
monitoring and enforcement procedures under those treaties, which are mostly conducted at the 
same time, are closely inter-independent.  Existing scholarship has yet to offer an overarching 
theoretical framework for understanding a broad spectrum of autocratic states’ commitment to 
international human rights treaties. 
Additionally, autocratic countries do not engage global human rights institutions only 
through legal commitments to human rights treaties, despite the current focus in empirical human 
rights scholarships on treaty commitment (Hafner-Burton 2012).  The United Nations has 
various human rights institutions beyond treaty systems, including the Universal Periodic 
Review –  a newly created human rights monitoring and enforcement mechanism.  In response to 
heavy criticisms that the former UN Commission on Human Rights was politicized, partial, and 
subjective (United Nations 2005), the UPR is designed to subject all UN members to regular 
scrutiny.  This process puts all UN member states procedurally on equal footing in evaluating 
and making recommendations to fellow states.  The UPR’s innovative approach attempts to 
!
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complement the expert-based monitoring system of most international treaties, including and 
beyond human rights, with a peer-based monitoring system (Cochrane and McNeilly 2013).   
Strikingly, autocratic members of the UN are neither uniformly vocal nor silent when 
given the opportunity to publicly shine spotlights on peer states’ human rights policies and 
practices.  During the first cycle of the UPR, from 2008 to 2011, Azerbaijan issued 337 
recommendations on other states’ human rights performances while the United Arab Emirates 
only issued twenty-nine (UPR-Info 2014b).  Recommendations from authoritarian states, 
moreover, vary a great deal in substance.  Some recommendations specifically request changes 
to domestic laws and institutions, as when Zimbabwe urged the United Arab Emirates to 
establish national laws to protect children’s rights (UPR-Info 2014b).  Other recommendations 
shift the spotlight away from a state’s dismal human rights practices by instead focusing on the 
lack of international assistance for human rights capacity-building.  Still others compliment the 
state’s human rights policies instead of offering constructive criticism to help the state improve. 
Current scholarship on human rights naming and shaming, both in the UPR and in 
general, often overlooks this interesting diversity in autocratic behaviors in international human 
rights institutions.  Existing literature on the UPR follows the conventional approach of focusing 
on stark behavioral distinctions between autocracies and democracies and concludes that 
democratic recommenders are, indeed, participating more actively and in more meaningful ways 
than their autocratic counterparts (McMahon 2012).  However, as Figure 1.4 shows, the 
level of democraticness among autocracies alone cannot fully explain their internal heterogeneity 
regarding their utilization of international human rights institutions such as the UPR. 
 
 
!
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FIGURE 1.4: Number of recommendations by the level of 
democraticness among non-democracies. States whose 
average Polity score (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) during 
the first cycle of the UPR from 2008 to 2010 is less than 
seven are considered autocracies.!Data: UPR-Info (2014b). 
 
 Autocratic participation in particular international human rights institutions occurs in the 
complex context of overlapping international (and possibly also domestic) human rights 
institutions.  For example, a vast majority of UN human rights institutions are clustered in the 
Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, from the Human Rights Council to specific human 
rights treaty bodies.  The same diplomats, as well as legal attachés specializing in human rights 
in permanent missions in Geneva, often simultaneously deal with their states’ reporting 
obligations to the committees of particular human rights treaties, voting in the Human Rights 
Council sessions, recommending in the Universal Periodic Review, and so on (Author’s 
fieldwork in Geneva, Switzerland from January 18 to 27, 2016).  Despite this reality, little 
attention has been paid to how states’ human rights policies are formulated through such 
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multilayered, overlapping human rights institutions both internationally and domestically (cf. 
Voeten 2013).3   
 
1.2 The Argument 
In this dissertation, I explore why some autocratic states, which have often been 
considered antagonistic toward human rights, actively take part in various international 
human rights institutions while other autocratic states do not.  Specifically, I address the 
following four questions:  
1.! Why do some autocratic leaders pursue multiple ratifications of the core UN 
human rights treaties either simultaneously or over their tenure? 
 
2.! Given the underlying motivation for pursuing memberships in human rights 
treaties, how do some autocratic leaders accept extra monitoring and/or 
enforcement procedures when joining those treaties?   
 
3.! Why do some autocratic states issue either a higher number of recommendations 
or more serious and meaningful recommendations to their peer states in the 
Universal Periodic Review? 
 
4.! Why do autocratic states issue meaningful recommendations to their peer states in 
the Universal Periodic Review as they commit to a higher number of the core UN 
human rights treaties?  
 
 
I argue that autocrats are motivated to participate in international human rights 
institutions, either legally or non-legally, by a desire to craft and secure good reputations before 
domestic and international audiences.  I focus on autocratic leaders’ pursuit of good domestic 
reputations on human rights regarding their legal commitments to human rights treaties.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 I would like to thank Courtney Hillebrecht, Benjamin Appel, Courtenay Conrad, Chris Fariss, Jill 
Haglund, and Dai Xinyuan and other participants in the overlapping institutions workshop hosted by the 
human rights and humanitarian affairs program at the University of Nebraska – Lincoln from April 18-19, 
2016 for sharing early ideas about how to study overlapping human rights institutions.   
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Regarding autocratic states’ behavior in the Universal Periodic Review as recommending states, 
I focus on their pursuit of good international reputations on human rights.  
First, I examine autocratic multiple ratifications of human rights treaties in the context of 
autocratic leaders’ pursuit of popular support to resolve the commitment and information 
problems inherent in power sharing relationships between autocrats and their political elites.  
Autocratic leaders with different support bases from those of their predecessors seek approval 
from broader masses to deter potential challenges from new regime insiders.  Both these 
autocrats and their new regime insiders suffer from a higher level of uncertainty about each 
other.  Such autocrats are not often equipped with the consolidated political and economic 
institutional tools to check regime insiders’ ambitions and keep them content with the status quo.  
In the meantime, these new regime insiders have more uncertainty about both their leaders’ 
willingness to honor power-sharing arrangements and their leaders’ capacity to withstand 
possible domestic challenges.  Members of ruling coalitions face serious coordination problems 
when plotting coups in the absence of manifestations of popular disapproval for the authoritarian 
leaders, however.  Thus, autocrats with new support bases distinct from those of the outgoing 
leaders need to shore themselves up as legitimate leaders with popular support in order to deter 
potential challenges from new members of their ruling coalitions. 
Such autocrats find ratification of human rights treaties an expedient policy tool either to 
signal a break from their repressive autocratic predecessors or to reassure citizens by 
demonstrating continuity with their democratic predecessors in human rights protections.  
Among many other liberalization policies under authoritarian leaders, human rights treaty 
memberships help governments appear to care for “broad interests” and therefore to be “broad-
based” in the eyes of ordinary citizens while still granting concentrated political, economic, and 
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social benefits to small segments of ruling coalitions.  Multiple ratifications of human rights 
treaties send an even stronger message to the masses whereas the expected costs of those 
commitments seem marginal, at best, especially to these autocrats’ myopic eyes. 
The masses welcome such seemingly cosmetic policy concessions for three reasons.  
First, people can look to international institutions as alternative actors with the authority to hold 
autocrats accountable for non-compliance as working domestic accountability mechanisms are 
absent in authoritarian countries (Cole 2006; Fang and Owen 2011; Smith-Cannoy 2012).  
Second, people may anticipate the unintended consequences that today’s human rights 
ratifications might bring about in the future by enabling civil societies and litigations (Goodliffe 
and Hawkins 2006; Simmons 2009a).  Last, people may be either simply content at seeing some 
evidence that their countries are moving in the right direction (Hawkins 2002; Vreeland 2008) or 
satisfied to see their countries assuming a rightful role in the international community alongside 
a majority of other countries (Goodman and Jinks 2013). 
Autocrats with new support bases add credibility to their promises to grant rights 
protections by accepting extra monitoring and/or enforcement procedures in addition to ratifying  
main treaties.  However, they are willing to accept a higher level of international accountability 
only when they expect positive returns from the targeted range of rights beneficiaries, the general 
citizens.  Conversely, these autocrats are less interested in garnering support from marginalized 
communities, such as women, children, racial minorities, people with disabilities, and migrant 
workers.  Most citizens view improvements in rights conditions for these marginalized 
communities as less important than many other factors when evaluating their governments’ 
performance.  In addition, autocrats prefer monitoring/enforcement mechanisms that allow them 
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to exercise some control over initiations and proceedings, such as ICJ jurisdiction, inter-state 
complaints, and inquiries as opposed to individual complaints and regular visits. 
Autocratic states are also active participants in UN human rights institutions other than 
these core human rights treaty instruments.  I argue that autocratic states actively engage in the 
Working Group Sessions of the Universal Periodic Review when seeking an enhanced reputation 
on human rights, either on their own or in relation to a particular state, in the eyes of the 
international audience.  In particular, autocratic states with higher profile positions in other 
international human rights institutions, such as the Human Rights Council, issue a higher number 
of recommendations as well as more meaningful recommendations to peer states.  Once 
achieving elected member status on the Human Rights Council, an autocratic state faces 
heightened international attention and scrutiny regarding its involvement with other international 
human rights institutions.  Therefore, such a state is motivated to look like a good actor in other 
human rights institutions.  Similarly, autocratic states issue more meaningful and serious 
recommendations to their foreign policy adversaries than to their foreign policy allies.  By 
commenting on the poor human rights policies and practices of their foreign policy adversaries, 
autocratic states can tarnish the reputations of states with which they are in conflict.  By issuing 
more meaningful and serious recommendations to foreign policy adversaries, autocratic states 
can enhance their own reputations as human rights advocates before the international 
community.      
Last, I examine autocratic states’ involvement with the UPR as recommenders in 
conjunction with their level of commitments to the UN core human rights treaties.  I argue that 
autocratic states issue the most meaningful recommendations, which mostly refer to international 
human rights instruments but stop short of encouraging domestic legal, institutional, and policy 
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reforms, as they commit to a higher number of core human rights treaties for the following two 
reasons.  First, financial and human resources constraints as well as the unique institutional 
structure of the UPR render referring to human rights treaties that they are already members of 
an efficient and effective way to deliver human rights priorities without upsetting targeted states 
under review.  By doing so, they can issue legitimate and objective recommendations while 
minimizing the potential for reciprocation when they are up for review.  Second, however, such 
autocratic recommending states are more cautious about interfering with other states’ domestic 
human rights policies by suggesting domestic reforms of law, institutions, or policies with 
specific action plans.   
 
1.3 Plan for the Dissertation 
This dissertation examines the participation of autocratic states, which are commonly assumed to 
be antagonistic to human rights, in various international human rights institutions both legally 
and non-legally.  I argue that such participation is driven by these autocrats’ pursuit of domestic 
and international reputations as good actors on human rights.   
 Chapter 2 surveys existing studies on autocratic states’ commitments to international 
human rights treaties as well as their bureaucratic involvement with the Universal Periodic 
Review as recommending states.  This chapter highlights questions unanswered by previous 
literature and fills in those gaps, enhancing our understanding of the relationship between 
autocratic states and international human rights institutions. 
 Broadly, autocratic legal participations in international human rights institutions are 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 whereas their non-legal involvements are examined in Chapter 5.  
With regard to autocratic states’ legal involvements with international human rights treaties, I 
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provide a novel theoretical mechanism in Chapter 3 to explain autocratic leaders’ multiple 
ratifications of human rights treaties, either concurrently or over their tenure.  Chapter 4 links 
this theoretical explanation of autocratic leaders’ horizontal commitments to human rights 
treaties to the empirical patterns of their vertical commitments to specific human rights treaties 
as they accept or reject higher levels of monitoring and/or enforcement from the relevant treaty 
bodies. 
In Chapter 3, I argue that autocratic leaders who come into power with different support 
bases from their predecessors seek popular support to enhance the legitimacy of their power in 
the eyes of their new regime insiders.  For these autocrats, multiple ratifications of international 
human rights treaties serve as an expedient policy tool either to signal a break from their 
repressive autocratic predecessors or to reassure citizens that their human rights protections are 
comparable to those of their democratic predecessors.  Committing to human rights treaties can 
communicate that their autocratic rule is “broad-based” while still actually benefiting only a 
small segment of ruling coalitions.  A new dataset I created on individual autocratic leaders’ 
ratification records of the seven core UN human rights treaties to test this theoretical expectation 
provides strongly supportive empirical evidence, which is robust to different model 
specifications, different estimations, and alternative explanations. 
Chapter 4 tests the empirical implications of Chapter 3 after carefully studying various 
optional monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of five core UN human rights treaties.  The 
empirical implication driven by the theoretical argument of Chapter 3 is that autocratic leaders 
with different support bases from their predecessors accept additional monitoring and/or 
enforcement procedures only when such deeper commitments are appealing to broader 
populations and when the procedures allow for substantial state control.  Based on the same 
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dataset used in Chapter 3, I estimate a series of the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models 
to account for the possible inter-dependence between autocratic decisions to ratify a given main 
treaty and decisions to accept extra monitoring/enforcement.  The findings are overall positive 
although the data suggest a more nuanced understanding of deeper autocratic commitments to 
the Convention against Torture.  
In Chapter 5, I address autocratic non-legal participation in international human rights 
institutions, with a special focus on the Universal Periodic Review.  After carefully examining 
the unique institutional design of the UPR’s Interactive Dialogue, I argue that autocratic states 
pursuing international reputations either on their own or in relation to a particular state under 
review issue more recommendations as well as more meaningful recommendations to peer states.  
I test this theoretical claim with a newly created directed-dyadic dataset, which extends the 
existing UPR-Info’s dataset on UPR recommendations (2014b).  The empirical findings are 
supportive and robust to different model specifications, alternative measures of dependent 
variables, and potential selection bias.  Personal interviews with state delegates across the world 
and human rights NGO staffs add illustrative supporting evidence to the main findings (January 
19-26, 2016). 
Chapter 6 explores the interaction between autocratic legal involvements with the core 
UN human rights treaties and their bureaucratic participations in the UPR as recommending 
states.  Based on the same dataset used in Chapter 5, I test whether autocratic states issue specific 
recommendations to peer states when ratifying a higher number of core human rights treaties and 
if so, how, with a series of simple logit estimations along with qualitative data gathered from my 
fieldwork in Geneva, Switzerland from January 17 to 28, 2016.  The results suggest that the UPR 
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is not a redundant human rights institution of the UN but rather an institution that reinforces the 
UN’s human rights standards.  
The last chapter concludes with a summary of the key findings of this dissertation and a 
discussion of its contributions to the broader literature on human rights institutions.  
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1.4 Appendix 
Table 1A.1. List of the United Nations Core Human Rights Instruments 
Title when open for signature 
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination 
December 21, 1965 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights December 16, 1966 
OP1 ICCPR Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
December 16, 1966 
OP2 ICCPR Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of 
the death penalty 
December 15, 1989 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
December 16, 1966 
OP ICESCR Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
December 10, 2008 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
December 18, 1979 
OP CEDAW Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
December 10, 1999 
CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
December 10, 1984 
OP CAT Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
December 18, 2002 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child November 20, 1989 
OP1 CRC Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the involvement of children in armed 
conflict 
May 25, 2000 
OP2 CRC Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and 
child pornography 
May 25, 2000 
OP3 CRC Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on a communication procedure 
February 28, 2012 
ICMWR International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families 
December 18, 1990 
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities December 13, 2006 
OP CRPD Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 
December 13, 2006 
ICED International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance  
December 20, 2006 
NOTE: United Nations Treaty Collection.  Database.  Accessed on May 4, 2016.  Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en.
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Autocratic Participation in the United Nations Human Rights Institutions 
 
 
 
 
Autocratic states’ behavioral patterns in the United Nations’ human rights institutions can be 
considered in terms of their means of participation: legal or non-legal.  Extant studies on 
autocratic participation in international human rights institutions have mostly focused on legal 
commitment to and compliance with human rights treaties (Conrad 2014; Hollyer and 
Rosendorff 2011, 2012; von Stein 2014; Vreeland 2008;), although a small number of 
researchers have started to pay attention to political activities as well (Lebovic and Voeten 
2006;McMahon 2012; Voeten 2000).  These include voting at the UN General Assembly for 
human rights resolutions, the former Commission on Human Rights, or the Human Rights 
Council, and issuing recommendations in the UN Universal Periodic Review.  This chapter will 
review both existing theoretical claims regarding how and why authoritarian governments 
participate in international human rights institutions the way they do and the major findings of 
corresponding studies.  I will follow this discussion with a brief survey of methodological 
progress on this topic, and I will conclude this chapter by discussing how my dissertation 
deepens our understandings of autocratic participation in international human rights institutions 
on both theoretical and methodological fronts.
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2.1. Autocratic Legal Participation4  
The current scholarship on autocratic ratification of the UN human rights treaties has 
demonstrated that autocrats seek the short-term benefits of treaty ratifications while 
underestimating their possible long-term unintended consequences.  These scholars claim that 
autocrats hope to enjoy the transitory rewards5 of HRA memberships but have no sincere intent 
to comply with terms of the treaties.  Early empirical findings show a disparity between 
repressive regimes’ rhetorical support for human rights norms through legal commitment to 
human rights treaties and their actual human rights practices (Cole 2012c; Conrad 2014; Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui 2005, 2007; Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui and Meyer 2008; Hathaway 2002, 2003, 
2007; Hill 2010 for the CAT and ICCPR; Keith 1999; Neumayer 2005; von Stein 2016).   
However, more recent studies highlight important nuances in this relationship conditional 
on domestic institutions such as democracy, judiciary, and/or civil society or on a leader’s job 
security (Cole 2013; Conrad and Ritter 2013; Landman 2005; Neumayer 2005; Powell and 
Staton 2009; Simmons 2009a).  Cole (2012b) also finds “unconditional” and “direct” positive 
effects of deeper commitments to human rights treaties by accepting extra monitoring from 
individuals or peer states on actual practices (see his empirical results especially for the CAT and 
ICCPR).  Cole (2012a) optimistically posits that treaty ratification has not only a direct long-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 In this dissertation, my focus on legal participation is limited to the acquisition of treaty memberships, 
including ratifying and accepting extra monitoring and enforcement from relevant treaty bodies by 
allowing individual complaints, inter-state complaints, inquiries, regular visits, and ICJ jurisdiction upon 
disputes.  However, please note that other avenues for legal participation in international human rights 
treaties exist.  Two examples worthy of future study include issuing objections to other states’ 
reservations (Hong 2015 working paper) and submitting periodic state reports to relevant treaty bodies 
(Creamer and Simmons 2015).  
5 See Nielsen and Simmons (2015) for their null empirical evidence of “reward-for-ratification thesis.” 
They could not find any increase in international aid, ratified preferential trade agreement, signed bilateral 
investment treaty, praise from the U.S., or decrease in Amnesty International’s criticism after human 
rights treaty ratifications. For the opposite result, please read Garriga (2016), Magesan (2013), and 
Schmaljohann (2013).   
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term positive effect on opportunistic ratifiers but also an indirect positive effect on non-ratifiers.  
Lupu (2013a) finds that the effectiveness of treaty ratification varies across types of specific 
rights depending on whether the evidence of abuse is easy to obtain and standards of proof are 
reasonably low.  He, thus, finds that the ICCPR has a positive effect on the improvement of civil 
rights protections but not on physical integrity rights protections.  Both Hill (2010) and Lupu 
(2013b) find that the CEDAW significantly improved women’s rights after addressing potential 
selection bias through matching techniques.  Unlike Hill (2010), however, Lupu (2013b) claims 
that the ICCPR and CAT have no impact on actual practices rather than worsening human rights.  
More importantly, Fariss (2014) finds that human rights practices have been indeed improved 
over time after correcting biased estimates of repression among the existing data.  Fariss (2014) 
identifies a positive relationship between CAT ratification and respect for human rights.6 
The reward-based theory of autocratic commitment is two-fold: ratification of human 
rights treaties would produce either international or domestic benefits (or both).  One strand of 
research holds that the benefits of human rights treaty membership come from outside the 
country.  Autocrats join human rights treaties to enjoy legitimacy, good reputation, or positional 
values in the international community (Cole 2009, 2012a; Goodman and Jinks 2013; Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2007; Heyns and Viljoen 2002; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
1999).7  For example, the Soviet Union ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR before participating in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 This null or negative impact of human rights treaty ratifications on the improvement in human rights 
practices might have been driven mostly by the “information paradox” (Clark and Sikkink 2013; Cole 
2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013; Goodman and Jinks 2003).  Ratification itself invites more monitoring 
from the media and/or enabled rights activists; thus, it is more likely to detect violations compared to ex-
ante ratification and frequently results in “spuriously inflated perceptions of abuse” (Cole 2012b).  In 
order to address this possible omitted variable bias, Cole factors freedom of the press into his studies on 
the compliance/effectiveness of human rights treaties (Cole 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013).    
7 Many transitional democracies tend to ratify human rights treaties as symbolic gestures to the 
international community that they are breaking from their authoritarian pasts (e.g. Brazil, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Romania, South Africa, and Spain. See Heyns and Viljoen 2002, p.9).  In comparison, Moravcsik 
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the European Conference on Security and Cooperation (Heyns and Viljoen 2002, 9).  This 
practice allows autocrats to avoid international scrutiny by hiding among other peer ratifiers 
(Simmons 2009a) and helps them avoid the cost of being left out as non-ratifiers when all other 
states acquire memberships (see the USSR for the CERD and CEDAW ratifications in Heyns 
and Viljoen 2002).  Alternatively, autocratic states may simply value conforming to what 
“modern” states are expected to behave as most developed countries do, not necessarily 
believing in human rights norms contained in international human rights treaties (Goodman and 
Jinks 2013).  Repressive autocrats use such ratification as the “legitimating cover”8 that helps 
them ward off international criticism while committing further human rights abuses (Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui 2005).   
Other researchers focus on the domestic benefits of treaty commitment.  They argue that 
autocrats seek memberships in international human rights treaties to appease domestic audiences 
and “temporarily” attenuate the pressure for real change (Moustafa 2003; Risse, Ropp, Sikkink 
19999; Vreeland 2008).  Thus, autocrats who need support from other domestic groups to survive 
in power tend to join international human rights treaties more than those who do not (von Stein 
2014; Vreeland 2008).  Multi-party autocracies are good examples (Vreeland 2008).  A power-
sharing opposition would be forward-looking, creating the expectation that human rights abuses 
would be attenuated after the ratification (Conrad 2014).  Autocrats who need to create and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(2000) argues that these transitional democracies (especially in the European context) do so in order to 
“lock-in” ongoing democratic reforms; thus, attaining memberships in international human rights treaties 
is more than cosmetic. 
8 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) reason that human rights treaty ratification alone gives legitimacy to 
oppressive states, making it difficult for critics to demand further actions beyond treaty ratification.  
Hence, oppressive human rights ratifiers tend to increase their repressive behaviors (p.1378) (See also 
Cole (2012c)’s summary on the “ratification-as-smokescreen argument”, p.541).   
9 Note that tactical concessions in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) differ from those in rational choice 
perspective. 
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maintain popularity to stay in power, such as personalist autocracies, are also good examples of 
human rights ratifiers (von Stein 2014).  On the other hand, the most repressive autocrats join 
human rights agreements in order to quiet potential domestic political opposition (Hollyer and 
Rosendorff 2011).  Such autocrats believe that they can signal their resolve to do anything 
necessary to stay in office to their domestic opposition by signing onto the HRA (especially, the 
CAT) and subsequently violating the treaty obligations.  
Smith-Cannoy (2012) rightfully stresses the interplay between international and domestic 
pressures when transitional10 states decide to join human rights treaties.  Leaders in politically 
and economically hard times need to address domestic dissatisfaction with the young regimes 
while answering demands for policy changes from potential Western donors, whose assistance 
can relieve economic hardships – and thereby political crises – at home. 
The reward-based commitment stories have been enriched when scholars take into 
account the cost side. Earlier studies on human rights treaty commitment rest on the premise that 
the costs of treaty commitment are distributed either uniformly or randomly (Hathaway 2002; 
Moravcsik 2000).  Recent works on treaty commitment and compliance posit more sophisticated 
assumptions about the costs (Cole 2009, 2012a; Conrad 2014; Goodliffe and Hawkins 200611; 
Hathaway 2003, 2007).  According to these more recent studies, there are two sources of 
commitment costs: 1) domestic accountability mechanisms, and 2) institutional designs for the 
monitoring and enforcement of treaties.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Smith-Cannoy (2012) looks into transitional states regardless of the direction of regime change.  Her 
samples are East European and Central Asian countries after the Cold War.  Please compare to Moravcsik 
(2000)’s focus on democratizing states.   
11 After releasing Moravcsik’s (2000) assumption on commitment costs uniformly distributed across 
states, Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006) found no ground for the lock-in theory of commitment to human 
rights agreements. 
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Considering the commitment costs arising from accountability mechanisms available in 
domestic political institutions, the costs of commitment to human rights treaties seem minimal, 
especially in autocracies (Hathaway 2002, 2003, 2007).  At first glance, repressive autocrats 
need to assume higher implementation costs to bring their extant human rights laws and practices 
into alignment with treaty requirements.  Absent effective judiciary, active civil societies, and/or 
free mass media within the territory, however, such autocrats face a low likelihood that their 
non-implementation or non-compliance would be caught and punished (Cole 2005; Hathaway 
2003, 2007; Powell and Staton 2009; Simmons 2009a).12  Repressive autocracies are therefore 
more likely to seek human rights treaty memberships since they have more to gain than to lose.  
Indeed, mounting empirical evidence shows that repressive autocrats are not less likely to join 
human rights treaties than rights-affirming democracies (Hathaway 2002, 2007; Hafner-Burton 
and Tsutsui 2007; Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, and Meyer 2008).  Conrad (2014) modifies this 
assertion by noting that not all autocrats are equally free of domestic accountability for human 
rights abuses.  She finds that multi-party autocrats with effective judiciaries are less likely to 
ratify the CAT than those with ineffective judiciaries.  
Besides, autocrats can partially control the costs of human rights treaty memberships by 
taking advantage of varying treaty designs.  Treaty commitment is not a simple binary choice of 
whether or not to join (Cole 2005, 2009, 2012b; Landman 2005).  Institutional designs of treaties 
allow states to select into the treaties with different levels of commitment: signing, ratifying with 
reservations (I will call reservations, understandings and declarations (RUDs)13 as reservations 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See Hafner-Burton (2005, 2009) for the effect of trade benefits on human rights performances and 
Hafner-Burton (2008) for the effect of naming and shaming. 
13 Legal controversies exist around the validity of reservations to multilateral human rights agreements.  
Although it is not a focus of this study, please see Bradley and Goldsmith (2000), Cole (2013), Landman 
(2005), Lijnzaad (1995), Parisi and Ševčenko (2003) and Swaine (2006) for further discussion on the 
matter. 
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hereinafter), ratifying without reservations, ratifying with extra monitoring and enforcement 
from individual petitions or peer state complaints (Cole 2009, 2012a, 2012b; Hill 2015; 
Landman 2005; Simmons 2009b).1415  
A few studies examine why repressive autocratic countries might choose to make even 
deeper commitments to these treaties (Cole 2009; Hill 2015; Landman 2005; Simmons 2009; 
Smith-Cannoy 2012).  Briefly, scholars have not reached a consensus regarding whether 
autocrats tend to avoid substantive treaty obligations by lodging reservations.  Nevertheless, they 
tend not to accept additional procedural monitoring from international bodies. 
The existing scholarship offers mixed empirical results regarding how repressive non-
democratic states enter reservations upon ratification. Some studies have revealed that repressive 
non-democratic states are less likely to attach reservations than rights-affirming liberal 
democracies (Goldsmith and Posner 2005; Neumayer 2007).  Autocrats would not bother to 
detail the conditions of their commitment – to ensure that their domestic laws and institutions 
conform to the terms of ratified treaties – when they do not intend to comply with the treaties 
anyway (Goodman 2002; Neumayer 2007).  Alternatively, authoritarian executives do not need 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) achieved almost universal ratification only in a 
decade but it is also the most heavily reserved (Neumayer 2007).  On the other hand, the anti-apartheid 
convention took three decades to recruit 101 ratifiers, but it is least reserved (Cole 2009, p.566).  See Cole 
(2009) for further illustration.    
15 The levels of internal monitoring and enforcement are different from treaty to treaty.  Even state self-
reporting, which has been considered a primary example of the “toothless” enforcement mechanisms of 
human rights treaties, is not equally designed across treaties. Some human rights treaties impose only 
routine self-reporting obligations on members (e.g. with 5-year-intervals in the ICESCR) whereas others 
delegate a treaty body to request such reports from members whenever it deems necessary (e.g. the 
Human Rights Committee of ICCPR) (Cole 2009, p.568).  In addition, among the many UN human rights 
agreements, mere nine (ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT, CEDAW, CRC, CERD, CRPD, CED, CMW) allow 
individual citizens to file human rights complaints in front of relevant treaty bodies only when a member 
state ratifies corresponding optional protocols or articles as of May 6, 2016 (OHCHR 2016b) 
(http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx).  See also the discussion 
of the unique strength of the Convention against Torture and the Convention against Enforced 
Disappearance with universal jurisdiction compared to all other human rights treaties, which lack such 
power in Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006), Hollyer and Rosendorff (2011), and von Stein (2014). 
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to use reservations to get around complicated domestic ratification processes, which often 
require the approval of other domestic actors, like legislatures (see Kearney and Powers [2011] 
for the positive relationship between reservations and veto players).16  Lastly, in repressive 
autocracies, extra costs from not respecting new legal human rights obligations are not incurred 
because these countries often lack effective domestic judiciaries to rule against the violating 
executives; thus, autocrats do not need to attach reservations (Hill 201517).  Conversely, 
Simmons (2009a) finds the opposite results: Democracies are less likely to enter reservations 
than non-democracies because the contents of human rights treaties that they ratify already 
reflect their preferences regarding human rights norms (pp.98-103).18  
Autocrats, however, would not expose themselves to extra international scrutiny arising 
from individual communication mechanisms under given treaties.  Democracies are found to be 
more likely than autocracies to join highly monitored treaties, like the Optional Protocol of 
ICCPR (Cole 2009).19  What is still inconclusive, however, is whether countries with a recent 
autocratic past (i.e. transitional democracies or transitional states) are more willing to accept 
additional monitoring.  Some studies (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Smith-Cannoy 2012) find 
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16 Landman (2005) and Simmons (2009a) also find that transitional democracies (especially in the fourth 
wave) tend to attach fewer RUDs to their commitments to human rights treaties than established 
democracies (Landman 2005; Simmons 2009a).  Similarly, Neumayer (2007) finds that liberal 
democracies lodge the most RUDs because they commit to only what they can sincerely live up to.  
17 Hill (2015) concludes that a state’s likelihood to enter reservations is determined not by regime type but 
by how much extant domestic laws need to be reformed in order to incorporate newly imposed 
international human rights obligations.  Again, this effect is conditional on the effectiveness of domestic 
judiciaries. 
18 With respect to the Laws of War, Morrow (2014) finds that reservations are “a signal by 
nondemocracies that they will not fully comply with the treaty. For democracies, on the other hand, 
reservations signal that they take the treaty seriously and lodge their reservation only to clarify the 
portions of the treaty with which they have a specific problem” (121). 
19 The number of individual petitions filed with the Human Rights Committee is likely to be lower in 
democracies than in autocracies (Cole 2006).  Many alternative domestic remedies to redress citizens’ 
grievances are ready and effective in democracies whereas seeking a treaty monitoring body’s view 
confirming that a state is in violation can often be the only available means for repressed individuals in 
autocracies (Cole 2006; Smith-Cannoy 2012).  
! 27!
that transitional states welcome more intrusive international treaties while other studies find the 
opposite (Cole 2005, 2009).  The former rests on the logic that a deeper commitment to human 
rights treaties serves as a costly signal to targeted audiences (e.g. either domestic oppositions, 
international donors, or both), lending these states additional international legitimacy or 
credibility and allowing them to enact desired domestic political or economic reforms (Landman 
2005; Moravcsik 2000; Smith-Cannoy 2012).  Domestic accountability mechanisms are still very 
young and shaky in these transitional states; thus, their international commitments communicate 
their intentions to carry out policy reforms more credibly to the relevant audiences.  The latter 
challenges such a theoretical claim by demonstrating that newly democratic states are indeed 
more willing to commit to human rights treaties but not with extra monitoring obligations (See 
Cole (2005, 2009) for the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR).  They explain that 
democratizing states avoid more intrusive human rights treaties because the anticipated number 
of complaints filed by newly empowered but dissatisfied citizens is too high, given the 
environment of violent political upheaval.  
Such reward-seeking cynical autocratic ratifiers are shortsighted (Conrad 2014; Simmons 
2009a).  The benefits of making cosmetic gestures toward human rights without backing them up 
with actual human rights improvements are “ephemeral” at best (Cole 2009, p.570).  
Disingenuous ratifiers’ credibility would be challenged, and they would eventually be worse off 
than before ratification (Cole 2009, p.570).  Legacy ratifications can be a good example in this 
case (Simmons 2009a).  Leaders ratify HRAs late in their tenure, so they can enjoy all the 
nominal benefits of treaty memberships before handing over the burdens of actual 
implementation and the costs of non-compliance to their successors.  Autocrats who feel 
seriously threatened by power-sharing oppositions in the short-run under the shadow of future 
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legal adjudication from effective judiciaries adopt this strategy (Conrad 2014).  The benefits of 
dealing with threatening oppositions today through ratification, while continuing torture and 
other human rights abuses, overshadow the expected costs of being held accountable by 
independent judiciaries tomorrow. 
In sum, repressive autocrats join human rights treaties only when the benefits of 
membership outweigh the expected costs of commitment.  They attempt to give an impression 
(perhaps, in the short run) that they support the human rights norms wholeheartedly by not 
qualifying the substantive conditions of their treaty commitments and thus making the most out 
of their cosmetic gesture.  Simultaneously, they tend to minimize the costs if they can by 
refusing to embrace extra monitoring from third parties.  
Two methodological innovations were made in this field over the past years from a 
quantitative angle.20 First, scholars have started to take endogeneity problems seriously.  One 
possibility is that rights-affirming (or rights-abusing) states are more likely to join human rights 
treaties in the first place (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996; von Stein 2005).  Without 
addressing this possible selection bias, the estimated effects on treaty commitment can be biased 
upward (see Landman 2005) or downward (see Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Hathaway 2007; 
Vreeland 2008).  In fact, Hathaway (2002, 2003, 2007) finds that liberal democracies with better 
human rights records are often strong supporters of human rights treaties.  Among autocracies, 
more oppressive regimes tend to find human rights treaty memberships more attractive than their 
less oppressive counterparts (Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; Vreeland 2008).  Unlike the early 
quantitative works on states’ commitments to human rights treaties (Goodliffe and Hawkins 
2006; Hathaway 2002, 2003, 2007; Keith 1999), recent researchers use various estimation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Please see the state-of-the art research in compliance with human rights treaties (Fariss 2014; Lupu 
2013a, 2013b). 
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techniques, which include Heckman’s two-way (or three-way) selection models (Hill 2015), 
matching methods (Hill 2010; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011) and an instrumental variables 
approach (Cole’s works; Landman 2005; Simmons 2009a) to take care of this potential selection 
bias.   
Second, scholars have started to pay more attention to the measurement of treaty 
commitment.  Treaty commitment has long been treated as a simple binary choice: join or not 
join (Hathaway 2002, 2003, 2007).  Recent scholarly works reflect the fact that states’ 
commitments to human rights treaties legally differ depending on in what mode they join the 
treaties and under what conditions (Hill 2015; Landman 2005; Neumayer 2007; Simmons 
2009a). Specifically, states can join the treaties by signing (with or without reservations), 
ratifying (with or without ratification), ratifying with extra monitoring of individual and/or state 
complaints mechanisms or inquiry from a given treaty body, or ratifying with extra enforcement 
under ICJ jurisdiction.  Extant literature has yet to consider ratifications with inquiry processes 
and ratification with accepted ICJ jurisdiction.  Without taking into account how states have 
qualified their commitment through lodging reservations and how states have added depth to 
their commitment through accepting extra monitoring and enforcement, we may over/under-
estimate the effects of treaty ratifications on the improvement of human rights practices.  We 
may also miss more nuanced reasons to join human rights treaties if we fail to differentiate 
among modes of commitment.  
On a related note, scholars have only recently started to pay attention to the design 
characteristics inherent in human rights treaties themselves when answering questions regarding 
commitments.  Von Stein (2014) has noted that a majority of human rights treaties are soft and 
toothless while most quantitative results (Conrad 2014; Conrad and Ritter 2013; Goodliffe and 
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Hawkins 2006; Hill 2010; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; Lupu 2013a, 2013b; Powell and Staton 
2009; Vreeland 2008) are driven by relatively harder treaties like the ICCPR and/or CAT. 
Therefore, the inference we have taken from them may not be representative of states’ 
commitments to human rights treaties in general. 
 
2.2. Autocratic Non-legal Participation  
Besides committing to human rights treaties, autocrats participate in international human rights 
institutions by casting votes in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) for human rights resolutions, 
the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), and the UN Human Rights Council and also 
by issuing recommendations in the UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR).  Scholars have only 
recently started to pay attention to this aspect of state participation in international human rights 
institutions. Accounts of autocratic non-legal participation in these institutions are still lacking to 
date.  Given the exclusive focus of my dissertation on the UPR, I will devote substantial space in 
this section to a survey of extant studies on how and why states, especially authoritarian 
recommending states, that are often associated with the worst human rights violations (Hathaway 
2002, 2007; Vreeland 2008; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011), utilize the UPR. 
 A vast majority of studies on states’ non-legal participation in human rights institutions 
rest on roll-call voting behavior (Lebovic and Voeten 2006; Voeten 2000).  The West vs. non-
West line has been proven a key predictor of states’ voting behavior over time and across issues 
in UNGA (Voeten 2000).  When it comes to UNGA resolutions on issues involving liberal 
principles like human rights, democratic polity stands out as a key predictor of whether states 
vote in alignment (Voeten 2000).  Lebovic and Voeten (2006)’s work on UNCHR reveals further 
determinants of a state’s voting to condemn other states’ human rights abuses.  In particular, a 
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target state’s good human rights records as well as the mutual ratification status of a human 
rights treaty (i.e., ICCPR) between the target and the voter state set a high standard for the target 
to avoid shaming from the UNCHR.  In contrast, the target’s capability, its UNCHR member 
status, similarities in foreign policy positions between the target and voter states measured by the 
S-score and military alliance, their regional affinity, and domestic regime type convergence (e.g. 
the Left-Left regimes or the Right-Right regimes only during the Cold War) shield the target 
country from the public shaming of UNCHR. 
 The UPR was added to existing UN human rights monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms in 2007.  Due to its young age, few studies on this new human rights institution 
exist.  Specifically, scholars have identified four behavioral patterns when states issue 
recommendations in the first cycle of the UPR’s interactive dialogue.  First, states recommend in 
alignment with their regional and/or political groups.  The African Group, the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the Like Minded Countries 
(LMC) are regional and/or political allies that act as one body to exert greater influence in the 
UPR as well as in other UN organizations such as the former UN Commission on Human Rights 
(Abebe 2009; Dominguez-Redondo 2012; Freedman 2011; McMahon 2012, 7).  
Such politically allied states usually take the floor to praise the state under review when 
that state comes from the same region or group (Abebe 2009, 19; Freedman 2011, 306-7; 
McMahon 2012, 17).  Abebe illustrates this pattern with the example of the Tunisian review, in 
which fifty out of sixty-five statements were positive, and these reviews came mostly from 
African and Middle Eastern states (2009, 20).  Reviews of China and Cuba also demonstrate this 
pattern of political allies trying to protect each other from criticism (Freedman 2011).  “Sudan 
sought to justify China’s re-education through labour sanction by emphasizing its roots to 
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Chinese culture, its legal basis and its role in long-term rehabilitation.  Iran encouraged China to 
strengthen its Internet censorship, arguing that the negative impact of the Internet can never be 
underestimated” (Freedman 2011, 308).  This tactic leaves little time for the rest of the world to 
make recommendations due to pre-allocated time restrictions for the question and comment 
session.  More importantly, this tactic may give a wrong impression to the world that there are 
few things to criticize about the state under review’s current human rights practices (Freedman 
2011, 306-7).  Each recommending state repeats the group’s statement, creating yet another 
wrong impression that such positive perceptions of the reviewed state’s human rights situation 
are widely shared among many states (Freedman 2011, 306-7). 
Next, scholars often use power asymmetry to explain why weaker states are inactive 
compared with stronger states in the UPR.  Weaker states are less likely to issue 
recommendations to more powerful states from other regions either because they lack interest in 
other regions and/or they do not wish to offend more powerful counterparts (Freedman 2011, 
307; McMahon 2012, 17).  For example, in the Chinese review, only Western countries 
attempted to shine a spotlight on Chinese human rights violations (Freedman 2011, 308).  
Similarly, McMahon interviewed an African diplomat who said that “he would think twice 
before producing a criticism of Western states who are donors, such as the U.S. and the U.K.” 
(2012, 16).  
Third, the North-South dynamic generates different recommendations.  Developing 
states’ recommendations are either too general to fulfill or concern a need for technical 
assistance and/or capacity building to implement recommendations, whereas recommendations 
from developed countries are more likely to level specific criticisms or require specific policy 
changes (Abebe 2009, 16 and 21; Freedman 2011, 311).  Many African countries with poor 
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economic conditions and thereby no diplomatic representation in Geneva find it difficult to 
actively participate in the UPR Working Groups, which are held three times a year (Abebe 2009, 
22; McMahon 2012, 17).  
Last, recommendations differ across recommending states’ regime types. Autocracies 
tend to make weaker recommendations than democracies irrespective of their regional groupings 
(McMahon 2012, 22-3).  In contrast, these autocratic states tend to make stronger, action-
oriented recommendations compared to transitional states (McMahon 2012, 22-3). 
Despite much interesting descriptive information, little scholarly attention has been paid 
to what leads autocratic states to make substantively critical recommendations regarding their 
fellow states’ human rights situations.  As discussed in Chapter 1, not all autocrats uniformly 
view the UPR as “a mutual admiration society” where they simply conduct “back patting and 
mutual congratulation” among themselves to solicit friendly comments from their allies in a hope 
of enjoying reciprocal treatment when their turn comes up (Abebe 2009, 34).  “Angola and 
Zambia raised questions about the restrictions on freedom of expression in Tunisia.  The 
Democratic Republic of Congo criticized the report of Gabon for lack of information on people 
living with HIV/AIDS and requested additional information on the situation of minorities such as 
pygmies in the country” (Abebe 2009, 20-1).  We still need an explanation of why some human 
rights abusing autocratic states participate more actively than other human rights abusing 
autocracies in the UPR, and why some autocracies launch certain types of recommendations to 
certain types of states under review.   
Most analyses on how states utilize it are geared towards qualitative methods based on a 
few close anecdotal observations (Abebe 2009; Blackburn 2011; Cochrane and McNeilly 2013; 
Dominguez-Redondo 2012; Freedman 2011; Gaer 2007; Smith 2011, 2013; Sweeney and Saito 
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2009).  Relevant quantitative studies are still in early assessment using mostly descriptive 
analytical tools (McMahon 2010, 2012, 2013; Milewicz and Goodin 2016).  While recognizing 
the importance of rich historical analyses, we still need a systematic analysis to understand why 
human rights abusing states participate in the UPR in the way they do.  Without addressing the 
underlying causes of their current patterns of participation, it is easy to under- or over-estimate 
the effectiveness of the UPR itself (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; von Stein 2005).  
 
2.3. Contributions of the Dissertation 
My dissertation builds on the aforementioned current scholarship and offers new theoretical 
arguments with rigorous empirical approaches in the following chapters.    
 My dissertation relates to existing domestic accounts of autocratic commitments to 
human rights treaties (Conrad 2014; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; von Stein 2014; Vreeland 
2008) and introduces several new approaches and findings.  First, taking seriously the empirical 
pattern that multiple ratifications of human rights treaties often occur under a particular 
autocratic leader within one country, I focus on political circumstances that autocrats themselves 
personally and individually need to deal with rather than different institutional characteristics 
across autocratic states.   
Second, my dissertation incorporates one of the two important mainstream explanations 
of authoritarian politics in comparative politics literature, left somewhat untouched by existing 
literature on autocratic commitments to human rights treaties.  Existing literature on autocratic 
commitments (Conrad 2014; Vreeland 2008) builds on the autocratic account of making policy 
concessions in order to coopt the opposition (Gandhi and Przeworksi 2007).  Differently, this 
dissertation proposes that the underlying motivation of autocratic ratifiers of human rights 
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treaties lies in the strategic power-sharing relationships between autocratic leaders and members 
of their ruling coalitions (Boix and Svolik 2013; Brownlee 2007; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; 
Geddes 1999, 2003; Magaloni 2006, 2008; Svolik 2012a).  This approach connects autocratic 
human rights literature with other vast and serious studies of authoritarian politics in comparative 
politics literature. 
Third, my dissertation advances the current understanding of treaty ratifications by taking 
into account the complex motivations and mechanisms that inform autocratic decisions to ratify 
(Cole 2009; Landman 2005; Simmons 2009a).  Contributing to recent empirical human rights 
research on reservations (Hill 2015; Koremenos 2016) and individual complaints (Cole 2006; 
Smith-Cannoy 2012), this dissertation suggests additional means through which states can tailor 
their level of treaty commitments, including the optional acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction, 
individual complaints, inter-state complaints, inquiries, and regular visits.  As I discussed earlier, 
not all members of human rights treaties bear the same weight of treaty obligations.  This study 
will be the first to theoretically explain why some authoritarian leaders are willing to bear more 
obligations than their authoritarian peers.  Unlike current studies that examine options available 
for adjusting human rights treaty commitments (Hill 2015; Smith-Cannoy 2012), my dissertation 
aims to theoretically link the two inter-dependent decisions of main treaty commitments and the 
corresponding optional acceptance of extra monitoring/enforcement procedures.   
Fourth, my dissertation expands scholarly attentions to human rights institutions beyond 
the human rights treaty systems, which have largely been the focus of existing studies.  
International pressures or socializations are not limited to human rights treaty systems.  Other 
human rights institutions, such as the UN Human Rights Council and its Universal Periodic 
Review, are equally important venues where states interact, both cooperating and pressuring each 
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other for changes in human rights policies and practices.  This dissertation joins a small number 
of studies in providing a first systematic analysis of autocratic states’ involvements in human 
rights institutions other than treaties (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 2009; Lupu and Voeten 2011; 
Voeten 2013). 
Last, my dissertation explores one of the many possible unintended consequences of 
countries’ legal commitment to global human rights treaties in the context of the UN Universal 
Periodic Review.  Although a state’s human rights policies are formulated in overlapping human 
rights institutions, either domestic, regional, or global, studies on human rights institutions do not 
take this complex state of human rights institutions seriously.  This study proposes an initial 
examination of the interaction between two international human rights institutions and suggests 
that multiple overlapping human rights institutions are not redundant but complementary in 
reinforcing human rights standards. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Autocrats with New Support Coalitions and  
Multiple Ratifications of Human Rights Treaties 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Yoweri Museveni seized power in 1986 as a result of the Ugandan Bush Wars against the 
draconian Obote and Idi Amin regimes (Tripp 2010).  Among his many liberalization policies, he 
ratified all five available core UN human rights treaties during his tenure:21  the Convention 
against Torture in 1986; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
1987; the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990; the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights in 1995 (UNTS 2016).  
Museveni, who transitioned with a political and social support base distinct from that of his 
autocratic predecessor, pursued liberalization policies as a means of differentiating himself from 
the ruthless former leaders and thus appealed to the broader populations (Lindemann 2011; 
Oloka-Onyango 2016; Tripp 2010).  “Broad-based” and “anti-sectarian” governance have been 
the main tenets of government during his thirty-year reign though he continuously favors the 
particular ethnic and geographic segments of the society that comprise the de facto support base 
of his own ruling coalitions.  The threat of violence always looms in the background.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Ratifications of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
as well as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women occurred in 
1980 and 1985 during the second term of Milton Obote, who was elected as a president.  
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This Chapter explores autocratic horizontal commitment to human rights treaties that 
engage substantively diverse issues by asking the following questions.  Why do some autocratic 
countries legally commit to human rights treaties?  Why do some autocratic leaders ratify 
multiple human rights agreements concurrently?  And why do numerous ratifications of human 
rights treaties concerning diverse human rights issues take place during particular leader tenure 
within non-democracies?  Answering this set of questions on autocratic ratifications of human 
rights treaties, I build on recent studies in comparative politics literature on commitment and 
information problems inherent in power-sharing relations between autocratic leaders and 
members of their ruling coalitions (Boix and Svolik 2013; Brownlee 2007; Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2003; Geddes 1999, 2003; Magaloni 2006, 2008; Svolik 2009, 2012a).  Specifically, I argue 
that an autocrat with different domestic support coalitions from those of his or her predecessor 
pursues ratifications of multiple human rights treaties, either concurrently or over the course of 
his or her tenure, to win popular support that is needed for him or her to deter potential 
challenges from new regime insiders.  With a newly collected dataset on individual autocratic 
leaders’ ratifications of seven core UN human rights treaties from 1966 to 2008, I find strong 
supportive empirical evidence, which is robust to different model specifications, estimations, and 
alternative explanations.    
 
3.2 Crafting a Domestic Reputation on Broad-based Governance through Multiple 
Ratifications of Human Rights Treaties 
 
The primary political goal of autocratic leaders is to remain in office at all costs (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003; Wintrobe 1998) because the consequences of losing office are personal and 
harsh (Debs and Goemans 2010; Goemans 2000, 2008).  Fallen autocrats are often subject to 
imprisonment, exile, and death (Debs and Goemans 2010; Goemans 2000, 2008).  Most threats 
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to autocratic leaders come from regime insiders, followed by popular uprisings (Svolik 2012a).  
Thus, the primary factor related to an autocrat’s job security22 is the status of his relationship 
with both the ruling coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Svolik 2012a) and the masses 
(Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2015a; Svolik 2012a).   
 A significant number of important studies in authoritarian politics examine the 
difficulties inherent in power-sharing situations between an autocrat and the ruling coalition 
(Geddes 2008; Magaloni 2006, 2008; Myerson 2008; Svolik 2009, 2012a; Boix and Svolik 
2013).  Due to resource constraints, an autocrat cannot govern without the support of political 
elites.  However, the political allies may struggle to hold the autocrat accountable for honoring 
power-sharing agreements once the autocrat comes into power, as authoritarian governance is 
based on unconstrained violence and non-transparency (Boix and Svolik 2013).  In other words, 
commitment problems are exacerbated by information asymmetry between an autocrat and his 
ruling coalitions.  Once in office, an autocrat has incentives to exploit his power, not distributing 
spoils as promised either by misrepresenting the prize itself or manipulating its distribution.  
Political allies possess limited tools for knowing exactly what the autocrat is doing.  Therefore, a 
power-sharing agreement is possible only when the ruling coalitions can credibly threaten coups 
when an authoritarian leader either fails or is perceived to fail to comply. 
 It is impossible for the autocrat to know exactly whether his political allies are content 
with the current distribution of power and spoils and if not, what his political allies are up to, 
either.  To facilitate power-sharing situations, autocrats usually rely on a combination of 
repression and concessions (Wintrobe 1998).  Under the shadow of violence, he may set up 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 A number of scholars aim to measure autocrats’ sense of job security, based on the leader’s time in 
office, previous trends in leadership change, and annual economic growth. (Cheibub 1998; Conrad and 
Ritter 2013).  Others directly estimate coup risk by accounting for the immediate and structural causes of 
coup attempts (Kim 2012 and compare to Belkin and Schofer 2003).  
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various authoritarian institutions, such as legislatures (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Wright 
2008), political parties (Brownlee 2007; Geddes 2008; Magaloni 2006), or elections (Blaydes 
2011; Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010), either to resolve commitment and information problems 
(Boix and Svolik 2013; Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999, 2003; Magaloni 2006, 2008) or to co-opt 
possible dissidents into the regime (Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006).   
His management of cooperative relationships with his allies also depends on his 
maintaining popular support among the masses.  Regime insiders are less likely to plot 
challenges to an autocrat’s authority in the absence of public manifestations of popular 
discontent due to severe coordination problems (Casper and Tyson 2014; Galetovic and 
Sanhueza 2000; Powell 2012; Thyne 2010).  Popular protests or a failure to achieve a landslide 
electoral victory provide a focal point for political elites to overcome the coordination problem 
when contemplating a coup in two ways.  First, such events supply observable information about 
the autocrat’s degree of popular approval or legitimacy (Magaloni 2006).  Second, they provide a 
measure of the autocrat’s capacity to survive domestic tensions (Casper and Tyson 2014, 548).   
 Given the aforementioned strategic interactions among an autocrat, his political allies, 
and the masses, I expect that autocrats who suffer greater commitment and information problems 
with respect to their ruling coalitions seek out policy concessions to win popular support that is 
needed for him to deter potential challenges from members of his regime insiders.  The degree of 
commitment problems and information asymmetry between an autocrat and his political elites is 
partly determined by whether an autocrat inherits the domestic support base of the outgoing 
leader.   
First, autocrats who came into power with support from the ruling coalition shared with 
their predecessors encounter relatively lower commitment and information problems than 
! 41!
autocrats with new domestic support bases.  Their selection as leader was based on the consensus 
of the contiguous ruling coalitions through a pre-embraced organizational means for selection.  
The distributions of power and spoils are anticipated in the context of existing authoritarian 
institutions by members of continuous ruling elites.  Autocrats enjoy stable institutional and 
personal support grounds, including the dominant party, military, clique, and dynasty.  These 
autocrats are more knowledgeable about potential challengers and better equipped with pre-
existing institutional tools to threaten or appease potential coup plotters (Kono 2015).  Thus, both 
autocrats’ power and allies’ satisfaction with the status quo are more easily checked and 
managed through already agreed upon institutional arrangements, such as parties, legislatures, 
elections, military or familial rules.  Autocrats with uninterrupted support bases do not need to 
win over the general populace in order to deter possible challenges from within ruling coalition.  
In sum, autocrats with the inherited support coalition have little incentive to make policy 
concessions to the general populations. 
 These leaders are new successive autocrats without regime changes in single party 
systems, as in Singapore from 1946 to 2008 (Mattes et al. 2015, 285).  New military leaders who 
come to power without systemic regime changes, such as Bouteflika succeeding Zéroual in 
Algeria, also belong to this type (2015, 285).  Predesignated successors by outgoing leaders in 
personalist regimes also face less strategic problems in power-sharing situations.  For example, 
Joseph Kabila relied on his father Laurent Kabila’s ruling coalition in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo despite Laurent’s assassination (2015, 285).  Last, hereditary successors in monarchies, 
such as Abdullah, the half-brother of the previous leader, Fahd, in Saudi Arabia, are another 
example of this type of autocrat (2015, 285).   
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 Conversely, an autocrat with a new domestic support base needs to deal with greater 
commitment and information problems with respect to regime insiders, yielding more job 
insecurity.  Autocrats whose transitions accompanied changes in the dominant party in single 
party autocracies, new military leaders following regime changes in military autocracies, non-
predesignated personalist successors, and new rulers with changes in dynasties all represent this 
type of autocrat (Mattes et al. 2015, 285).  These autocrats are highly uncertain about the 
political aspirations of not only their potential challengers but also their loyal supporters (Kono 
2015).  These autocrats are not prepared with the institutionalized political and economic tools to 
effectively threaten or appease potential coup plotters but must start from scratch to diffuse 
political elites’ suspicions and demonstrate their willingness and capability to carry out the 
power-sharing agreements once in office.  Without enough information about these autocrats’ 
capacity to withhold potential challenges, new political elites have more incentives to issue 
challenges if they perceive the autocrats as failing to distribute political power and benefits as 
promised.   
Such autocrats must shape and consolidate political and institutional arrangements to 
alleviate the commitment problems between themselves and new ruling coalitions.  At the same 
time, these authoritarian leaders aim to establish a relationship with the masses to manage 
possible challenges from them, which can, in turn, trigger the defection of members of ruling 
coalitions.  Changes in ruling coalitions that autocrats rely on to stay in power mean that such 
autocrats’ policy preferences differ from those of outgoing leaders (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003).  Thus, they seek to publicly demonstrate that such differences are driven by their care for 
the masses even while still favoring specific segments of the societies (Tripp 2010).  In 
particular, autocratic leaders want to either differentiate themselves from repressive former 
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autocratic rulers or reassure the citizens in their effective inclusive governance compared to 
incompetent former democratic rulers.  To do so, they employ a series of symbolic liberalization 
policies, such as holding elections and other political openings (Tripp 2010, 26) or reducing food 
and oil prices (Chow and Kono 2014) to improve general welfare, mitigate social unrest, and 
preempt coups.   
Seeking out memberships in multiple human rights treaties is another way for such 
autocrats to buy out the masses by shaping an image of themselves as benevolent23 leaders.  The 
principle beneficiaries of autocrats’ commitment to international human rights treaties are 
individual rights holders: general citizens.  If the previous regime was also autocratic, the general 
public is often weary of repressive governance.  Human rights concerns can be a primary focus 
of mass dissatisfaction with the previous regimes, ultimately paving the road for leadership 
transitions (e.g. the 1986 Museveni’s transition from Obote in Uganda).  If transitioning from 
previous incompetent democratic rulers, incoming autocrats need to establish their legitimacy by 
assuring the general public about their human rights policy intentions (e.g. the 2000 Gustavo 
Noboa’s transition from Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador).  In either case, transitioned autocrats with 
new domestic support coalitions have incentives to pursue proactive human rights policies. 
While myopic autocratic leaders underestimate the consequences of making such legal 
commitments (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Simmons 2009a), general public rally behind the 
seemingly symbolic act of ratifying human rights treaties (Vreeland 2008) despite the fact that 
ratification alone does not guarantee compliance.  First, people can look to international 
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23 In economic terms, “benevolent dictators” are often referred to as those who are interested in long-term 
economic growth. August Pinochet in Chile, Park Chung-Hee in South Korea, and Deng Xiaoping in 
China are examples (Gilson and Milhaupt 2011). However, these economically benevolent autocrats are 
ruthless enough in other dimensions, such as human rights. Therefore, in this study, I use this term in a 
broader sense to refer to autocrats who appear to be responsive to the interests of the general public.   
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institutions as alternative mechanisms to hold autocrats accountable for non-compliance or non-
implementation as working domestic accountability mechanisms are absent in authoritarian 
countries (Fang and Owen 2011; Smith-Cannoy 2012).  Second, people anticipate that treaty 
ratifications may bring about, in the long-run, unintended consequences, empowering rights 
holders and activists and enabling litigations (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Simmons 2009a).  
Last, the masses may welcome the leaders’ decision to ratify because it suggest that their states 
are moving in the right direction (Hawkins 2002; Vreeland 2008) or satisfied that their countries 
are taking an active role tantamount to other major countries in the international arena (Goodman 
and Jinks 2013).   
At the same time, the risk of being caught violating of human rights treaty obligations 
later in time is of little concern to these autocrats at the moment.  Domestically, opacity in 
government-controlled media and civil societies severely limits citizens’ ability to acquire clear 
information about leaders’ international treaty violations (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland 
2015a).  Autocratic leaders have a disincentive to disclose such information to the general public 
(Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland 2015b).  Internationally, human rights treaties themselves are 
mostly “soft” in terms of consequences of violations (von Stein 2014).  Indeed, more human 
rights violations occur in Uganda and Kenya after ratifying human rights treaties (Goldsmith and 
Posner 2005, 123; also see Schmitz 1999). 
Therefore, acquiring membership in international human rights treaties offers autocrats 
with new domestic support bases an expedient opportunity to publicly communicate their 
willingness to make concessions to the masses through breaking with past rulers.  Simultaneous 
ratifications or multiple ratifications of more international human rights treaties, thus, send a 
stronger signal than one ratification of a single human rights agreement.  Eventually, the 
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appearance of such benevolence will also deter allies’ potential challenges because the threat of 
coups in the absence of public manifestations of popular disenchantment with the government 
seem hollow. 
The aforementioned theoretical discussion generates the following two hypotheses:  
H3-1: Autocrats transitioned with new domestic support coalitions are likely to 
ratify a greater number of human rights treaties in a given year than those 
without changes in domestic support coalitions.  
 
H3-2: Autocrats transitioned with new domestic support coalitions are likely to 
ratify a greater number of human rights treaties during tenure than those 
without changes in domestic support coalitions. 
 
 
If the aforementioned theoretical claim is correct, the question remains: When, during his 
tenure, will such an autocrat ratify multiple human rights treaties, either concurrently or over 
time?  I argue that the autocrats ratify multiple human rights treaties, either simultaneously or 
not, only after the initial years of power struggle.  Authoritarian leaders are particularly sensitive 
to potential challenge from regime insiders, opposition groups, or the masses in their initial years 
because leadership change in authoritarian regimes creates a high level of uncertainty, 
disagreement over power distribution among the ruling elites, and a possible power vacuum 
(Brownlee 2007).  Regardless of changes in domestic support coalitions, all new autocrats face 
more threats to their rule during the first a few years than subsequently (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith 2010, p.938; Brownlee 2007, p.597).  Autocrats whose primary concern is to stay in power 
at all costs are not likely to view human rights treaty ratification as an attractive policy tool 
during this time.  Instead, such leaders often rely on ruthless repression to achieve this goal.  
However, as the initial risk declines over time (Flores and Smith 2012, p.22; Licht 2010, pp. 67-
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8; Svolik 2009, p.491), some autocrats begin to see human rights treaty membership as beneficial 
to their political survival at home.  This leads to the last hypothesis:  
H3-1a: Autocrats transitioned with new domestic support coalitions are likely to 
ratify a greater number of human rights treaties only after the initial years 
in power. 
 
3.3 Research Design 
Data 
Combining “Leader and Ruling Coalition Dataset” (Svolik 2012b) with “Change in Source of 
Leader Support” (CHISOLS, hereinafter) dataset (Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura Forthcoming), 
I create a new complete dataset on ratification records of seven of the nine core United Nations 
human rights treaties by 432 autocratic leaders from 121 countries, spanning the years 1966 to 
2008.24  The seven core UN human rights treaties include the 1966 International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of the Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMWR).  I exclude the remaining two 
core UN human rights treaties, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (ICED), from empirical analyses due to their limited time coverage.  The CRPD 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 This is the first year when at least one of the agreements under study is open for signature. The ICERD, 
the ICCPR, and the ICESCR all opened for signature in 1966.   
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and ICED were open for signature in December 13 and 20, 2006, respectively, while my dataset 
ends at 2008.  Table 1A.1 in Appendix at the end of Chapter 1 displays a complete list of the 
nine core UN human rights instruments.  
 Given that the theoretical focus of this study is individual autocrats rather than autocratic 
countries, an autocrat enters into the dataset when a first human rights treaty in my dataset opens 
up for signature25 – 1966, here – or when he starts his tenure, whichever comes earlier.  An 
autocrat exits the year after the ratification of the last available human rights treaties among 
seven for a given country or the year his tenure is over, whichever occurs earlier.  Therefore, an 
autocrat who inherits the treaty ratification status of seven human rights treaties from his 
autocratic or democratic predecessors is dropped from the analysis because I am interested in an 
autocrat’s own decision to ratify, not his inherited status of ratification.  For example, in 
Morocco, the moderately liberal Mohammed VI succeeded his father Hassan II in 1999 and 
inherited his repressive father’s seven ratifications of core human rights treaties.  He is dropped 
from the analysis because no additional human rights treaties were available for him to ratify.  
On the other hand, Ben Ali came to power following a coup in Tunisia in 1987 and inherited four 
ratifications of the ICERD, ICCPR, ICESCR, and CEDAW from the authoritarian regime of 
Habib Bourguiba, which was pro-women’s rights. He stays in the analysis for the possible 
ratification of the three remaining treaties, and he indeed ratified the CAT and CRC during his 
tenure.  The units of analysis are a country-year for the time series and cross-sectional analyses 
as well as a leader for cross-sectional analysis in this chapter.  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Although the ICERD had been open for signature on December 21, 1965, there is no country that 
ratified in 1965.  Thus, I treat the year 1966 as the year when the first set of treaties, the ICERD, ICCPR, 
and ICESCR, in my dataset was open for signature.  
! 48!
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is a count of ratification incidence of the seven human rights agreements 
in a given year.  This ranges from 0 (no ratification) to 7 (ratification of all seven treaties).  This 
dependent variable enables me to examine why an autocrat ratifies multiple human rights 
agreements simultaneously in a given year as well as why autocrats ratify multiple human rights 
treaties during their tenure.  For the analysis of the latter question, this yearly count dependent 
variable is collapsed by an individual autocrat to represent the maximum count of ratified human 
rights agreements during an autocrat’s tenure.  This modified count dependent variable also 
ranges from 0 (none) to 7 (ratifications of all seven treaties).  Ratification information was drawn 
from the United Nations Treaty Series Online Collection database (UNTS 2016).     
 
Independent Variable 
The main independent variable is a Change in Leader Support Coalition from that of Predecessor 
(SOLS Change) drawn from the CHISOLS data (Mattes et al. Forthcoming).  This variable 
captures whether an autocrat has a political and societal support base enabling him to achieve 
and retain, distinct from his predecessor.   This binary variable is coded 1 for an autocrat with a 
different leader support coalition than his predecessor, and zero otherwise.  Among 432 autocrats 
in the dataset, 41% involve SOLS change while 59% do not.  This distribution of SOLS changes 
is largely consistent with that of the complete sample of leadership changes in autocracies in the 
original CHISOLS data where 45% are associated with SOLS changes and 55% are not (Mattes 
et al. Forthcoming, 286). 
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Control Variables 
I include a battery of control variables, which have been associated with human rights treaty 
commitment in previous studies.  I expect these variables to be associated with multiple human 
rights treaty ratifications. 
 First of all, I expect that autocrats ratify fewer human rights treaties when fewer are 
available.  Thus, I control for the number of available human rights treaties in a leader-year.  
Using the leader as a unit of analysis, I collapse this variable to be the maximum available 
number of human rights treaties when an autocrat comes into power.  
 The existing literature on commitment to human rights treaties demonstrates that the 
benefits and costs of treaty commitment affect state decisions to join international human rights 
treaties.  In studies on autocratic commitment (Conrad 2014; Vreeland 2008), autocratic 
countries with multiparty systems are found to be more likely to ratify the Convention against 
Torture to appease domestic oppositions.  Assuming that similar motives prompt autocrats to 
extend their liberalization policies beyond anti-torture commitments to all other human rights 
issues, I expect that autocracies with multiparty system ratify more human rights treaties.  
Drawing from Vreeland (2008) and Conrad (2014), I employ a legalistic definition to see 
whether multiple parties are allowed de jure.  I create a binary variable, indicating 1 if multiple 
parties are legally allowed, and 0 if not, drawn from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s dataset 
(2010). This variable captures the legal presence of opposition in autocracies. 
I also include independent judiciary from the Cingranelli-Richard (CIRI) Human Rights 
dataset (2014) to address the cost of treaty ratification (Hill 2015; Powell and Staton 2009; 
Conrad and Ritter 2013).  This variable shows whether the judiciary is independent of other 
sources of power.  In the presence of an independent judiciary, I expect the ex post ratification 
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costs to be higher.  This ordinal variable ranges from 0 (not independent) to 2 (generally 
independent). 
Human rights conditions on the ground can be another source of ex post costs for 
autocrats, which are often considered worse on human rights than their democratic counterparts.  
To measure actual human rights practices, I mainly rely on the Latent Human Rights Protection 
Scores (v.2) (Fariss 2014; Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014).  This measure is limited to the level 
of protection of physical integrity rights while my empirical analyses concern seven human 
rights treaties across different human rights issue areas from physical integrity rights to minority 
rights.  Drawing from Fariss and Schnakenberg (2013), however, I assume that human rights 
violations across specific human rights issues are largely interdependent.  This latent physical 
integrity variable addresses rising concerns that the dominant two existing measures of human 
rights practices -- the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney et al. 2012) and the CIRI Human 
Rights Data (CIRI) (Cingranelli et al. 2014) -- fail to account for dynamic changes in how 
monitoring agencies like Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department interpret 
available information about repression over time (Fariss 2014; Clark and Sikkink 2013).  This 
continuous variable ranges from -2.94 (more abuse) to 3.90 (more respect).  
Common law variable is added to the model to account for one of the domestic 
institutional ratification barriers, which impose ex ante ratification costs (Simmons 2009a).  We 
would expect that autocratic countries with common law systems face more domestic 
institutional constraints on ratifying a higher number of human rights treaties.  I use the English 
Common Law legal origin from the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al. 2015), which 
extends La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999), and made it a dummy variable, 
indicating 1 if a common law country and 0 otherwise. 
! 51!
The cultural argument posits that Islamic countries are often negatively associated with 
Western values, especially with regard to the rights of women and children (Cole 2005).  Thus, 
Islamic countries may be less likely to join human rights treaties driven by Western countries 
(Wotipka and Ramirez 2008).  The Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al. 2015) 
extending La Porta et al. (1999) also provides this indicator, referring to the population’s 
percentage of Muslims in the year 1980 (See Vreeland 2008, 89).  
Last, in order to control for the diffusion effects of ratification among autocrats 
(Goodliffe, Hawkins, and Vreeland 2009), I include regional autocratic ratification scores.  These 
indicate the yearly rate of ratifications of seven human rights treaties among autocracies within 
the same region with a given autocracy.   
For the analysis of multiple ratifications during an autocratic tenure, I include an 
additional variable for years in power.  Given the dependent variable is a count in nature, we 
expect that autocrats who stay in power longer have a better chance of ratifying a higher number 
of human rights treaties than those who lose power after a couple of years.  Thus, I control for 
the number of years since a given autocrat entered office.  Information on the start and end dates 
of autocratic leaders are drawn from Svolik (2012a). 
For an extra test to explore when an autocrat ratifies multiple human rights treaties during 
his tenure, I include an indicator variable of new leader and its interactive term with SOLS 
change.  It is coded 1 if it is less than four years since an autocrat enters into power and 0 
otherwise (Brownlee 2007, 597).  I expect that autocrats who transitioned with leader support 
coalition changes from their predecessors ratify multiple human rights treaties only after those 
initial years.  Data is drawn from Svolik (2012a). 
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For robustness checks, I include the following control variables.  Autocratic sub-regime 
type may affect the likelihood of human rights treaty ratifications as well as changes in domestic 
political and societal support coalitions.  In line with Way and Weeks (2014) on the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons, von Stein argues that personalist autocracies more readily ratify human rights 
agreements (2014).  On the other hand, changes in leader support coalitions is conditioned by 
autocratic sub-regime types, according to Mattes et al. (forthcoming).  I include a binary 
variable, coded 1 if a personalist regime and 0 if otherwise.  Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) 
provide this variable.  
I also include trade as a percent of GDP (logged) and foreign aid (logged) as well as the 
presence of civil war to account for the possible impact of international pressures and domestic 
inability to pursue memberships in human rights treaties.  The two economic factor variables 
come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).  The UCDP/PRIO Conflict 
Database (Themnér and Wallersteen 2013) provides the ordinal indicator of civil war, and I 
switch it to a binary variable, indicating 1 if any internal armed conflicts and 0 if no internal 
armed conflict.  All data are drawn from Teorell et al. (2015). 
 
3.4. Empirical Analysis 
The dependent variable is a count of ratification incidence of seven of the UN core human rights 
agreements with a Poisson distribution.  A series of the goodness-of-fit tests indicate the 
presence of over-dispersion in the empirical models in this chapter.  Thus, a negative binomial 
regression model, which allows a conditional variance to exceed the conditional means with a 
Poisson distribution, is used to estimate the results.  With a panel data set-up, I also use a 
random-effects negative binomial regression model to address unobservable heterogeneity 
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among countries.  Most covariates are lagged one year except for time invariant variables.  I 
cluster robust standard errors on the autocratic countries to address the possible non-
independence of observations within the same country.  For robustness checks, I estimated the 
same model with a logit and random effects logit model to see if the results are driven by the 
binary nature of ratifications instead of that of count.  
Figure 3.1 provides suggestive evidence from descriptive statistics to support my 
theoretical expectations.  The left plot shows that around 13 percent and 18 percent of autocratic 
leaders, who inherited support bases from outgoing leaders, ratify one and more than one UN 
core human rights treaties, respectively, while in power.  More than a majority of such autocrats 
(e.g. around 69 percent) do not ratify any human rights treaties.  Compared to this, the right plot 
displays slightly different patterns.  Autocrats who transitioned with new leader support coalition 
ratify at least one such treaty at 10 percentage points greater than those with the same support 
coalition.   
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FIGURE 3.1. Frequency of autocratic human rights treaty ratifications by change 
in domestic sources of autocratic leader support.   
NOTE: The left plot displays the frequency and fraction of multiple ratifications of 
human rights treaties by an autocrat who enters into power without changes in domestic 
sources of political and social supports from his predecessor.  The right plot examines 
autocrats who achieve and retain power with different domestic sources of support to stay 
in power from his predecessor. Data: Svolik (2012a), CHISOLS (Mattes et al. 
forthcoming), and the UNTS (2016).   
 
Next, I test the hypotheses with the multivariate models.  Table 3.1 reports the primary 
empirical results regarding H3-1.  SOLS change variable is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1 or 5 percent levels in all model estimations.  The effect is also substantively significant, 
as shown in Figure 3.2.  Autocrats with changes in domestic support coalitions are likely to ratify 
42.4 percent more human rights treaties than those without such changes in a year.  This 
difference in the expected count of ratification incidences is statistically significant with the p-
value of 0.018.  Control variables generally perform as expected and are consistently across 
different models.  When more human rights treaties become available for ratification in a given 
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year, an autocrat is likely to ratify a higher number of human rights treaties, and this is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level across all model estimations.  Under the common 
law legal system, autocrats are less likely to ratify a higher number of human rights treaties, and 
this effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level across all models.  Other control 
variables, such as multiparty, independent judiciary, latent human rights scores, Muslim 
populations, and regional autocratic ratification rates, never achieve statistical significance from 
models 1 through 4 in Table 3.1. 
 
  TABLE 3.1: Multiple Ratifications of Core UN Human Rights Treaties, 1966-2008. 
ratification incidence NB 
(1) 
RENB 
(2) 
logit 
(3) 
RE logit 
(4) 
SOLS changet 0.353** 0.461*** 0.409*** 0.494*** 
 (0.142) (0.164) (0.153) (0.191) 
number of available HRAs  0.363*** 0.422*** 0.296*** 0.474*** 
for ratificationt (0.050) (0.064) (0.051) (0.086) 
multipartyt-1 0.217 0.237 0.154 0.219 
 (0.178) (0.162) (0.190) (0.194) 
independent judiciaryt-1 0.043 0.024 0.069 0.040 
 (0.111) (0.115) (0.129) (0.135) 
latent human rights scoret-1 -0.001 0.035 0.010 0.084 
 (0.097) (0.095) (0.095) (0.114) 
common lawt -0.487** -0.541*** -0.466** -0.610** 
 (0.196) (0.201) (0.215) (0.245) 
muslimt 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
regional autocratic  0.028 0.050 -0.003 0.027 
ratificationst-1 (0.063) (0.064) (0.058) (0.072) 
constant -3.451*** -2.640*** -3.259*** -3.936*** 
 (0.378) (0.398) (0.365) (0.485) 
ln α 0.915*** 2.548***   
 (0.174) (0.417)   
N 1,959 1,959 1,959 1,959 
N of countries  115  115 
NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses except for the 
random effects models in Models (2) and (4). *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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FIGURE 3.2: Change in predicted count of ratification by SOLS 
change, 1966-2008. Based on NB model (1) in Table 3.1.  
 
For robustness checks, I added additional control variates that might be associated 
with multiple ratifications either positively (e.g., trade dependence and amount of received 
foreign aid) or negatively (e.g., the presence of civil wars).  Autocrats who rely on external 
economic pressures are expected to proactively pursue human rights treaty ratifications 
(Garriga 2016; Hathaway 2005; Smith Cannoy 2012).  Conversely, autocrats who are either 
fighting or just fought civil conflicts are less likely to seek out human rights treaty 
memberships because governments themselves tend to commit human rights violations 
during civil wars (Nalepa 2010).  Table 3A.1 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter 
reports the empirical results.  The impact of SOLS change stays intact and statistically 
significant across all model estimations.  The additional covariates behave interestingly.  
While the presence of civil war fails to achieve statistical significance, two covariates related 
to external pressure are positively associated with multiple ratifications of human rights 
treaties.  Autocrats’ vulnerability and susceptibility to external pressures are beyond the 
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scope of the current chapter; however, this result yields an interesting potential for future 
research. 
  
TABLE 3.2: New Leader and Multiple Ratifications of Core  
UN Human Rights Treaties, 1966-2008. 
ratification incidence NB 
(1) 
SOLS changet 0.348** 
 (0.154) 
new leadert -0.068 
 (0.259) 
SOLS changet x new leadert 0.038 
 (0.357) 
number of available HRAs  0.363*** 
for ratificationt (0.050) 
multipartyt-1 0.218 
 (0.178) 
independent judiciaryt-1 0.045 
 (0.112) 
latent human rights scoret-1 -0.002 
 (0.097) 
common lawt -0.486** 
 (0.196) 
muslimt 0.002 
 (0.002) 
regional autocratic  0.028 
ratificationst-1 (0.062) 
constant -3.440*** 
 (0.387) 
ln α 0.915*** 
 (0.174) 
N 1,959 
NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered on country in 
parentheses except for the random effects models in Models 
(2) and (4). *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 
In an additional test, I examine when an autocrat with changes in domestic support 
coalitions from his predecessor pursues multiple human rights treaty ratifications during his 
tenure.  Table 3.2 provides a supporting evidence to H3-1a.  The effect of SOLS change on the 
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number of ratification incidence is positive and significant only when autocrats are not new 
leaders.  The average marginal effect of SOLS change on the number of ratification is 0.06 after 
the initial three years of an autocrat’s rule, and this is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level.  On the other hand, the same is not significant at any conventional levels during the initial 
three years of an autocrat’s reign. 
I switch the structure of the main dataset to make a leader as a unit of analysis to test why 
autocrats ratify multiple human rights treaties during their tenure, not necessarily in a given year.  
To do so, I collapse all observations by individual autocrat, keeping years in power and number 
of human rights treaties available for ratification at their maximum values, multiparty, which is a 
binary covariate, at its median, ordinal or continuous covariates, such as independent judiciary, 
latent human rights score, Muslim, and regional autocratic ratifications at their means.   
Table 3.3 reports the main result.  Controlling for the duration in which an autocrat stays 
in power as well as the maximum number of available seven core UN human rights treaties, I 
find that an autocrat with domestic support coalitions different from those of his predecessor is 
likely to ratify a higher number of human rights treaties during his tenure.  The coefficient of 
SOLS change is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  Substantively, as 
Figure 3.3 displays, autocrats with distinct domestic support coalitions from their predecessors 
are likely to ratify around 33% more human rights treaties than those with contiguous domestic 
support coalitions.  This difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  The other 
control variables generally behave as Models in Table 3.1.  Autocrats with longer tenure have 
positive impacts on the number of human rights treaty ratifications.  Likewise, as more human 
rights treaties are available when an autocrat enters into power, the autocrat is more likely to 
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ratify a higher number of them.  Common law is again negatively associated with the number of 
treaty ratifications.  These effects are all significant at the conventional level. 
 
TABLE 3.3: Multiple Ratifications of Core UN Human  
Rights Treaties, 1966-2008 (during autocratic tenure) 
number of ratifications NB 
(1) 
SOLS change 0.286** 
 (0.125) 
years in power 0.061*** 
 (0.006) 
number of available HRAs  0.204*** 
for ratification (0.035) 
multiparty 0.171 
 (0.155) 
independent judiciary 0.004 
 (0.121) 
latent human rights score 0.009 
 (0.078) 
common law -0.323** 
 (0.153) 
muslim 0.001 
 (0.001) 
regional autocratic  0.041 
ratifications (0.057) 
constant -1.660*** 
 (0.299) 
ln α -1.347*** 
 (0.328) 
N 278 
NOTE: Negative binomial results. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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FIGURE 3.3: Change in predicted count of ratification by SOLS change, 
1966-2008. Based on NB model (1) in Table 3.3.  
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
Autocratic leaders ratify multiple human rights treaties either simultaneously or over their tenure.  
Building on autocratic politics literature in comparative politics, I provide a novel theoretical 
explanation to this unexamined empirical pattern of autocratic human rights treaty ratifications in 
this Chapter.  I posit that autocratic leaders with new support bases distinct from those of their 
outgoing leaders pursue membership in multiple human rights treaties in order to win popular 
support that is needed for them to deter potential challenges from regime insiders.  A series of 
empirical analyses render positive evidence to my main theoretical claim.    
 One remaining question is how and under what circumstances such autocratic leaders 
seeking popular support through human rights treaty ratifications make their promises of rights 
concessions credible in the eyes of targeted policy audiences.  While human rights treaties are 
“soft” in general, not all human rights treaties allow the identical levels of monitoring and 
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enforcement from treaty bodies to their member states.  Treaty ratification is also not a binary 
choice, concerning whether to commit or not.  Autocratic leaders must determine to what extent 
they will be bound by monitoring and enforcement procedures upon joining the treaty.  The next 
Chapter will examine autocratic decisions to pursue vertical memberships in UN core human 
rights treaties.         
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3.6 Appendix 
 
 
 
TABLE 3A.1: Multiple Ratifications of Core UN Human Rights Treaties, 1966-2008. 
ratification incidence NB 
(1) 
RENB 
(2) 
NB 
(3) 
RENB 
(4) 
leader with SOLS changet 0.320** 0.454** 0.480*** 0.564*** 
 (0.162) (0.184) (0.163) (0.172) 
number of available HRAs  0.384*** 0.411*** 0.439*** 0.457*** 
for ratificationt (0.055) (0.070) (0.052) (0.065) 
multipartyt-1   0.175 0.255 
   (0.186) (0.166) 
personalistt-1 0.153 0.017   
 (0.188) (0.207)   
independent judiciaryt-1 0.117 0.077 0.129 0.100 
 (0.114) (0.121) (0.112) (0.123) 
latent human rights scoret-1 0.045 0.041 -0.048 0.024 
 (0.102) (0.098) (0.110) (0.121) 
common lawt -0.656*** -0.739*** -0.636*** -0.647*** 
 (0.213) (0.219) (0.203) (0.201) 
muslimt 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
regional autocratic  0.041 0.065 0.109* 0.100 
ratificationst-1 (0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.068) 
trade (percent as GDP)   0.268** 0.166 
(logged)   (0.129) (0.138) 
foreign aid   0.297* 0.322* 
(logged)   (0.180) (0.183) 
civil war   -0.112 -0.109 
   (0.253) (0.225) 
constant -3.387*** -2.619*** -11.16*** -10.29*** 
 (0.375) (0.407) (3.935) (3.993) 
ln α 0.964*** 2.588*** 0.661*** 3.160*** 
 (0.179) (0.507) (0.189) (0.656) 
N 1,706 1,706 1,520 1,520 
N of countries  104  104 
NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses except for the 
random effects models in Models (2) and (4). *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Autocrats with New Support Coalitions and 
Deeper Commitment to Human Rights Treaties 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I show that autocratic leaders who transitioned with domestic support bases that 
differed from those of their predecessors ratify multiple human rights treaties either concurrently 
or over their tenure.  Multiple ratifications of various human rights treaties allow such autocrats 
to quickly signal a break from past rulers, who were often abusive or incompetent, while sending 
a public message to the general public that their governance is designed for the broader interests.  
Autocrats use this strategy to gain legitimacy and popular approval needed for them deter 
potential challenges from new regime insiders.   
One remaining question, however, is why targeted domestic audiences, including the 
opposition and citizens, believe that such autocrats will honor the rights concessions that they 
have promised after winning increased support.  After all, failure to honor those concessions will 
not likely be evident as violations of certain human rights, especially physical integrity rights, are 
inherently unobservable (Conrad, Haglund, and Moore 2013).  Domestic accountability 
mechanisms are limited in autocracies.  Autocrats themselves control the flow of information 
about rights violations: what information to reveal, how to present the information, and who has 
access to the information (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2015a, 2015b).  Even if autocrats 
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are caught in violation, domestic institutional means to replace such autocrats are scant.  Indeed, 
human rights treaties, in general, lack the strong accountability mechanisms present in other 
issue areas, especially economics.   
Monitoring of all main UN human rights treaties primarily relies on state self-reports on 
implementation and compliance submitted to the relevant treaty bodies (Creamer and Simmons 
2015, 580; Goodman and Jinks 2013, 121-4).26  States are uniform neither in their willingness to 
submit such reports nor in the overall quality of those reports, and autocracies are not best 
examples in this context (Creamer and Simmons 2015).  However, in addition to this general 
monitoring mechanism, states can also tailor the level of monitoring they receive from the treaty 
bodies by either accepting optional articles and protocols or by issuing reservations and 
declarations against provisions containing extra monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
 Once a state accepts extra monitoring from relevant treaty bodies, either upon joining or 
later, individual citizens, peer states, or other groups of actors can pull fire alarms when rights 
are violated.  Drawing from the literature on American Politics, fire alarms refer to 
Congressional oversight that enables third parties such as individuals and organized interest 
groups to examine the executive through established rules, procedures, and informal practices 
(McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 166).  On the other hand, police-patrol oversight means that 
Congress oversees a sample of administrative activities “at its own initiative” (1984, 166).  If a 
state does not issue reservations against compulsory jurisdiction, peer states can bring a case to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ, hereafter) if they disagree about how to interpret or apply 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 I do not consider informal monitoring from human rights NGOs, which may be a primary monitoring 
mechanism of human rights treaties (See Chapter 9 of Koremenos 2016 for further discussion).  Even so, 
civil societies in autocracies are often tainted with counter-activities from Government Organized 
Nongovernmental Organizations (GONGOs) (I thank Laura Landolt for this discussion at the 2015 ISA 
annual conference).   
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relevant treaty provisions only after failing to resolve the dispute bilaterally or with arbitration.  
States can even invite regular visits to places of detention and advisory visits to national 
preventive mechanisms from a treaty body if they opt to accept such extra monitoring.27  Absent 
working accountability mechanisms at home, domestic rights beneficiaries may expect 
international institutions to hold their autocratic leaders accountable for non-compliance (Fang 
and Owen 2011).  Existing studies show that autocratic states are less likely to accept this extra 
monitoring procedures of human rights treaties than their democratic counterparts (Cole 2009 for 
the individual complaints under the ICCPR).  Would autocrats with support bases that differ 
from those of the outgoing leaders accept such extra monitoring mechanisms from treaty bodies 
in order to demonstrate the credibility of their commitments to human rights treaties?   
 If my theoretical claim in Chapter 3 is correct, I should observe autocrats with different 
support bases from their predecessors accepting extra monitoring and enforcement obligations to 
add credibility to their promised rights concessions to the masses, with several caveats.  First, if 
such autocratic leaders ratify human rights treaties as a means of earning legitimacy from 
popular approval, they are likely to focus on promises that generates broader impacts instead of 
targeted specific benefits to limited segments of the population.  The latter often fall into the 
margins of the country politically, economically, or socially.  Thus, autocrats with new support 
bases would increase their chances of being caught failing to implement general rights 
protections when accepting extra monitoring from treaty bodies.  Such autocrats are less likely to 
accept that extra monitoring from treaties concerning only minority rights, as these have lower 
salience to the general populations.  
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27 Regular visits are only available under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture.  
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Second, such autocrats are likely to guard their implementation of physical integrity 
rights, which is highly related to a key autocratic governing tool, violence, without accepting 
more monitoring procedures from treaty bodies.  Last, various monitoring mechanisms impose 
different expected costs to autocratic leaders; thus, autocrats with different support bases from 
their predecessors are likely to allow only those mechanisms that they view as unlikely to be 
invoked.  I explore these theoretical expectations with a series of empirical analyses.  
 
4.2 Optional Monitoring and Enforcement Mechanisms in the UN Human Rights Treaties 
The United Nations nine core human rights treaties contain multiple layers of monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms that operate in conjunction with periodic self-reports by states.  States 
are not allowed to opt out of reporting, but these human rights treaties allow member states to 
adjust the level of monitoring they receive from treaty bodies by adding reservations and 
declarations to optional articles and protocols about such monitoring and enforcement 
provisions.  These monitoring and enforcement procedures include individual complaints, inter-
state complaints, inquiry, regular visits, and the International Court of Justice jurisdiction over 
contentious disputes on interpretation or application of treaty provisions.28  
 Monitoring mechanisms of the UN core human rights treaties have been mostly based on 
a fire-alarm system in which victims or interested third-parties draw attentions to specific treaty 
bodies when alleged rights violations occur.  Individual and inter-state complaints procedures as 
well as inquiries are good examples.  A recent adoption of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture (OPCAT) in 2002 provides an innovative approach of adding police 
patrol monitoring to the existing human rights treaty system, allowing experts from a treaty 
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28 I do not consider universal jurisdictions in the 1984 Convention against Torture and the 2006 
Convention against Enforced Disappearance in this dissertation for reasons discussed later in this section. 
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monitoring body to make regular visits to places of detentions in member states’ territories and 
directly assist in establishing national preventive mechanisms.  Table 4.1 list monitoring bodies 
of the nine core UN human rights treaties.  I briefly examine the workings of each monitoring 
mechanism available in the human rights treaty systems in this section, working largely off 
information provided by the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights’ webpage.  
 
Table 4.1: Monitoring Bodies in the UN Core Human Rights Treaties 
treaty monitoring body 
ICERD The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
ICCPR The Human Rights Committee (CCPR) 
ICESCR The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
CEDAW The Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
CAT/OPCAT The Committee against Torture (CAT)/The Subcommittee on Prevention of 
Torture (SPT) 
CRC The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
ICMW The Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) 
CRPD The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
CPED The Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) 
NOTE: Data from “The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies,” 
OHCHR (2016c). Accessed on July 2, 2016. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx.  
 
 Through individual complaints procedures, individuals can file communications about 
alleged rights violations against a State Party relevant to specific treaties in all nine human rights 
treaty bodies.29  Third parties, working on behalf of individuals and with or without written 
consent, can bring a petition to the treaty monitoring bodies as well.  The Office of High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) states that the essence of procedures is consistent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 The individual complaints mechanism in the 1990 International Convention on Migrant Workers’ 
Rights has not entered into force as of July 2, 2016 because 10 necessary State Parties have not yet made 
such declarations regarding Article 77 (Human Rights Bodies – Complaints Procedures, OHCHR 2016b. 
Accessed on July 2, 2016.  Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx).  
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across the nine core treaties, though specific details may vary.30  The complainant should meet 
the requirement of exhausting domestic remedies in the alleged State Party before bringing the 
petition to a Committee.  The Committee offers the State Party an opportunity to respond, 
usually within six months.  After the State comments, the complainant can respond, also within a 
certain time limit.  Once the Committee decides the case is admissible, it then determines 
whether the alleged rights violations occurred in a closed session.  The final decisions of the 
Committee are public and constitute an authoritative interpretation of the given treaty even 
though recommendations therein to the State Party are not legally binding.  However, public 
follow-up procedures monitor whether the State Party implements the suggested 
recommendations.  If the State Party fails to take appropriate measures, the case remains open 
under the Committee’s attention.        
 Similarly, a member state can bring a complaint to a relevant treaty body (e.g. either a 
committee or an ad hoc Conciliation Commission) if it believes that another member state has 
violated a given treaty’s obligations.  After domestic remedies have been exhausted and bilateral 
negotiations between the two parties have failed, the relevant treaty body offers good offices to 
the member states concerned to help them reach a friendly solution, mostly in closed meetings.  
No case invoking the inter-state complaints procedures across seven core human rights treaties 
has ever happened as of July 2, 2016 (OHCHR 2016; Smith-Cannoy 2012). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 The subsequent discussion of the procedure is based on the information from the OHCHR webpage.  
Human Rights Treaty Bodies – Individual Communications, OHCHR 2016c. Accessed on July 2, 2016.  
Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/IndividualCommunications.aspx#proceduregener
ale.  
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 The last monitoring procedure based on fire alarms is an inquiry process in six out of nine 
core human rights treaties.31  This monitoring procedure is confidential and requires cooperation 
from states that are alleged systematic violators of rights.  After receiving reliable information 
about serious or systematic rights violations by a State Party from individuals or relevant NGOs, 
a Committee can make inquiries on its own initiative.  The Committee can request that the State 
Parties submit observations to the Committee.  Based on those observations, the Committee 
designates members to carry out an inquiry and report promptly back to the Committee.  Such an 
inquiry can include a visit to the State Party but only with the State Party’s consent.  The 
Committee examines the findings and sends them to the State Party with comments and 
recommendations.  The State Party is then invited to respond to the Committee within a limited 
time and report out on any measures taken in response to the inquiry (OHCHR 2016).  
 Other than fire alarm mechanisms across all nine core human rights treaties, only one 
core human rights treaty, the 1984 Convention against Torture, incorporates police patrol type 
monitoring mechanisms in its Optional Protocol from 2002.32  An independent international 
monitoring body, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT, hereafter), conducts regular 
visits of around ten days to places of detention – police stations, military or civilian prisons, 
detention centers, or mental health and social care institutions – in member countries to prevent 
torture.  The SPT has unlimited access to all places of detention as well as to all relevant 
information.  Experts can conduct private and confidential interviews with detainees and any 
other related people.  Based on the visit, they can issue confidential recommendations and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 This paragraph is also drawn from the OHCHR webpage, “Human Rights Bodies – Complaints 
Procedures” (OHCHR 2016b).  Accessed on July 5, 2016.  Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx#inquiries.   
32 This paragraph is also drawn from the OHCHR webpage, “Optional Protocol to the Convention against 
Torture (OPCAT), The SPT in Brief” (OHCHR 2016f).  Accessed on July 5, 2016.  Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/Brief.aspx. 
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observations to the state concerned to improve rights conditions and can publish that report if 
that state requests.  If the country itself publishes part of the report, the monitoring body can then 
publish all or parts of the report.  More importantly, if a country is non-cooperative or fails to 
implement recommendations, the SPT can ask the Committee against Torture to issue a public 
statement or to make the SPT report public.  In addition, these monitoring bodies are mandated 
with capacity-building.  They advise and assist States Parties to establish their own National 
Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs), which mandate regular visits to places of detention, and they 
work closely with the NPMs, subsequently.  
 Apart from the aforementioned monitoring mechanisms, five out of nine core human 
rights treaties allow for compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over 
contentious disputes on the interpretation or application of relevant human rights treaties only if 
states do not attach reservations or declarations against ICJ jurisdiction upon joining the treaties 
(i.e., a compromissory clause).  Only when efforts to resolve such disputes through bilateral 
negotiations or arbitration have failed can either of the parties refer the case to the ICJ.  Only 
states have legal standing before the Court on matters of contentious jurisdiction, and the Court 
needs the consent of member states of the General Assembly or the Security Council to have 
advisory jurisdiction (Wilde 2013, 650).  
Other monitoring procedures that exist outside the UN treaty body system include the 
Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council and the Human Rights Council Complaint 
Procedure.33   Since the focus of this chapter concerns autocratic states’ participation in human 
rights treaties, I do not discuss these two outside mechanisms in my dissertation. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Special Procedures are either special rapporteurs or independent experts with mandates to visit 
countries to examine human rights conditions, to send communications like urgent appeals and other 
letters to states and non-states actors to provide response reports on information and follow up, to report 
yearly to the Human Rights Council as well as the General Assembly, etc. (The Office of the United 
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In sum, the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of international core human rights 
instruments are largely based on fire alarm systems with one exception of regular visits in the 
OPCAT.  Most fire alarm monitoring and enforcement procedures, other than individual 
complaints, are state-centric.  Inter-state complaints require a case to be initially resolved 
bilaterally, and even after a case is referred to relevant treaty monitoring bodies, the role of 
referred monitoring bodies is limited to that of facilitator, offering good offices for disputing 
states to reach friendly solutions.  No particular follow ups regarding implementation are 
specified.  Likewise, state cooperation is a necessary condition for inquiry procedures at all 
stages.  Without consent from the State Party, the monitoring body cannot visit its territory to 
conduct inquiries.  The threshold for an inquiry procedure to be initiated is also high since only 
“serious” and “systemic” rights violations can be brought to the relevant treaty bodies.   
Recommendations from monitoring bodies are not legally binding.  Additionally, only states can 
bring cases to the International Court of Justice despite the fact that the actual rights holders and 
victims of rights violations are individuals.  Rulings on contentious cases are legally binding 
while rulings on advisory opinions are not, and the Court has no means of physical enforcement.  
Besides each member state chooses the level of monitoring and enforcement it receives 
from each treaty body, either upon joining or at a later point in time, every core human rights 
treaty itself has different levels of monitoring and enforcement.  Table 4.2 provides a snapshot of 
the levels of monitoring and enforcement procedures in nine core human rights treaties (See 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016g, accessed on July 1, 2016.  Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx).  Likewise, individuals, groups, or 
NGOs can bring attention to the Human Rights Council through confidential Human Rights Council 
Complaint Procedure regarding states’ rights violations (OHCHR 2016d, accessed on July 1, 2016. 
Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ComplaintProcedure/Pages/HRCComplaintProcedureIndex.as
px).   
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Table 4A.1 of the Appendix at the end of this chapter for specific corresponding provisions from 
each treaty). 
Table 4.2: Monitoring Procedures in the UN Core Human Rights Treaties 
 individual complaints 
inter-state 
complaints inquiry 
regular  
visits ICJ 
International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
 
+ +*   + 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) 
 
+ +    
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
 
+ + +   
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
 
+  +  + 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT) 
+ + + + + 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
+ + +   
International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families (ICMW) 
+ +   + 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) 
 
+  +   
International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(CPED) 
+ + +*  + 
NOTE: * refers to cases where the relevant monitoring procedure is mandatory and cannot be reserved and they 
include inter-state complaints under the ICERD and inquiry under CPED.  Data from the relevant treaty text from 
the United Nations Treaty Series as well as Human Rights Bodies-Complaints Procedures from OHCHR (Accessed 
on May 6, 2016.  Available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx).  
 
The Convention against Torture is equipped with the heaviest monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms, containing all five procedures on top of a provision on universal 
jurisdiction (i.e. Article 534), which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  States can declare at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Article 5 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment reads as follows. “1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases: (a) When the 
offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in 
that State; (b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State; (c) When the victim is a national of 
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any time to accept individual complaints (Article 22) and inter-state complaints (Article 21).  At 
the time of joining, states can issue reservations against the inquiry procedure (Articles 20 and 
28) and against the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (Article 30).  CAT member states can later 
ratify the Optional Protocol (OPCAT), thereby accepting regular visits from the Subcommittee 
on Prevention of Torture to places of detention and establishing national preventive mechanisms. 
Similarly, the Convention against Enforced Disappearance has four procedures but 
regular visits as well as universal jurisdiction (i.e. Article 935), which is, again, beyond scope of 
this dissertation.  States can at any time declare to accept individual (Article 31) and inter-state 
(Article 32) complaints and attach reservations against compulsory ICJ jurisdiction (Article 42).  
Interestingly, the inquiry procedure under the Convention against Enforced Disappearance is 
mandatory, so member states cannot opt out of this monitoring mechanism (Article 33).  
Five human rights treaties – the 1965 Convention against Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD), the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
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that State if that State considers it appropriate.  2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as 
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is 
present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of 
the States mentioned in paragraph I of this article.  3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal 
jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law (OHCHR 2016a, accessed on July 2, 2016. 
Available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx).  
35 Article 9 of the Convention against Enforced Disappearance reads as follows.  “1. Each State Party 
shall take the necessary measures to establish its competence to exercise jurisdiction over the offence of 
enforced disappearance: (a) When the offence is committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on 
board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; (b) When the alleged offender is one of its nationals; (c) 
When the disappeared person is one of its nationals and the State Party considers in appropriate.  2. Each 
State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its competence to exercise 
jurisdiction over the offence of enforced disappearance when the alleged offender is present in any 
territory under its jurisdiction, unless it extradites or surrenders him or her to another State in accordance 
with its international obligations or surrenders him or her to an international criminal tribunal whose 
jurisdiction it has recognized.  3. This Convention does not exclude any additional criminal jurisdiction 
exercised in accordance with national law” (OHCHR 2016c, accessed on July 2, 2016. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/ConventionCED.aspx).     
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(CEDAW), the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the 1990 Convention on 
Migrant Workers’ Rights (ICMW) – include variations of three monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms.  First, the ICERD and the ICMW establish optional (or mandatory) monitoring and 
enforcement procedures.  States that join the Convention against Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
can accept individual complaints at any time (Article 14) as well as state reservations against the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ36 (Article 22 and Article 20) upon ratification or accession.  
Inter-state complaints are mandatory for all ratified member states (Articles 11-13).  Likewise, 
under the Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights, states can declare to accept individual 
(Article 77) and inter-state (Article 76) complaints at any time.  They can also declare against 
ICJ compulsory jurisdiction upon signature or ratification (Article 92). 
Next, the ICESCR and CRC have monitoring and enforcement procedures in Optional 
Protocols separate from the main treaties.  By ratifying the Optional Protocol of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, states accept individual complaints.  When 
they do so, they can declare to accept inter-state complaints (Article 10 of the Optional Protocol) 
as well as inquiries (Article 11 of the Optional Protocol) at any time.  Similarly, states accept 
individual complaints by ratifying the Optional Protocol on a Communication Procedure to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Ratifiers of the Optional Protocol can declare to accept 
inter-state complaints at any time (Article 12 of the Optional Protocol on a Communication 
Procedure) and to opt out of inquiries (Article 13 of the same Optional Protocol) upon joining. 
Last, the CEDAW has monitoring and enforcement provisions across the main treaty and 
its Optional Protocol.  States can declare that they are not bound by the ICJ compulsory 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Unlike the corresponding provisions in the other human rights treaties, Article 22 itself does not 
provide the option that member states to opt out of the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction.  However, state 
practice seems that they attach reservations to Article 22 when they ratify or accede to the ICERD by 
invoking Article 20 on reservations.  
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jurisdiction upon joining the main treaty of the Convention on the Eliminations of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (Article 29).  Besides, they accept individual complaints by 
ratifying the Optional Protocol.  Ratifiers of the CEDAW Protocol can declare not to accept 
inquiry procedures upon joining (Articles 8 and 10).  
The ICCPR and CRPD contain the least extra monitoring mechanisms.  First, states that 
ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can declare to accept inter-state 
complaints at any time (Article 41).  They can also accept individual complaints by ratifying the 
First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.  Likewise, states accept individual complaints by ratifying 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities.  Ratifiers of 
such the Optional Protocol can declare against inquiry procedures when joining (Articles 6, 7, 
and 8 of the Optional Protocol). 
Some core human rights treaties, such as the 1984 Convention against Torture and the 
2006 Convention against Enforced Disappearance, contain universal jurisdiction provisions.  
Other human rights treaties, like the 1965 Convention against Racial Discrimination and the 
2006 Convention against Enforced Disappearance, have mandatory provisions on inter-state 
complaints procedures and inquiry procedures, respectively.  I do not consider cases where 
certain monitoring and enforcement procedures are mandated in treaty membership in my 
empirical analyses so I can differentiate autocrats’ decisions to accept extra monitoring and 
enforcement from their initial decisions to join the main human rights treaties. 
 
4.3 Theoretical Expectations on Autocratic Deeper Commitment 
Based on the discussion of various monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in the UN core 
human rights treaties, I derive the following theoretical expectations concerning autocratic 
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leaders’ deeper commitments to core human rights treaties.  When determining the level of 
monitoring and enforcement they are willing to assume, autocrats need to consider the following: 
1) the benefits of a deeper commitment in terms of receiving popular support, and 2) the amount 
of control they would have over the initiations and proceedings of monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms.  I expect that autocrats with different support bases from their predecessors accept 
the extra monitoring and enforcement procedures of treaties protecting general human rights 
rather than those concerned with minority rights.  These autocrats also accept treaties that allow 
them relatively more leverage over the initiation and proceedings of a given procedure.  
First, autocrats with different support bases from their predecessors are likely to commit 
deeply when they join human rights treaties concerning general rights protections.  If the 
theoretical claim posited in Chapter 3 that such autocrats pursue memberships in human rights 
treaties in order to win broad popular support from their citizens is correct, I should observe that 
they pay more careful attention to human rights treaties concerning general rights protections 
than to those concerning minority rights protections.  Such autocrats seek to lend credibility to 
their promises of general rights protections as a means of securing broad popular support.  
Conversely, they are unlikely to make concessions beyond symbolic treaty ratifications 
when the rights protections concern groups at the margins of the societies.  Improvements in 
rights conditions for politically, economically, and socially powerless groups of people, such as 
women, children, racial minorities, migrant workers, and persons with disabilities, are not of 
high salience to ordinary citizens when they evaluate their governments, especially under 
authoritarian rules.  The survey results of the PEW Research Center on Egyptians’ priorities 
provides illustrative supporting evidence (2013, 18).  While 83% of respondents strongly value 
improved economic conditions, a majority of respondents also strongly value fair judiciary 
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(81%), uncensored media (60%), and freedom of speech (51%).  Survey respondents who 
strongly value women’s rights (42%) and religious freedom for minorities (32%) do not amount 
to a majority.  Moreover, policy concessions that benefit certain groups of citizens may produce 
losers in domestic politics, and those who consider themselves losers may not return their 
approval.  Thus, autocrats anticipate receiving more popular support from broader populations 
when their promises to grant general human rights protections gain credibility through a deep, 
demonstrated commitment to relevant human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
the Convention against Torture, and the Convention against Enforced Disappearance.   
Next, autocrats tailor their level of extra monitoring and enforcement by mostly accepting 
mechanisms over which they have more leverage in terms of procedure initiation and 
proceedings.  As discussed in the previous section, each monitoring and enforcement procedure 
differs in what it requires of the allegedly violating state’s involvement or cooperation.  Regular 
visits, on the extreme side, do not require an accused state’s consent prior to the monitoring 
bodies’ physical visits to its territory.  Individual complaints also do not require a state’s 
cooperation for a case to be brought to monitoring bodies.  Instead, the State Party’s influence is 
limited in providing observations, responses, and comments at each stage.   
On the other hand, inter-state complaints, ICJ jurisdictions, and inquiries all require 
significant state cooperation and involvement.  Both inter-state complaints and ICJ jurisdictions 
presuppose that bilateral negotiations between the two disputing states have failed before one 
disputant brings the case to the relevant monitoring or enforcement bodies.  Despite the first-
hand rights holders as individuals, only states have standings before these two procedures.   
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Thus, the case is much less likely to be brought to the corresponding international bodies 
in the first place.  The OHCHR webpage indicates that this inter-state complaints procedure has 
yet to be invoked (2016).  At this time, State Parties of the UN core human rights instruments 
have brought only three cases to the ICJ:  The 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the 2005 
judgement on the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. 
Uganda), and the 2008 Order Indicating Provisional Measures in the Application of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. 
Russian Federation) (Wilde 2013, 642-3).37  This is in sharp contrast to the high use of 
complaints mechanisms by individuals.  According to Smith-Cannoy, 1964 cases were submitted 
to the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR as of 2010, 462 cases to the Committee against 
Torture as of 2011, 54 cases to the Racial Discrimination Committee as of 2010, and 27 cases to 
the Women’s Discrimination Committee as of 2010 (2012, 57).   
Monitoring bodies require the consent of accused states in order to carry out country 
visits under inquiries procedures and rights violations to reach at the levels of being “serious” 
and “systematic.”  I expect that autocrats prefer monitoring and enforcement procedures that give 
them more control over the process, such as accepting the ICJ jurisdiction, inter-state complaints, 
and inquiries.  This produces the following hypotheses:  
 
H4-1: Autocratic leaders with different support bases from their predecessors are 
likely to accept extra monitoring procedures of human rights treaties 
concerning general rights during their tenure. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 “The treaties at issue were the ICCPR (Wall Advisory Opinion and DRC v. Uganda), the CRC (DRC v. 
Uganda), the CRC Optional Protocol (DRC v. Uganda), the ICESCR (Wall Advisory Opinion) and the 
CERD (Georgia v. Russia)” (Wilde 2013, 661).  Please see Higgins (2007) for additional cases referring 
to human rights treaties beyond the core human rights treaties, such as the Genocide Convention.  
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H4-2: Autocratic leaders with different support bases from their predecessors are 
likely to accept extra monitoring procedures over which they have more 
control during their tenure.   
 
 
 
4.4 Research Design 
Building on the empirical models developed in Chapter 3, I test the driven hypotheses based on a 
newly created dataset on autocratic deeper commitment to five core human rights treaties.  
Information about the acceptance of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms is drawn from the 
UNTS database (2016).  The dataset is collapsed into individual autocratic leaders in order to 
examine each leader’s decisions to commit deeply to core human rights treaties during his or her 
tenure.  Once the leader accepts a monitoring/enforcement mechanism, the successor is dropped 
from the analysis.  The unit of analysis is the autocrat.   
Among nine core UN human rights treaties, only five are considered here – ICERD, 
ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT, and CMWR – due to limited data availability and short time coverage.  
The Optional Protocols containing monitoring provisions in the ICESCR and CRC opened for 
signature on December 10, 2008 and February 28, 2012.  The ICED was open for signature on 
December 26, 2006, and the CRPD as well as its Optional Protocol were open for signature in 
2006.  My dataset ends in 2008.   
In addition, I estimate models separately for each human rights treaty because autocrats 
might value their deeper commitments to some human rights treaties more than to others both 
due to the substantive human rights issues and the different layers of monitoring and 
enforcement procedures of each treaty.  Last, I use a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model 
(BVP), to address potential endogeneity problems.  An autocrat’s decision to ratify a main 
human rights treaty is very likely correlated with his or her decision to accept relevant extra 
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monitoring or enforcement obligations.  To compare, I also report results from separate logit 
models, which does not assume such correlation.  
 The dependent variable is whether to accept a given monitoring or enforcement 
obligation.  It indicates 1 if accepting and 0 otherwise.  For example, if an autocrat lodges a 
reservation to the compromissory clause on the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction, I coded 0 for the 
ICJ jurisdiction.  If an autocrat declares to accept individual complaints, I coded 1 for individual 
complaints.  The independent variable is SOLS change, indicating 1 if the support base is 
different from the predecessor and 0 otherwise, as in Chapter 3 (Mattes, et al. Forthcoming).  The 
covariates for the main treaty ratification equation remain identical to those reported in Chapter 
3.  For the deeper commitment equation, I exclude the number of available human rights treaties 
as well as the percentage of Muslim populations.  Theoretically, these two covariates are not 
associated with autocratic decisions to accept extra monitoring or enforcement obligations. 
 
4.5 Empirical Analysis 
Tables 4.3 through 4.7 present estimates of the effect of SOLS change on main human rights 
treaty commitment and acceptance of extra monitoring/enforcement mechanisms.  The columns 
labeled as SUR BVP show the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit results on each human rights 
treaties commitment (upper half of the table) and deeper commitment to that treaty (lower half of 
the table).  The columns labeled as individual logit show the effects of the covariates on a deeper 
commitment to each human rights treaty.  The results strongly support my theoretical 
expectations and also suggest a few more nuanced findings. 
 As I expected in H4.1, autocratic leaders with different support bases from their 
predecessors are likely to accept extra monitoring mechanisms from those human rights treaties 
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that grant general rights protections.  More importantly, these autocrats also accept even extra 
monitoring mechanisms over which they have relatively less control.  In particular, autocrats 
with SOLS change are positively associated with the acceptance of individual complaints as well 
as inter-state complaints under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
(Table 4.3).  The results are statistically significant and robust both in the seemingly unrelated 
bivariate probit and individual logit models.   
The results suggest that autocrats with new support bases attempt to render their human 
rights commitments to general populations more credible by accepting even the costliest 
monitoring mechanisms.  Although accepting such relatively costly monitoring mechanisms, 
such as individual complaints of the ICCPR, does not necessarily translate into improvement of 
such rights conditions (Smith-Cannoy 2012),38 it offers one of few domestically non-available 
institutional tools for citizens to make a dent in human rights situations under authoritarian rules 
(Cole 2006; Smith-Cannoy 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Smith-Cannoy discusses “significant deterioration of civil and political rights including censorship of 
the media, efforts to undermine the access to justice, and the systematic use of torture to extract 
confessions,” following “commitment to the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights” in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (168).  She argues that partnership with NGOs and 
local IGOs has a key role in triggering such monitoring mechanisms’ positive impacts on improvement of 
rights conditions even in insincere ratifiers (3). 
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TABLE 4.3: Deeper Commitments to the ICCPR, 1966-2008 (during autocratic tenure) 
 Individual complaints Inter-state complaints 
SUR BVP 
(1) 
individual logit 
(2) 
SUR BVP 
(3) 
individual logit 
(4) 
Dependent variables:                       Accepting individual complaints Accepting inter-state complaints 
SOLS change 0.796** 1.516*** 1.202** 1.792** 
 (0.320) (0.482) (0.482) (0.888) 
years in power 0.044*** 0.080*** 0.046** 0.068*** 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.021) (0.026) 
multiparty 0.237 0.055 0.508 0.187 
 (0.353) (0.537) (0.611) (0.843) 
independent judiciary -0.508 -0.544 1.002*** 1.285* 
 (0.353) (0.517) (0.353) (0.685) 
latent HR score 0.075 0.250 -0.546 -0.568 
 (0.217) (0.250) (0.454) (0.522) 
common law -0.573* -0.997* -0.028 -0.319 
 (0.309) (0.559) (0.387) (0.670) 
regional autocratic ratifications 0.209** 0.366* -0.208 0.078 
 (0.107) (0.214) (0.171) (0.218) 
constant -2.420*** -4.511*** -4.737*** -7.044*** 
 (0.623) (1.169) (1.559) (1.851) 
 ↑  ↑  
Dependent variable: ICCPR ratification 
SOLS change 0.136  0.132  
 (0.228)  (0.227)  
N of available HRAs -0.076  -0.159*  
 (0.073)  (0.086)  
years in power 0.050***  0.052***  
 (0.012)  (0.012)  
multiparty 0.324  0.378  
 (0.237)  (0.238)  
independent judiciary -0.135  -0.151  
 (0.210)  (0.212)  
latent HR score 0.034  0.065  
 (0.121)  (0.120)  
common law -0.492**  -0.510**  
 (0.232)  (0.238)  
Muslim 0.001  0.004  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  
regional autocratic ratifications 0.221**  0.213**  
 (0.095)  (0.098)  
constant -1.286***  -1.011*  
 (0.482)  (0.524)  
rho 0.976 
(0.084) 
 0.777* 
(0.220) 
 
log pseudo-likelihood -124.52 -71.18 -99.58 -35.66 
N 170 243 170 265 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Wald test shows that rho is not significantly different from zero 
(p=0.217) in the SUR BVP regarding individual complaints while it is significantly different from zero (p=0.061) 
in the SUR BVP regarding inter-state complaints.  *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Results regarding the CAT require a more cautious interpretation (Table 4-4).  SOLS 
change is positively associated with acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction as well as with inquiries.  The 
results on inquiries are statistically significant at the 5 percent level and robust across models; 
however, the results on the ICJ jurisdiction are only statistically significant with the seemingly 
unrelated bivariate probit model at the 10 percent level.  It does not affect acceptance of other 
types of monitoring/enforcement from the CAT, including individual complaints, inter-state 
complaints, and regular visits.  
The Convention against Torture directly and specifically regulates one of the most 
effective policy tools of authoritarian governance: violence.  Autocrats face two conflicting 
incentives when deciding whether to accept extra monitoring and enforcement obligations.  They 
value appearing to adopt broad-based governance as a means of differentiating themselves from 
their autocratic or democratic predecessors in the eyes of general populations by committing to 
treaties concerning general human rights, including physical integrity rights.  At the same time, 
they equally value maintaining the use of violence as an effective policy tool to supervise, deter, 
and eliminate potential regime dissidents.  Thus, they need to ensure that they have sufficient 
control over the initiation and proceedings of accepted monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.  
This explains why only the effects of SOLS change on the ICJ jurisdiction and inquiries, both of 
which require a high threshold to be invoked and allow more state involvement during the 
process, are positive, and not those of individual complaints and regular visits, as expected in 
H4-2.  The null result of accepting inter-state complaints is an exception.  
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TABLE 4.4: Deeper Commitments to the CAT, 1984-2008 (during autocratic tenure) 
 ICJ jurisdiction Individual complaints Inter-state complaints 
SUR BVP 
 
(1) 
individual 
logit 
(2) 
SUR BVP 
 
(3) 
individual 
logit 
(4) 
SUR BVP 
 
(5) 
individual 
logit 
(6) 
Dependent variables:         Accepting ICJ jurisdiction Accepting individual 
complaints 
Accepting inter-state 
complaints 
SOLS change 0.423* 0.695 -0.212 -0.614 -0.246 -0.651 
 (0.250) (0.442) (0.360) (0.650) (0.338) (0.772) 
years in power 0.046*** 0.093*** 0.016 0.031 0.023* 0.049 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.014) (0.026) (0.014) (0.031) 
multiparty 0.115 0.336 -0.104 0.368 -0.338 -0.321 
 (0.284) (0.501) (0.405) (0.813) (0.371) (0.927) 
independent judiciary 0.100 0.545 0.097 0.434 0.381 1.294 
 (0.267) (0.483) (0.412) (0.706) (0.385) (0.791) 
latent HR score -0.029 -0.021 -0.034 0.0705 -0.283 -0.197 
 (0.145) (0.224) (0.164) (0.346) (0.208) (0.420) 
common law -0.628** -1.003** -5.319***  -0.754* -1.640 
 (0.278) (0.470) (0.331)  (0.388) (1.135) 
regional autocratic  0.610*** 1.022*** 0.229** 0.388** 0.320** 0.540 
ratifications (0.129) (0.245) (0.110) (0.191) (0.133) (0.336) 
constant -3.680*** -6.923*** -2.394*** -4.544*** -3.010*** -5.894*** 
 (0.777) (1.523) (0.589) (1.267) (0.780) (2.069) 
 ↑  ↑  ↑  
Dependent variable: CAT ratification 
SOLS change 0.490**  0.452*  0.452*  
 (0.233)  (0.234)  (0.234)  
N of available HRAs -0.060  -0.010  -0.008  
 (0.054)  (0.071)  (0.071)  
years in power 0.064***  0.061***  0.061***  
 (0.012)  (0.020)  (0.012)  
multiparty 0.068  0.119  0.114  
 (0.239)  (0.241)  (0.647)  
independent judiciary -0.010  0.031  0.036  
 (0.251)  (0.250)  (0.251)  
latent HR score -0.014  -0.061  -0.065  
 (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.135)  
common law -0.641**  -0.672***  -0.663***  
 (0.250)  (0.241)  (0.243)  
Muslim 0.003  0.002  0.002  
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
regional autocratic  0.547***  0.541***  0.543***  
ratifications (0.114)  (0.112)  (0.115)  
constant -3.180***  -3.325  -3.365  
 (0.645)  (0.630)  (0.638)  
rho 1*** 
(2.74e-11) 
 0.712*** 
(0.143) 
 0.732*** 
(0.130) 
 
log pseudo-likelihood -113.14 -80.12 -110.62 -42.81 -111.32 -39.10 
N 202 213 202 160 202 236 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Wald test shows that rho is significantly different from zero 
(p=0.000, 0.002, and 0.000) in the SUR BVP regarding ICJ jurisdiction, individual complaints, and inter-state 
complaints, respectively.  Common law variable is dropped from model (4) due to perfect prediction of an 
outcome.  *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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TABLE 4.4 (continued): Deeper Commitments to the CAT, 1984-2008  
         (during autocratic tenure)  
 Inquiries Regular visits 
SUR BVP 
(7) 
individual logit 
(8) 
individual logit 
(9) 
Dependent variables:                        Accepting inquiries Accepting regular visits 
SOLS change 0.656** 1.027** 0.952 
 (0.261) (0.427) (1.004) 
years in power 0.056*** 0.105*** -0.038 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.075) 
multiparty -0.043 0.026  
 (0.265) (0.459)  
independent judiciary 0.056 0.372 -0.859 
 (0.262) (0.460) (0.907) 
latent HR score -0.060 -0.080 0.851* 
 (0.142) (0.224) (0.435) 
common law -0.621** -0.977** -0.358 
 (0.258) (0.450) (2.383) 
regional autocratic ratifications 0.536*** 0.964*** -0.108 
 (0.125) (0.217) (0.882) 
constant -3.492*** -6.551*** -1.801 
 (0.736) (1.325) (5.169) 
 ↑   
Dependent variable: CAT ratification    
SOLS change 0.523**   
 (0.243)   
N of available HRAs -0.065   
 (0.046)   
years in power 0.066***   
 (0.012)   
multiparty 0.064   
 (0.262)   
independent judiciary -0.035   
 (0.250)   
latent HR score -0.018   
 (0.150)   
common law -0.695***   
 (0.243)   
Muslim 0.003*   
 (0.002)   
regional autocratic ratifications 0.558***   
 (0.120)   
constant -3.237***   
 (0.659)   
rho 1 
(6.23e-10) 
  
log pseudo-likelihood -109.10 -84.297 -16.946 
N 202 213 78 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Wald test shows that rho is not significantly 
different from zero (p=0.212) in the SUR BVP regarding inquiries.  Regarding regular visits, 
the SUR BVP fails to produce maximum likelihood, so only individual logit results are 
reported in model (9).  Multiparty variable is dropped from model (9) due to perfect 
prediction of an outcome.    *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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 Interestingly, SOLS change is positively associated with the main CAT ratification at 5 to 
10 percent levels across different seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models.  When controlling 
for SOLS change, the effect of the presence of multiparty, which has long been considered as the 
main cause of autocratic ratification of the CAT in the literature (Conrad 2014; Vreeland 2008), 
loses its statistical significance.  Substantively, this may suggest that the underlying reason 
autocrats ratify the CAT is to grant policy concessions to the general masses rather than to the 
opposition groups, as claimed in the existing literature.   
 The other significant covariates behave as expected across all estimations.  Overall, 
autocrats are likely to ratify the CAT main treaty as well as to accept extra monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms of the CAT as they stay in power longer.  Common law is associated 
with both the main treaty ratification and acceptance of extra monitoring and enforcement in 
consistently negative ways.  When a region relevant to a given autocrat is dense with various 
human rights treaty memberships, that autocrat is more likely to ratify the main CAT treaty and 
accept extra monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
Tables 4-5 through 4-7 present another supportive evidence to H4-1 and H4-2.  When it 
comes to human rights treaties concerning minority rights, autocratic leaders with new support 
bases are not likely to accept extra monitoring and enforcement mechanisms beyond those over 
which they have more control.  Such autocrats are likely to accept only ICJ jurisdictions from the 
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Table 4-5), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Table 4-6), and 
the Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights (Table 4-7).  The results are robust to different 
estimation techniques except for the CEDAW (Table 4-6).  The effect of SOLS change on 
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accepting ICJ jurisdiction under the CEDAW is only significant in individual logit.  When 
accounting for possible endogeneity, its impact disappears. 
With respect to the ICERD, autocrats with new support bases are not associated with 
accepting individual complaints in any significant way (Table 4-5).  With the CEDAW, such 
autocrats are also not associated with accepting individual complaints and inquiries in significant 
ways (Table 4-6).  Interestingly, however, the presence of multiparty affects autocratic leaders’ 
acceptance of individual complaints and inquiries from the CEDAW at the 10 percent level.  
This effect is robust to different model estimation techniques.  This, again, suggests that when 
autocrats accept individual complaints and inquiries, their target audience is opposition groups 
rather than the general masses.  The significant covariates, such as years in power, common law, 
and regional autocratic ratification rates, behave as expected in general.  
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TABLE 4.5: Deeper Commitments to the ICERD, 1966-2008 (during autocratic tenure) 
 ICJ jurisdiction  Individual complaints 
individual logit 
(3) 
SUR BVP 
(1) 
individual logit 
(2) 
Dependent variables:                 Accepting ICJ compulsory jurisdiction Accepting individual complaints 
SOLS change 0.617** 0.978** 0.017 
 (0.291) (0.425) (0.861) 
years in power 0.036*** 0.061*** 0.022 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.028) 
multiparty -0.364 -0.409 0.197 
 (0.298) (0.491) (1.182) 
independent judiciary 0.345 0.696* 0.558 
 (0.266) (0.383) (1.043) 
latent HR score -0.029 0.131 0.629* 
 (0.157) (0.299) (0.373) 
common law -0.055 -0.129  
 (0.318) (0.428)  
regional autocratic ratifications 0.097 0.141 0.342*** 
 (0.112) (0.184) (0.119) 
constant -1.511 -2.852*** -5.181*** 
 (0.497) (0.907) (1.559) 
 ↑   
Dependent variable: ICERD ratification 
SOLS change 0.245   
 (0.362)   
N of available HRAs -0.240   
 (0.146)   
years in power 0.060***   
 (0.014)   
multiparty -0.507   
 (0.371)   
independent judiciary 0.320   
 (0.354)   
latent HR score -0.049   
 (0.173)   
common law -0.184   
 (0.511)   
Muslim 0.003   
 (0.004)   
regional autocratic ratifications 0.182   
 (0.135)   
constant -0.417   
 (0.653)   
/athrho 14.101*** 
(3.697) 
  
log pseudo-likelihood -82.15 -78.74 -27.46 
N 108 147 186 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Wald test shows that rho is significantly different from zero 
(p=0.0001) in the SUR BVP.  Regarding individual complaints, the SUR BVP fails to produce maximum 
likelihood, so only individual logit results are reported in model (3).  Common law variable is dropped from 
model (3) due to perfect prediction of an outcome. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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TABLE 4.6: Deeper Commitments to the CEDAW, 1979-2008 (during autocratic tenure) 
 ICJ jurisdiction Individual complaints Inquiries 
SUR BVP 
 
(1) 
individual 
logit 
(2) 
SUR BVP 
 
(3) 
individual 
logit 
(4) 
SUR BVP 
 
(5) 
individual 
logit 
(6) 
Dependent variables:         Accepting ICJ jurisdiction Accepting individual complaints Accepting inquiries 
SOLS change 0.372 0.881** 0.693 0.239 0.693 0.239 
 (0.242) (0.363) (0.488) (0.577) (0.488) (0.577) 
years in power 0.022* 0.0568*** 0.060** 0.133*** 0.060** 0.133*** 
 (0.011) (0.0165) (0.029) (0.034) (0.029) (0.034) 
multiparty 0.247 0.204 1.131* 1.838* 1.131* 1.838* 
 (0.232) (0.400) (0.610) (0.947) (0.610) (0.947) 
independent judiciary -0.114 0.0859 -0.154 0.327 -0.154 0.327 
 (0.221) (0.325) (0.624) (0.754) (0.624) (0.754) 
latent HR score 0.244 0.238 0.478 0.483 0.478 0.483 
 (0.157) (0.226) (0.395) (0.350) (0.395) (0.350) 
common law -0.055 -0.0172 -7.765*** -1.647 -7.765*** -1.647 
 (0.261) (0.372) (0.745) (1.224) (0.745) (1.224) 
regional autocratic  0.167* 0.140 0.259 1.169*** 0.259 1.169*** 
ratifications (0.098) (0.148) (0.374) (0.411) (0.374) (0.411) 
constant -1.130** -2.444*** -3.947* -10.24*** -3.947* -10.24*** 
 (0.511) (0.718) (2.056) (2.435) (2.056) (2.435) 
 ↑  ↑  ↑  
Dependent variable: CEDAW ratification 
SOLS change 0.023  -0.493  -0.493  
 (0.232)  (0.425)  (0.425)  
N of available HRAs -0.087  0.090  0.090  
 (0.056)  (0.137)  (0.137)  
years in power 0.044***  0.032  0.032  
 (0.011)  (0.024)  (0.024)  
multiparty 0.531**  0.254  0.254  
 (0.235)  (0.559)  (0.559)  
independent judiciary -0.193  1.023*  1.023*  
 (0.220)  (0.558)  (0.558)  
latent HR score 0.220  0.032  0.032  
 (0.144)  (0.339)  (0.339)  
common law 0.020  -0.793  -0.793  
 (0.275)  (0.608)  (0.608)  
Muslim -0.002  -0.012**  -0.012**  
 (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
regional autocratic  0.314***  0.688**  0.688**  
ratifications (0.112)  (0.333)  (0.333)  
constant -0.800  -2.247  -2.247  
 (0.511)  (1.439)  (1.439)  
rho 1*** 
(1.56e-13) 
 1 
(0.000) 
 1 
(0.000) 
 
log pseudo-likelihood -132.88 -107.92 -33.62 -42.03 -33.62 -42.03 
N 154 187 48 120 48 120 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  The results for the CEDAW individual complaints are the same as the 
results for the CEDAW inquiries.  Autocratic countries that accept individual complaints also accept inquiries under 
the CEDAW in my dataset.  Only two out of five countries that opt out of inquiries under the CEDAW are autocracies 
in my dataset.  Cuba has not accepted individual complaints to date, and Tajikistan accepted individual complaints in 
2014, beyond the timeframe of my dataset.  Wald test shows that rho is significantly different from zero (p=0.000) in 
the SUR BVP regarding ICJ jurisdiction while it is not significantly different from zero (p=0.9903) in the SUR BVP 
regarding individual complaints and inquiries.  *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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TABLE 4.7: Deeper Commitments to the CMWR, 1990-2008  
                                                   (during autocratic tenure)  
 ICJ jurisdiction 
SUR BVP 
(7) 
individual logit 
(8) 
Dependent variables:                        Accepting ICJ jurisdiction 
SOLS change 1.003*** 1.027** 
 (0.344) (0.427) 
years in power 0.088*** 0.105*** 
 (0.019) (0.022) 
multiparty 0.535 0.026 
 (0.560) (0.459) 
independent judiciary 0.573 0.372 
 (0.373) (0.460) 
latent HR score -0.025 -0.080 
 (0.208) (0.224) 
common law -0.895* -0.977** 
 (0.495) (0.450) 
regional autocratic ratifications 0.864*** 0.964*** 
 (0.202) (0.217) 
constant -7.606*** -6.551*** 
 (1.297) (1.325) 
 ↑  
Dependent variables: CMWR ratification   
SOLS change 0.988***  
 (0.343)  
N of available HRAs -0.073  
 (0.045)  
years in power 0.104***  
 (0.022)  
multiparty 0.760  
 (0.573)  
independent judiciary 0.697*  
 (0.377)  
latent HR score -0.046  
 (0.209)  
common law -0.786  
 (0.493)  
Muslim 0.005  
 (0.003)  
regional autocratic ratifications 0.907***  
 (0.205)  
constant -8.217***  
 (1.375)  
rho 1*** 
(1.49e-12) 
 
log pseudo-likelihood -40.23 -84.297 
N 193 213 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Wald test shows that rho 
is significantly different from zero (p=0.000) in the SUR BVP.  *** 
p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
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4.6 Conclusion  
In Chapters 3 and 4, I have examined the first set of substantive questions that I ask in this 
dissertation, that is, autocratic legal participations with international human rights treaties both 
horizontally and vertically.  Focusing on domestic politics, I argue that autocrats achieve power 
with leader support base, distinct from that of outgoing leaders pursue multiple human rights 
treaty ratifications either concurrently or throughout tenure.  Specifically, such autocrats lacking 
ready-made institutional tools from the predecessors as well as dealing with higher uncertainty 
about political aspirations of new elites seek out extra legitimacy or approval from the citizens to 
deter potential challenges from new regime insiders.  Memberships in various international 
human rights treaties can be one of many policy concessions that such autocrats can devise to 
win over the general populations by signaling that their governments are based on broader 
populations rather than specific segments of the societies.   
This chapter presents empirical evaluations of implications drawn from the theoretical 
discussion in Chapter 3.  It offers supportive evidence that autocrats with different support bases 
from their predecessors are likely to accept extra monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of 
human rights treaties granting general human rights protections as opposed to minority rights 
protections.  Also, when they commit deeply to human rights treaties, they are likely to accept 
those monitoring and enforcement mechanisms over which they have relatively more control. 
 This chapter suggests that commitment to legal obligations under human rights treaties is 
more nuanced than existing studies have indicated.  Although the scope of this chapter focuses 
on only procedural means, states can level their treaty commitments in terms of accepting or 
refusing extra substantive obligations.  First, they can declare to embrace extra substantive treaty 
obligations by accepting Optional Protocols, such as the second protocol on the abolition of 
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death penalty to the ICCPR.  States can also lodge reservations upon ratifications to limit the 
scope of prescribed substantive treaty obligations.39  Thus, for future studies, I will create a 
variable of level of ratification to accounts for the depth of treaty commitment to the nine core 
UN human rights treaties from 1966 to 2008.  This adjustment will produce a complete and 
exhaustive picture of states’ treaty commitment (See Table 4A-2 for the proposed structure of the 
variable). 
 In next chapter, I switch the focus of discussion from legal aspects to autocratic 
bureaucratic participations in other international human rights institutions.  Despite heavy 
scholarly attention to treaty commitment and compliance, autocratic states are not foreign to 
global human rights discourses occurring in other international human rights institutions and 
some of them participate in these venues as proactively as other democratic countries (Waltz 
2001, 2004).  To answer the second set of substantive questions of the dissertation, I will look 
into why some autocracies issue recommendations on peer states’ human rights policies and 
practices in the United Nations Universal Periodic Review more actively and meaningfully than 
their autocratic peers. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 In this study, reservation variables do not include reservations, declarations, or understandings (RUDs) 
regarding procedural obligations, such as opting out the ICJ jurisdiction. This kind of state declarations is 
separately coded for the ICJ jurisdiction variable.  
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4.7 Appendix 
 
Table 4A.1: Relevant Legal Texts for Monitoring and Enforcement Procedures 
Individual 
communications 
Article 14 of the ICERD 
1. A State Party may at any time declare that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and 
consider communications from individuals or groups of individuals within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims 
of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in this Convention. No communication shall be 
received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. 
First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
Article 1 
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the 
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall be 
received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present 
Protocol. 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR 
Article 2 Communications 
Communications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction 
of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in 
the Covenant by that State Party. Where a communication is submitted on behalf of individuals or groups of 
individuals, this shall be with their consent unless the author can justify acting on their behalf without such 
consent. 
Optional Protocol to the CEDAW 
Article 2  
Communications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction 
of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Convention by that State 
Party. Where a communication is submitted on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, this shall be with 
their consent unless the author can justify acting on their behalf without such consent. 
Article 22 of the CAT 
1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence 
of the Committee to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its 
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the Convention. No 
communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a 
declaration. 
Optional Protocol on a Communication Procedure to the CRC 
Article 5  
Individual  communications 
1.Communications may be submitted by or on behalf of an individual or group of individuals, within the 
jurisdiction of a State party, claiming to be victims of a violation by that State party of any of the rights set forth 
in any of the following instruments to which that State is a party: 
o! The Convention; 
o! The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography; 
o! The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict. 
2.Where a communication is submitted on behalf of an individual or group of individuals, this shall be with their 
consent unless the author can justify acting on their behalf without such consent. 
Article 77 of the ICMWR 
1. A State Party to the present Convention may at any time declare under the present article that it recognizes the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to 
its jurisdiction who claim that their individual rights as established by the present Convention have been violated 
by that State Party. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party that has not 
made such a declaration. 
Optional Protocol to the CRPD 
Article 1  
1. A State Party to the present Protocol (“State Party”) recognizes the competence of the Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (“the Committee”) to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of 
individuals or groups of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State 
Party of the provisions of the Convention.  
Article 31 of the ICED 
1. A State Party may at the time of ratification of this Convention or at any time afterwards declare that it 
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of 
individuals subject to its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by this State Party of provisions of this 
Convention. The Committee shall not admit any communication concerning a State Party which has not made 
such a declaration.  
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Inter-state 
complaints 
Articles 11-13 of the ICERD (mandatory*) 
Article 11 
1. If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention, it 
may bring the matter to the attention of the Committee. The Committee shall then transmit the 
communication to the State Party concerned. Within three months, the receiving State shall submit to the 
Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been 
taken by that State.  
Article 41 of the ICCPR 
1. A State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that 
another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant. Communications under this article 
may be received and considered only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in 
regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it 
concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. Communications received under this article shall be 
dealt with in accordance with the following procedure: 
Article 10 of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR  
Article 10 Inter-State communications 
1. A State Party to the present Protocol may at any time declare under the present article that it recognizes the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that 
another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant. Communications under the present article 
may be received and considered only if submitted by a State Party that has made a declaration recognizing in 
regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it 
concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. Communications received under the present article 
shall be dealt with in accordance with the following procedure: 
Article 21 of the CAT 
1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence 
of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State 
Party is not fulfilling its obligations under this Convention. Such communications may be received and 
considered according to the procedures laid down in this article only if submitted by a State Party which has made 
a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be dealt 
with by the Committee under this article if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. 
Communications received under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the following procedure; 
Article 12 of the Optional Protocol on a Communication Procedure to the CRC 
Inter-State communications 
1. A State party to the present Protocol may, at any time, declare that it recognizes the competence of the 
Committee to receive and consider 
communications  in  which  a  State  party  claims  that  another  State  party  is  not… 
Article 76 of the ICMWR 
1. A State Party to the present Convention may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that 
another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Convention. Communications under this 
article may be received and considered only if submitted by a State Party that has made a declaration recognizing 
in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it 
concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. Communications received under this article shall be 
dealt with in accordance with the following procedure: 
Article 32 of the ICED 
A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to 
receive and consider communications in which a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its 
obligations under this Convention. The Committee shall not receive communications concerning a State Party 
which has not made such a declaration, nor communications from a State Party which has not made such a 
declaration.  
Inquiries Article 11 of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR 
Article 11 Inquiry procedure 
1. A State Party to the present Protocol may at any time declare that it recognizes the competence of the 
Committee provided for under the present article 
Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW (Article 10 to opt out) 
Article 10  
1. Each State Party may, at the time of signature or ratification of the present Protocol or accession thereto, 
declare that it does not recognize the competence of the Committee provided for in articles 8 and 9. 
2. Any State Party having made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of the present article may, at any 
time, withdraw this declaration by notification to the Secretary-General. 
Article 20 of the CAT (Article 28 to opt out) 
1. If the Committee receives reliable information which appears to it to contain well-founded indications that 
torture is being systematically practised in the territory of a State Party, the Committee shall invite that State Party 
to co-operate in the examination of the information and to this end to submit observations with regard to the 
information concerned. 
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Article 28 
1. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or accession thereto, declare 
that it does not recognize the competence of the Committee provided for in article 20. 
2. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with paragraph I of this article may, at any time, 
withdraw this reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Article 13 of the Optional Protocol on a Communication Procedure to the CRC (paragraph 
7 to opt out) 
7. Each State party may, at the time of signature or ratification of the present Protocol or accession thereto, 
declare that it does not recognize the competence of the Committee provided for in the present article in respect 
of the rights set forth in some or all of the instruments listed in paragraph 1. 
Article 6 of the Optional Protocol to the CRPD (Article 8 to opt out) 
Article 8  
Each State Party may, at the time of signature or ratification of the present Protocol or accession thereto, declare 
that it does not recognize the competence of the Committee provided for in articles 6 and 7.  
Article 33 of the ICED (mandatory*) 
1. If the Committee receives reliable information indicating that a State Party is seriously violating the provisions 
of this Convention, it may, after consultation with the State Party concerned, request one or more of its members 
to undertake a visit and report back to it without delay.  
2. The Committee shall notify the State Party concerned, in writing, of its intention to organize a visit, indicating 
the composition of the delegation and the purpose of the visit. The State Party shall answer the Committee within 
a reasonable time.  
3. Upon a substantiated request by the State Party, the Committee may decide to postpone or cancel its visit.  
4. If the State Party agrees to the visit, the Committee and the State Party concerned shall work together to define 
the modalities of the visit and the State Party shall provide the Committee with all the facilities needed for the 
successful completion of the visit.  
5. Following its visit, the Committee shall communicate to the State Party concerned its observations and 
recommendations.  
ICJ jurisdiction Article 22 of the ICERD  
Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this 
Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, 
shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for 
decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement. 
Article 29 of the CEDAW 
Article 29 
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present 
Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If 
within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of 
the arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in 
conformity with the Statute of the Court. 
2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or ratification of the present Convention or accession 
thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph I of this article. The other States Parties 
shall not be bound by that paragraph with respect to any State Party which has made such a reservation. 
3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article may at any time 
withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Article 30 of the CAT (paragraph 2 to opt out) 
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention 
which cannot be settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If 
within six months from thc date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of 
the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in 
conformity with the Statute of the Court. 
2. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or accession thereto, declare 
that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph I of this article. The other States Parties shall not be bound 
by paragraph I of this article with respect to any State Party having made such a reservation. 
3. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article may at any time 
withdraw this reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Article 92 of the ICMWR (paragraph 2 to opt out) 
2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or ratification of the present Convention or accession thereto 
declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of the present article. The other States Parties shall 
not be bound by that paragraph with respect to any State Party that has made such a declaration. 
Article 42 of the ICED (paragraph 2 to opt out) 
2. A State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or accession thereto, declare that it 
does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of this article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by 
paragraph 1 of this article with respect to any State Party having made such a declaration.  
NOTE: Relevant texts are drawn from The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring 
Bodies (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016c). Accessed on May 8, 2016. 
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Table 4A.2: Depth of Commitment 
Type Commitment 
Depth 
Manner Examples from the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 
Baseline - Ratify the main 
treaty 
- North Korea ratified the CRC on September 21, 1990. 
Substanc
e 
+ Accepting 
higher rights 
standards 
- Ratify a 
substantive 
Optional 
Protocol 
- Declare to 
accept higher 
rights obligations 
- Afghanistan acceded the on September 19, 2002.  
- The Government of Colombia, pursuant to article 2, 
paragraph 1(d) of the Convention, declares that for the 
purposes of article 38, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the 
Convention, the age referred to in said paragraphs shall be 
understood to be 18 years, given the fact that, under 
Colombian law, the minimum age for the recruitment into 
the armed forces of personnel called for military service is 
18 years.  
- Limiting 
rights 
obligations 
in the main 
treaty 
- Lodge a 
substantive 
reservation 
- The People’s Republic of China shall fulfill its 
obligations provided by article 16 of the Convention under 
the prerequisite that the Convention accords with the 
provisions of article 25 concerning family planning of the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and in 
conformity with the provisions of article 2 of the Law of 
Minor Children of the People’s Republic of China. 
Procedur
e 
(Monitor
ing/ 
Enforce
ment) 
+ Accepting 
higher 
monitoring 
standards 
- Ratify a 
procedural 
Optional 
Protocol on 
individual 
complaints/state 
complaints 
- Accept a 
procedural 
optional article 
on individual 
complaints/state 
complaints/inqui
ry 
- Accept the ICJ 
jurisdiction 
- Thailand ratified Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on a communication procedure on 
Sep 25, 2012. 
- According to article 12, first paragraph of the Optional 
Protocol, the Republic of Albania hereby declares it 
accepts the competence of the committee to receive and 
examine the communications in which a State party claims 
that anther state party does not meet its obligations under 
the instruments referred to in this paragraph (to) which the 
State is a party.  
- Refusing 
higher 
monitoring 
standards 
- Opt out of 
inquiry 
procedure 
- Opt out of the 
ICJ jurisdiction 
- Pursuant to Article 13, paragraph 7, of the Protocol, the 
Principality of Monaco wishes to indicate that it does not 
recognize the competence of the Committee provided for 
in the present article in respect of the rights set forth in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of children in armed conflict and the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography.  
NOTE: United Nations Treaty Collection. Database. Accessed on May 4, 2016. Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Vying for a Good Reputation: 
Autocratic Participation in the United Nations Universal Periodic Review 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
State recommendations are critical to the UPR, providing a yardstick in subsequent rounds by 
which to evaluate states’ implementations of accepted recommendations as well as the impact of 
this process on the ground.  Strikingly, autocratic members of the UN are neither uniformly 
vocal nor silent when given the opportunity to publicly name and shame peer states’ human 
rights violations.  During the first cycle of the UPR, from 2008 to 2011, Azerbaijan issued 337 
recommendations on other states’ human rights performances while the United Arab Emirates 
only issued twenty-nine (UPR-Info 2014b).  Recommendations from authoritarian states, 
moreover, vary a great deal in substance.  Some recommendations specifically request changes 
to domestic laws and institutions, such as Zimbabwe urging the United Arab Emirates to 
establish national laws to protect children’s rights (UPR-Info 2014b).  Other recommendations 
shift the spotlight away from a state’s dismal human rights practices, instead focusing on the lack 
of international assistance for human rights capacity building.  Still others compliment the state’s 
human rights policies instead of offering constructive criticism to help the state improve.  
This chapter explores my second set of substantive dissertation questions concerning why 
some autocracies issue recommendations on peer states’ human rights policies and practices in
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the UPR more actively and meaningfully than their autocratic peers.  I argue that autocratic 
recommenders use the UPR as a foreign policy tool to enhance their reputation in the eyes of the 
international audience either on their own or in relation to particular states under review.  The 
UPR’s interactive dialogue establishes unlimited, repetitive interactions between recommending 
and reviewed states, and this process determines the expected costs and benefits of shining 
international spotlights on peer states’ human rights practices and policies.  Thus, only autocratic 
states who are willing to bear the costs of temporarily straining bilateral relationships with 
reviewed states actively and meaningfully participate in the UPR’s interactive dialogue.  Such 
states view the benefits of an enhanced international reputation as human rights supporter as 
exceeding the risks of potential damage to bilateral relationships. 
I test the main argument using a newly extended dyadic data set of autocratic 
recommendations during the first cycle of the UPR (UPR-Info 2014b).  The results confirm that 
autocratic states’ concern for their international reputations is the key driving force in shaping 
their recommendations not only in quantity but also in substance.  I find that autocratic 
recommenders with prominent positions in other international human rights institutions, 
including members of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC, hereinafter), are more likely to 
issue a higher number of recommendations as well as recommendations requiring greater costs to 
the targeted state.  Autocracies holding positions of authority in other human rights institutions 
are subject to heightened scrutiny from the international community, including relevant human 
rights advocates, and are thus incentivized to demonstrate their commitment to human rights in 
the UPR’s interactive dialogue.  To further corroborate my reputational account of autocratic 
recommending behaviors, I rule out the alternative explanation that HRC member states simply 
have greater bureaucratic capacity to generate recommendations.  Instead, I show that autocratic 
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HRC member states are likely to issue not only a higher number of recommendations but also 
more meaningful recommendations.  At the same time, I show that my results are not driven by 
potential endogeneity by controlling for states’ candidacy for the HRC member elections before 
a given review.  Autocrats who are concerned with their general reputations might be more likely 
to establish HRC candidacy in the first place.  Nevertheless, even after controlling for autocratic 
HRC candidacy status, the impact of HRC membership on issuing more meaningful 
recommendations remains intact, and its substantive effect is much greater than that of the HRC 
candidacy.           
I also find that an authoritarian state with confrontational foreign relations with a state 
under review is more likely to make its adversary the subject of serious international scrutiny.  
Possessing a better standing on human rights relative to a state’s foreign policy adversary is one 
way among many in which to gain international approval of its general foreign policies.  
Conversely, domestic unrest, driven by dissatisfaction with the current autocratic governance, 
does not affect a state’s number of recommendations and is negatively associated with issuing 
serious recommendations in the UPR.  This suggests that autocracies utilize the UPR for 
enhancing their international standing either in general or with respect to a particular reviewed 
state rather than for improving their domestic legitimacy. 
 
5.2   The Institutional Design of the Universal Periodic Review 
The unique institutional features of the UPR’s interactive dialogue structure autocratic state 
decisions about how to behave.  I briefly review the UPR’s interactive dialogue, focusing on the 
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first cycle from 2008 to 2011, on which I  base my empirical analyses.40   
The UPR subjects all 192 UN member states’ human rights practices to peer states’ 
scrutiny at regular intervals, with an emphasis on United Nations Human Rights Council 
members.  Three UPR Working Groups, composed of all HRC member states and observer 
states, review forty-eight states per year in the four-year cycle.  The troika, consisting of three, 
randomly drawn HRC members from different regional groups, assists the state under review 
while preparing a national report.  The troika then oversees the review session of the UPR 
Working Group (Freedman 2011; McMahon 2012).   
The three-hour review session is based on three documents: 1) a twenty-page national 
report submitted by the reviewed state, 2) a ten-page document prepared by domestic 
stakeholders and NGOs, and 3) a ten-page document compiled by the Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights with help from human rights treaty bodies, special procedures, 
and relevant UN agencies (UPR-Info 2014d).  The review assesses whether the state under 
review honors its human rights duties from the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, ratified human rights treaties, voluntary pledges and commitments by the state, 
and applicable international humanitarian law (HRC Resolution A/HRC/RES/5/1, UPR-Info 
2014d).  
As Figure 5.1 illustrates, the UPR can be viewed as a repetitive interplay in which two 
main players – a recommending state and a state under review – strategically vie for reputation in 
front of international audiences.  In each review, the state under review presents its national 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Some details have changed after the revision of modalities by the HRC Resolution A/HRC/RES/16/21 
on March 25, 2011.  For example, the UPR review occurs every 4.5 years as opposed to 4 years after the 
second cycle (UPR-Info 2014c).  The overall strategic implications of UPR institutional design remain 
intact. 
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report and responds to written questions, submitted by peer states ten days prior.  The interactive 
dialogue follows in which peer states ask questions and issue recommendations to the reviewed 
state.  The reviewed state decides whether to accept these recommendations and will only be 
held accountable in the subsequent round of the UPR for the implementation of 
recommendations it accepts (McMahon 2012, 4; Abebe 2009).  This interactive dialogue results 
in an outcome report from the UPR Working Group, which is submitted to the plenary of the 
HRC for adoption (See Dominguez-Redondo [2012] and Freedman [2013, 261-6] for the details 
of the procedure).  This process recurs every four years, so today’s recommending state becomes 
tomorrow’s state under review.  Each state issues recommendations, therefore, at the risk of 
reciprocation from targeted states (Personal Interviews. January 22, 2016).  
 
Figure 5.1: Strategic three-way interactions in the Universal Periodic Review. 
NOTE: Both a recommending state and a state under review aim to obtain (or at 
least maintain) a good standing on human rights issues in front of the international 
community.  Red refers to what a recommending state can do and achieve while 
blue refers to what a reviewed state can do in response and obtain in the UPR’s 
interactive dialogue.  
International Audiences
State-under-Review
recommendation  (t)=>
<= retaliation (t+1)
Recommending State
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Traditional international relations literature posits that states are usually reluctant to be 
vocal about other states’ human rights situations under the principle of sovereignty (Waltz 1979).  
Indeed, the inter-state complaints mechanisms in the seven UN human rights treaties have never 
been used to date (Smith-Cannoy 2012).  If states decide to single out and punish an abusive 
state, they often do so in the name of multilateral institutions, such as the UN General Assembly, 
Human Rights Council, or World Bank (Lebovic and Voeten 2009).  In the meantime, the UPR 
officially provides a political opportunity that enables otherwise reluctant states to comment on 
others’ human rights records.  The UPR gives such states a way to publicly present themselves as 
serious participants in global human rights discourse.  Unlike resolutions condemning repressive 
governments from multilateral institutions, however, recommendations are still published in the 
name of a specific country rather than by the UPR as an institution.  Although at first glance, 
issuing verbal recommendations may seem low-stakes, the benefits of being viewed as a human 
rights caring active recommender do not come for free.  
But do states care about having a good reputation in the UPR’s interactive dialogue?  
Since the early days of global human rights institutionalization, starting with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, even states that were often considered oppressive have 
joined human rights discourses and advocated their versions of human rights (Donnelly 1984; 
Glendon 2002; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Waltz 2004).  States’ reactions to the UPR 
mechanism is similar.  Ninety-eight percent of states complied with the obligation to submit a 
written national report prior to a session, and eighty percent of them sent ministerial level 
representatives to the interactive dialogues (Dominguez-Redondo 2012, 695).  In McMahon’s 
interviews with diplomats, a Mexican representative said “countries are on the world stage 
during their review.  No one wants to look bad” (2012, 13).  A Bangladeshi public official said 
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that “not wanting to be seen to be doing poorly creates a sort of competition to see who has done 
the most” (2012, 13).  All states are exposed to each other, and their behaviors in the UPR 
become a matter of public record.  National reports, other stakeholders’ preparatory reports, 
recommendations, and all responses are recorded as official UN documents.  A UPR live 
webcast is even available from session 12.  A UN human rights specialist claims that states take 
the UPR process “more seriously than the state reporting procedure before treaty bodies” 
(Dominguez-Redondo 2012, 680).  A series of personal interviews with state delegates and 
relevant NGO staffs in Geneva confirm that most states want to be seen as human rights 
advocates in the UPR (January 19-20, 22, 25-6, 2016).        
 When issuing recommendations, a state has an opportunity to polish its own image while 
simultaneously improving or tarnishing the reputation of the targeted state.  Thus, it needs to 
consider the strategic implications of every move in the UPR process.  First of all, a state must 
decide on the number of recommendations it will issue to any given state under review.  Issuing 
a higher number of recommendations signals that the reviewing state cares about other states’ 
human rights conditions and is well-versed in those of the reviewed state.  Such 
recommendations may highlight areas for improvement in the reviewed state’s human rights 
policies and practices.  
The recommending state also needs to consider the levels of any recommendations it 
issues.  Unlike recommendations simply blaming the reviewed states’ lack of capacity and 
calling for international financial or technical assistance, those calling for domestic policy or 
legal reforms are much more burdensome.  Such recommendations enable the reviewing state to 
impress upon the international audience that it takes human rights issues seriously.   
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However, such specific recommendations also impose the highest costs on the reviewed 
state in terms of implementation, accountability, and reputation.  Not only does the reviewed 
state need to secure financial resources to carry out changes in domestic institutions and laws, 
but it also needs to go through the process of gaining approval for these changes from its 
domestic constituents (Simmons 2009a).  In democracies, it is not usually easy to get around 
many veto players (Tsebelis 2002).  For example, the U.S. continuously refused to accept many 
states’ recommendations during the first cycle that it ratify the CEDAW or abolish the death 
penalty (UPR-Info 2014b).  In autocracies, although leaders are relatively less constrained than 
their democratic counterparts, they may be reluctant to change domestic rules due to the social 
and political costs, especially if they have long relied on religious or ethnic discrimination 
(Simmons 2009a).   
Additionally, the reviewed state bears extra accountability costs if it decides to accept 
such recommendations.  States will be held accountable for the implementations of accepted 
recommendations in the following cycle (Human Rights Council 2011, A/HRC/RES/16/21).  If 
they fail to implement them, they will be yet again subject to international naming and shaming, 
and their problem areas will continue to be the focus of the international spotlight until they are 
addressed.   
Rejecting meaningful recommendations can also have serious reputation costs for the 
reviewed state.  The reviewed state wants to exhibit itself as a serious participant by listening to 
peer states’ recommendations and accepting them.  Even rejected recommendations reveal the 
weaknesses in the reviewed state’s human rights practices to the public.  For example, while Iran 
accepted 123 out of 188 recommendations in the first cycle, other states and NGOs still harshly 
criticized the fact that it rejected forty-five of them, especially the recommendations addressing 
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the violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrations following the 2009 elections (Unrepresented 
Nations and Peoples Organization, 11 June 2010).  In fact, states rejected only fifteen percent of 
recommendations in the first cycle (McMahon 2012).  
In turn, the recommending state also needs to consider the potential negative 
consequences of straining bilateral relations with the reviewed state by inviting a serious 
international spotlight with specific recommendations (Personal Interviews. January 22 and 26, 
2016).  The targeted state might issue a diplomatic statement to express its resentment toward 
specific reviewer states in its official response to the UPR.  Mohammad Javad Larijani, 
secretary-general of Iran’s High Council for Human Rights, asked the following in Iran’s 
response to the HRC after its UPR review in 2010: “Were they [the U.S.-run detention facilities 
at Abu Ghraib, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay] closed down with the same speed? … There is 
violence against women in the U.S.  There are violations everywhere.  But the question is which 
country’s policies are used as the basis for measuring the violations” (Memarian 2010, emphasis 
added ).  The state under review may even retaliate by withholding political, military, or 
economic favors outside the human rights realm in its bilateral relations with the reviewer state. 
In addition, when the states’ roles are reversed in the following round, the former 
reviewed state is likely to issue similarly incriminating recommendations.  For autocratic 
recommending states with poor human rights records, this expected retaliation of naming and 
shaming in the next cycle of the UPR is particularly costly as it increases the chance of being 
caught and monitored for its own violations, which might otherwise remain unnoticed.  
Autocracies are found to be more susceptible to international naming and shaming than 
democracies (Hendrix and Wong 2013). 
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5.3 Recommending in the UPR as a Foreign Policy Tool  
I argue that only autocracies who care about their international standing as pro-human rights will 
risk the potential costs of issuing both a higher volume of and more meaningful 
recommendations in the UPR.  In particular, autocratic reviewers actively take part in the UPR 
process only when they need to look good, either generally or in comparison with a particular 
reviewed state before an international audience, in order to advance their broader foreign policy 
agendas. 
A good reputation41 is rewarding to a state for two main reasons (Erickson 2014).  First, a 
state that looks credible in the eyes of other international actors is more likely to obtain tangible 
policy gains.  Such a state could leverage that credibility both to deter future threats from 
potential opponents (Erickson 2014) and to secure future opportunities for cooperation as well as 
better terms in that cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Fearon 1998; Tomz 2011).  Second, states seek 
to establish good reputations due to their intangible benefits.  States often associate themselves 
with international groups that are widely regarded as legitimate, through memberships or by 
adopting policies in conformity with the international community (Cole 2005; Erickson 2014; 
O’Neill 1999).  With good international standing, a state is in a better position to exert “social 
influence” and “moral authority” to “bring fellow states’ preferences in line with its own” 
(Erickson 2014, 182).  A state may also view having a good reputation as intrinsically valuable 
(Wendt 1999). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Mercer defines reputation as an external judgment of a state’s character, which is used to forecast its 
future behavior in international conflicts and cooperation (1999, 6, recited from Erickson 2014, 181).  
Erickson rightly notes that this term has been used interchangeably in international relations with 
expressions such as “standing, status, prestige, and honor” (2014, 181). A state can hold a reputation both 
generally and in relation to a specific state or a group of states (Erickson 2014). 
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Striving for General Reputations  
First of all, autocratic states with high profile positions in international human rights institutions, 
such as members of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), strive to maintain or shape a 
favorable image of themselves as human rights advocates.  HRC memberships can be valuable to 
autocratic states because they enable the states to influence and exchange policies within the 
HRC by affecting the text of HRC resolutions and the agenda of the institution (Voeten 2013).  
HRC memberships also provide autocratic leaders with a means of prestige and patronage 
(Voeten 2013).  Assuming that autocrats stay in power by offering private benefits to their small, 
ruling coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003), HRC memberships provide the means by 
which autocrats generate the material assets that form these private benefits.  Voeten states that 
“UNHRC memberships increase the size and relevance of diplomatic missions.  Individual 
postings at IOs are attractive retirement positions for elites who have outlived their domestic 
usefulness.  The ability to promote domestic elites to international organizations can be useful to 
governments and comforting to current elites, given that these positions are generally well 
compensated and in attractive locales” (2013, 4).  
Given the rewards of obtaining HRC memberships, autocratic states often seek to acquire 
them.  Once they achieve these positions of international authority, however, they face more 
monitoring pressure to behave as the HRC prescribes (Voeten 2013).  When a state joins the 
HRC, the state’s position on human rights issues becomes a salient matter before domestic and 
international audiences (Voeten 2013).  The UPR also reviews HRC member states’ human 
rights practices with a particular emphasis (HRC Decision 6/102 2007).  Thus, the behavior of 
HRC member states in the UPR as both reviewer and reviewee receives more attention from 
international communities, such as Western states and NGOs.  Voeten shows that Amnesty 
!
!
!
108!
International uses HRC member status as a focal point for its mobilization activities (2013, 5).  
Likewise, Universal Rights Group, a human rights NGO, along with the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, has drawn attention to HRC member states’ engagement within UN human 
rights mechanisms since 2015 (see yourHRC.org).   
Considering the international community’s special attention to HRC members during the 
UPR, authoritarian reviewers with HRC memberships strive to demonstrate that they are 
fulfilling their job well, as voluntarily pledged during their elections and delegated by the 
international community.  Authoritarian HRC member states issue a higher volume of 
recommendations, as well as those involving higher costs, in an effort to shore up their 
international reputations and avoid further criticisms.  Despite the expected costs of upsetting 
bilateral relations and incurring retaliation from today’s reviewed states, autocratic reviewers can 
utilize their HRC memberships as legitimate rationale when issuing many and serious 
recommendations to states under review.  Seeking to establish generally good reputations while 
avoiding any upset to bilateral relations with reviewed states, these recommending states refrain 
from singling out particular states for heightened international scrutiny but instead issue 
recommendations broadly. 
One may question whether HRC member status is simply a reflection of bureaucratic 
capacity as HRC members tend to have larger staffs and larger missions in Geneva.  If this is 
true, we need only observe that autocratic states with HRC member status issue a higher number 
of recommendations but that those recommendations are not necessarily more meaningful or 
serious.  Personal interviews with state delegates and relevant NGO staffs provide supportive 
anecdotes, suggesting that states with HRC membership care about their visibility as HRC 
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members in the UPR’s interactive dialogue (January 22 and 26, 2016).  I aim to adjudicate 
between the two different accounts with empirical tests.   
This expected behavior leads to the following hypotheses: 
H5-1a (bureaucratic capacity account): Authoritarian states are more likely to 
issue a higher number of recommendations when they are members of the 
HRC, irrespective of which states are under review, than those without 
HRC member status. 
H5-1b (reputational account): Authoritarian states with HRC memberships are 
more likely to make recommendations with higher costs, irrespective of 
which states are under review, than those without HRC member status. 
 
Striving for Specific Reputations 
Some autocratic states are quite critical of each other and the rest of the world’s human rights 
conditions, condemning rights violations and urging real change.  Although the UPR enables 
states to comment on all UN member states’ human rights policies and practices, states do not 
issue material recommendations randomly.42  I argue that an autocratic state issues 
recommendations involving high costs only when seeking better standing in regard to its 
adversarial foreign relations with a specific state under review.  Such recommendations put the 
reviewing state in a better position to accomplish its political, security, and economic aims.  
States find it useful to attain international approval of foreign policies, especially when 
those policies involve confrontational relations with another state on a given issue.  States could 
avoid the possible negative consequences of shunning international institutions’ authorizations 
(especially for weaker states), gain public support with extra legitimacy, and shift public 
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42 During the second cycle, some Western states tend to adopt a standardized recommendation policy of 
issuing an equal number of recommendations to all states under review (Personal Interviews. January 19, 
20, and 26, 2016).  Although the future studies should account for this cycle-specific effect, this study’s 
scope is limited to the first cycle. 
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attitudes (Chapman 2012, 5-6).  States acquire a veneer of procedural legitimacy by merely 
consulting multilateral organizations or receiving the symbolic seals of legitimacy conferred by 
international organizations (Chapman 2012, 5; Thompson 2006; Voeten, 2005).  Seeking 
external legitimacy for national foreign policies, therefore, has been increasingly common both 
for democracies and autocracies since 1945 (Chapman 2012).  
By issuing recommendations on particular human rights problems, states help shape the 
global understanding and discourse on human rights conditions of a given state under review.  
Receiving the same recommendations from a significant number of peer states contributes to 
widespread perceptions about whether or not a reviewed state is doing well on human rights.  For 
example, during a review of Singapore in the 24th UPR session on January 27, 2016, overlapping 
recommendations commending Singapore’s education and welfare policies, issued by a majority 
of developing countries, made Singapore seem to be a model human rights country.  This 
changed when Western European countries began to urge specific measures to ensure the 
freedom of association, to abolish corporal punishment as a state criminal justice, and to ratify 
the Convention against Torture and its Optional Protocol (Personal Fieldwork).  Thus, some 
reviewed states even reach out to recommending states in advance, requesting that they focus on 
certain issues during their review (Personal Interviews, January 22 and 26, 2016).  Adopted 
recommendations from peer states become part of the official UN record and a focal point for 
human rights NGOs to press for change.  Also, peer states evaluate the reviewed state’s 
implementations of accepted recommendations in the next cycle.  
While UPR recommendations verbally legitimize reviewed states’ human rights policies 
and practices, states’ use their recommendation policies as a means of enhancing their standing 
relative to their foreign policy adversaries in lower level policy areas.  States value the external 
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legitimation granted by international or regional organizations on issues other than wars, such as 
peacekeeping operations, denunciation of colonial rules, state independence, and developmental 
issues with respect to states with conflicting agendas (Claude 1966).  Having secured 
international legitimacy, the state occupies a better position to win in the courts of international 
and domestic public opinion with regard to its handling of a foreign policy adversary.  Even if it 
fails in those individual conflicts, the state can still use its international standing to defend its 
positions to domestic audiences and to continue to survive politically at home.  To this end, 
possessing a better standing on human rights relative to the state’s foreign policy adversary 
serves as one way among many in which to gain international approval of its general foreign 
policies. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union competed for a moral high ground 
by establishing human rights discourses and post-war global human rights institutions to justify 
their two different versions of governance (Donnelly 2003, 2007).  
This leads us to expect that if a reviewing autocracy is in conflict with a reviewed state – 
on political, security, or economic fronts, it would issue costlier recommendations, requesting 
specific policy reforms of domestic institutions or law.  First, if a reviewing autocracy is in a 
militarized conflict with a reviewed state with major power status, the reviewing state can use the 
UPR as a continuation of the ongoing conflicts.  The reviewing state would want to win political 
and moral approval from the international community and shame its powerful military adversary, 
causing the enemy to lose moral ground in the conflict and encouraging it to make concessions to 
the recommending state.  In order to win international support, such reviewing autocracies are 
likely to specifically rely on existing human rights treaty instruments to add authority to their 
recommendations or to request more detailed policy changes.  To them, the benefits of achieving 
international political/moral support are much greater than the costs of ruining already bitter 
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bilateral relationships.   
For example, North Korea devoted eleven out of their fifty-four recommendations to 
shaming the U.S. during the first cycle, three of which urged the U.S. to ratify the ICESCR, 
CEDAW, and CRC.  Georgia’s recommendation to Russia is another good example (UPR-Info 
2014b).   Five out of Georgia’s six recommendations targeted Russia during their militarized 
conflict in 2008, and two invoked international law, such as the Resolution of 1648 adopted by 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the prescriptions of the ICJ (UPR-Info 
2014b).  China does not typically urge peer states to join international human rights instruments 
in its recommendations, the one exception being its recommendations to the United States during 
the first cycle regarding the ICESCR, CEDAW, and CRPD (Ahl 2015, 656). 
This leads to the last hypothesis:  
H5-2: Authoritarian states are more likely to target recommendations requesting 
higher costs when they are in adversarial foreign relations with states 
under review.  
 
 
5.4 Research Design 
Extending the UPR Info’s database on UPR Recommendations (2014b), I created a new directed 
dyadic dataset in order to more precisely represent the strategic interactions between reviewing 
autocracies and reviewed states in the UPR’s interactive dialogue.  My analyses are limited to 
5,627 recommendations issued by eighty-three autocratic states, whose Polity scores (Marshall 
and Jaggers 2002) are less than seven,43 regardless of the reviewed states’ regime types, during 
the first cycle of the UPR spanning the years 2008 to 2011.   
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43 Most international relations scholars view a Polity score (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) of 6 as a cut-off 
point for non-democratic states, but some consider a score of 7 as an alternative cut-off point (Epstein, 
Goldstone, Kristensen, and O’Halloran 2006). 
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The second cycle from 2012 to 2016 is excluded from the analysis.  Technically, the full 
data are not available yet, and the focus of review is substantively different.  In the second cycle, 
countries are encouraged to pay more attention in reviewing actual implementations of 
recommendations accepted during the first cycle, besides commenting on peers’ human rights 
policies and practices.  States also learn by doing and change their review policies.  See 
McMahon (2012) for how states increase the number of recommendations and issue costlier 
recommendations over sessions even within the first cycle.  Personal interviews with state 
delegates and related human rights NGO staffs also reveal that certain Western states tend to 
adopt a standardized policy of issuing an equal number of recommendations to all states under 
review during the second cycle (January 19, 20 and 26, 2016).  Thus, future studies incorporating 
further cycles would need to address cycle-fixed effects. 
To test the hypotheses concerning the reviewing states’ bureaucratic capacity account as 
well as the general reputational account, I switch the data structure to a monadic setting by 
collapsing all the relevant observations to each recommending state.  Here, the unit of analysis is 
a recommending state.  For testing Hypotheses 5-1a and 5-1b, I use negative binomial 
regression, which is appropriate for modeling over-dispersed count dependent variables 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2013; Long 1997).  I, then, switch the structure of my dataset back to a 
directed dyadic setting.  By doing this, I additionally test Hypothesis 5-1b in a dyadic setting and 
also Hypothesis 5-2.  Here, the unit of analysis is a recommending state-a state under review-a 
recommendation event.  Ordinal logit estimations are used to take advantage of the ordered 
dependent variable, the level of a recommendation. 
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Dependent Variable 
Recommending states’ participations in the UPR’s interactive dialogue are operationalized into 
three indicators: 1) the total number of all types of recommendations per recommending state, 2) 
the number of recommendations per recommending state by each category of requested action 
for implementation, and 3) the level of recommendation in terms of expected costs.  
For the latter two indicators, I use the variable of action category of the Database of UPR 
Recommendation (McMahon 2012; UPR-Info 2014a).  In brief, recommendations are grouped 
into five different action categories based on the expected costs of implementation (McMahon 
2012, 14-5).  “Minimum Action” recommendations target states other than the reviewed state, 
urging technical or financial assistance from the international community or requesting that they 
share information on best human rights practices with their peers.  “Continuing Action” 
recommendations emphasize that the reviewed state should simply keep up the good work.  The 
state under review is asked to consider changes in policies and practices in “Considering Action” 
recommendations. “General Action” recommendations request that the reviewed state take 
general actions to improve, and “Specific Action” recommendations detail specific steps that 
should be taken to redress pending issues in human rights.  Tables 5A-1 and 5A-2 of Appendix at 
the end of this chapter provide summary statistics and more detailed examples for each action 
category recommendation.  Based on this general coding scheme by McMahon (2012), I 
construct the second and third dependent variables for empirical analyses.  
For the last ordinal dependent variable, I rescale it to the range of 0-4:44 0 for a dyad 
where no recommendation is made, 1 both for “Minimal Action” and “Continuing Action,” 2 for 
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44 I expanded the original UPR-Info dataset (McMahon 2012) so that possible pairs of countries where no 
recommendation is made at all are also included and therefore addressed (n=19,020).  Otherwise, the 
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“General Action,” 3 for “Considering Action,” and 4 for “Specific Action.”  Recommendations 
asking for minimal and continuing action require minimal costs.  In actuality, states seem more 
hesitant to accept “Considering Action” recommendations than to accept those asking for 
“General Action.”  McMahon concludes that states regard even considering policies, that are 
politically and socially very sensitive, such as death penalty abolition or restrictions based on 
sexual orientation, as too expensive (2012).  Conversely, states are able to exercise a great deal 
of discretion in terms of how to specifically implement general action recommendations.  
Summary statistics in Table 5A-3 attest that commenting on other states’ human rights situations 
is indeed a rare event.  
 
Independent Variables 
Human Rights Council Membership: Autocratic recommending states’ HRC membership status 
during the first cycle is used to capture whether autocratic states seek to craft a generally positive 
reputation before an international audience.  I code 1 if an autocratic state serves as a HRC 
member for a given year and 0 otherwise (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
United Nations Human Rights 2014).  
Foreign Policy Adversaries to the Reviewed State: The international relations literature uses 
several measures based on UN General Assembly votes to evaluate similarities in foreign policy 
preferences among countries.  These include state ideal points (Bailey et al. 2015) and 
Affinity/S-scores (Bailey et al. 2015; Gartzke 1998; Signorino and Ritter 1999).  Heterogeneity 
in foreign policy preferences may not be a direct indicator of adversarial relations between two 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
analyses would be based on a truncated dataset, which contains only pairs of states in which at least one 
recommendation (n=5,627) is made, and it is likely to suffer from sample selection bias (Reed 2000). 
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countries.  Given the existing literature’s usage of this measure (Voeten 2000, 2004), it serves 
well as a good proxy indicator of whether two states are more likely to engage in conflict at any 
level.  Gartzke shows that affinity scores serve as a proxy for the possible absence or presence of 
conflict between states (1998, 2000), and Baily et al. (2015) attest that ideal point estimates 
outperform to measure the same.  Following this lead, I use the absolute distance between the 
ideal points of two countries, ranging from 0 to 4.49 for directed-dyadic analysis of this study.  
For robustness checks, I, alternatively, use Affinity/S-scores, ranging from -1 (least similar 
interests) to 1 (most similar interests) (Strezhnev and Voeten 2013).  
 
Control Variables 
To account for possible alternative hypotheses, I include a series of control variables that might 
influence autocratic states’ recommending behaviors.   
The existing literature on the UPR points out that a state’s level of wealth and regional 
groupings may be underlying forces that influence the state’s recommending behaviors.  First, I 
include the recommending states’ log of GDP (in current US dollar) from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).  This variable captures the level of wealth in each 
recommending country and accounts for managerial explanations of participation with IOs 
(Chayes and Chayes 1993).  I expect that poor countries are less likely than wealthy countries to 
issue recommendations in the first place and/or specific recommendations due to their lack of 
technical, financial, and human resources.  Alternatively, wealth can be a proxy measure for 
power.  I expect that powerful states issue more and serious recommendations because they are 
less vulnerable to the potential retaliation of targeted states.  
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Next, I include four regional dummy variables for the monadic analysis with the Group 
of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) as the excluded reference category.45  
For the dyadic analysis, I construct a common region variable, 1 if a pair of states belongs to the 
same regional groups, and 0 otherwise.  This variable allows me to test whether autocracies are 
indeed protective of their regional peers when publishing recommendations. 
Additionally, recommending states’ characteristics with respect to human rights may also 
affect their propensity to issue many and serious recommendations.  To measure actual human 
rights practices, I mainly rely on the Latent Human Rights Protection Scores (v.2) (Fariss 2014; 
Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014).  This latent physical integrity variable addresses rising concerns 
that the dominant two existing measures of human rights practices -- the Political Terror Scale 
(PTS) (Gibney et al. 2012) and the CIRI Human Rights Data (CIRI) (Cingranelli et al. 2014) -- 
fail to account for dynamic changes in how monitoring agencies like Amnesty International and 
the U.S. State Department interpret available information about repression over time (Fariss 
2014; Clark and Sikkink 2013).  This continuous variable ranges from -2.52 (more abuse) to 4.67 
(more respect).  For the dyadic analysis, I include human rights scores for both a recommending 
state and a reviewed state.  For robustness checks, I alternatively use the PTS score based on 
Amnesty International reports (Gibney et al. 2012) and the CIRI physical integrity rights index 
(Cingranelli et al. 2014).  The higher the score, the more abusive a state is in the PTS score.  The 
opposite is true with the CIRI index.  
I measure a state’s legal commitment to international human rights treaties (Voeten 2013) 
by looking at the number of the five UN human rights treaties it has ratified, which includes the 
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45 Western European and Others Group was excluded due to zero observations among autocracies. 
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CAT, ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC, and CEDAW (United Nations Treaty Series, Database 2014).  
This is an ordinal variable, which ranges from 0 (minimal treaty commitment) to 5 (most treaty 
commitment).  Again, I include this variable both for recommending and reviewed states in the 
dyadic analysis.  
I also include a variable of globalization to account for the possible correlation between a 
state’s openness to the international community and its propensity to be vocal in international 
institutions.  This variable is taken from the KOF globalization index, which is the weighted 
average of economic, social and political globalization and ranges from 0 to 100 (higher degree 
of globalization) (Dreher 2006).  The Quality of Government dataset provides this variable 
(Teorell et al. 2015). 
Some may also argue that autocratic states actively recommend in order to obtain extra 
legitimacy in times of domestic unrest.  To address this alternative explanation, I include a 
domestic unrest variable, which is an additive measure of general strikes, riots, revolutions, and 
anti-government demonstrations from the CNTS Data Archive (Banks and Kenneth 2015). 
I also include a variable measuring whether an autocratic recommending state with HRC 
membership serves in the troika during the preparation of a review of a given state.  Troika states 
may either have more to say in that state’s review, given their better knowledge of the state’s 
human rights situation, or be reluctant to substantively engage in the reviewing session in order 
to remain neutral.  
Lastly, one might raise concerns about a potential selection bias.  Autocratic states that 
want better reputations abroad are more likely to pursue HRC memberships in the first place, and 
these states are more likely to issue a higher number of and more serious recommendations.  
Unfortunately, no variable exists in the literature that satisfies the exclusion restriction, which is 
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an instrument variable affecting the dependent variable only through the independent variable.  
Alternatively, I control for the election candidacy of HRC members in a given year to at least 
partly address the potential selection biases in recommending behaviors.  In doing so, I follow 
Hug and Lukács (2014), who control for the authorship of the proposal to account for selection 
biases in evaluating voting behaviors among HRC member states.  I code 1 if an autocratic 
recommending state is a candidate for HRC membership in a given year and 0 otherwise. 
 
5.5 Empirical Analysis 
The findings strongly support the main argument that autocratic recommending states take part 
in the UPR’s interactive dialogue more actively and seriously when they need to shape their 
general or specific reputations before an international audience.  First, if the bureaucratic account 
is only true, we do not necessarily observe that autocratic states with HRC membership issue 
more meaningful and serious recommendations but simply a higher number of them.  However, 
the empirical results from count models with monadic settings as well as ordinal logits with 
directed dyadic settings show that HRC member autocratic states issue not only a higher number 
of recommendations but also more meaningful recommendations irrespective of which state is 
under review.  Next, while autocratic states that ran in HRC member elections are more likely to 
issue more meaningful recommendations, the impact of HRC membership status on the 
likelihood of states’ issuing more serious recommendations is still statistically significant and 
substantively larger than that of mere candidacy.  Across different model specifications, the 
effect of candidacy fails to achieve statistical significance most of the time, too.  Thus, the results 
suggest that the theoretical mechanism explaining the recommending behaviors of autocratic 
states with HRC member status may be multifaceted; however, the reputational account still 
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holds despite all other alternative explanations.  Last, autocratic states issue more meaningful 
and costlier recommendations to their foreign policy adversaries. 
Table 5-1 displays the result of negative binomial regression analysis.  I find that 
autocratic states with HRC membership are indeed likely to issue a higher number of 
recommendations than those without HRC membership, even after controlling for their levels of 
wealth, actual human rights practices, degree of globalization, number of ratified human rights 
treaties, domestic unrest, and regional associations (column 1).  With respect to how control 
variables behave, it is strongly positive that rich autocratic countries tend to issue a higher 
number of recommendations at the 1% level.  To the contrary, the remaining control variables 
turn out to have nothing to do with the number of recommendations.  For robustness checks, I 
estimated the same model but with the PTS score and the CIRI physical integrity rights instead 
of the latent human rights scores.  The impact of HRC membership is still positive and 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level (columns 2-3). 
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Table 5.1: Number of Overall Recommendations 
# of recommendations  (1) (2) (3) 
HRC 0.553** 0.553* 0.555* 
 (0.275) (0.272) (0.275) 
Log of GDP 0.692*** 0.730*** 0.694*** 
 (0.143) (0.140) (0.140) 
Latent HR scores -0.020   
 (0.179)   
Political terror scale  0.137  
(amnesty)  (0.156)  
Physical integrity rights   -0.006 
(ciri)   (0.102) 
Globalization -0.017 -0.008 -0.018 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
N of ratified HRAs -0.089 0.081 -0.088 
 (0.129) (0.128) (0.129) 
Domestic unrest -0.005 -0.015 -0.004 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) 
Africa -0.162 -0.384 -0.157 
 (0.470) (0.495) (0.468) 
Asia -0.018 -0.329 -0.019 
 (0.436) (0.477) (0.446) 
East Europe 0.581 0.287 0.578 
 (0.570) (0.590) (0.587) 
Constant -11.72*** -14.03*** -11.74*** 
 (3.276) (3.269) (3.387) 
N 77 75 77 
Log-likelihood -364.75 -352.90 -364.75 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Troika drops out due to 
multicollinearity.  
 
Table 5-2 summarizes the results of a series of negative binomial regressions in different 
categories of recommendations.  Autocratic reviewers’ HRC member status is significantly 
associated with a higher number of recommendations only for those requesting to take “general” 
or “specific” actions while it has nothing to do with issuing recommendations of “minimal,” 
“continuing,” and “considering” actions.  Although the UPR-Info dataset originally codes that 
“general action” is costlier than “considering action,” I reversed the order for my analysis.  
Ordinal logit results in Table 5-3 are robust to both coding schemes.  Wealth is again a 
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significantly positive predictor of a higher number of recommendations across all action 
categories.  The other control variables, with the exception of a few regional dummies, do not 
affect autocratic recommending states’ propensity to issue a higher number of recommendations 
across any category. Autocratic countries belonging to Asian and African groups tend to issue 
more recommendations requiring minimal actions compared to states belonging to GRULAC. 
Also, Asian autocracies are less likely to make recommendations requiring specific actions to be 
carried out than are GRULAC autocracies.  The results are robust to accounting for both 
autocratic sub-regime types and degrees of personalism, which are the focus of much current 
literature.  Many studies posit these domestic institutional characteristics as driving autocratic 
states’ foreign policies, such as the pursuit of nuclear weapons (Way and Weeks 2014) (Tables 
5A-5 and 5A-6). 
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Table 5.2: Number of Recommendations by Action Category 
# of  
recommendations 
Minimal 
Action 
Continuing 
Action 
General 
Action 
Considering 
Action 
Specific 
Action 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HRC 0.318 0.389 0.566** 0.413 0.712** 
 (0.274) (0.296) (0.285) (0.495) (0.291) 
ln GDP 0.572*** 0.595*** 0.776*** 0.665*** 0.641*** 
 (0.137) (0.157) (0.130) (0.187) (0.134) 
Latent HR  0.057 -0.064 0.020 -0.190 -0.215 
scores (0.172) (0.210) (0.166) (0.382) (0.199) 
Globalization -0.025 -0.013 -0.017 0.035 -0.003 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018) 
N of ratified  -0.071 -0.163 -0.049 -0.243 0.062 
HRAs (0.130) (0.163) (0.130) (0.239) (0.133) 
Domestic  -0.010 0.003 -0.008 -0.046 -0.003 
unrest (0.025) (0.019) (0.016) (0.044) (0.019) 
Africa 1.754*** -0.244 -0.227 -0.117 -0.786 
 (0.481) (0.717) (0.484) (0.782) (0.530) 
Asia 1.243*** 0.176 -0.060 -0.943 -1.187** 
 (0.479) (0.723) (0.458) (0.836) (0.509) 
East Europe 0.786 0.461 0.773 0.295 -0.119 
 (0.762) (0.801) (0.588) (0.832) (0.597) 
Constant -12.48*** -10.34*** -15.02*** -15.28*** -12.99*** 
 (2.991) (3.685) (3.024) (4.634) (3.097) 
N 77 77 77 77 77 
Log-likelihood -175.77  -285.87 -280.86 -165.94 -232.04 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Troika drops out due to multicollinearity. 
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Next, Table 5-3 summarizes the directed dyadic analyses results using ordinal logit 
models with clustered robust standard errors.  In this directed dyadic setting, autocratic 
recommenders’ HRC member status is positively related with recommendations entailing higher 
costs, and this effect is strongly significant across all models at the 1% level.  My expectations 
regarding the performance of all measures of foreign policy adversaries are strongly supported at 
the 1% level.  Specifically, as the absolute distance of an ideal point of an autocratic 
recommending state from that of a state under review becomes larger, it is more likely for the 
autocratic state to issue recommendations with higher costs (columns 1-2).  Again, as their 
foreign policy preferences are more similar, the autocratic state is less likely to make such 
serious recommendations (columns 3-4).  The results are robust to the potential selection bias 
(columns 2 and 4), using different measures of human rights practices (Table 5A-8), addressing 
the material capability of reviewed states (Table 5A-9), accounting for autocratic sub-regime 
types and the degree of personalism (Table 5A-7), and different coding of the dependent variable 
(Table 5A-10). 
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Table 5-3: Issuing Recommendations Requiring Higher Costs 
lv of recommendations  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HRC  0.490*** 0.456*** 0.465*** 0.436*** 
 (0.064) (0.070) (0.064) (0.070) 
Distance in ideal points 0.394*** 0.396***   
 (0.048) (0.048)   
S scores   -0.744*** -0.746*** 
   (0.110) (0.110) 
Log of GDP  0.570*** 0.571*** 0.591*** 0.593*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Common region  0.637*** 0.640*** 0.605*** 0.607*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
Globalization  -0.007** -0.007** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Latent HR scores (recommending state) 0.083** 0.082** 0.089** 0.087** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Latent HR scores (state under review) -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.126*** -0.125*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
N of ratified HRAs (recommending state) 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
N of ratified HRAs (state under review) 0.035 0.035 0.052** 0.052** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Domestic unrest  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Troika  0.098 0.109 0.102 0.111 
 (0.188) (0.189) (0.189) (0.190) 
Candidate   0.114  0.097 
  (0.104)  (0.104) 
Cut 1 15.74*** 15.77*** 15.20*** 15.23*** 
 (0.577) (0.579) (0.584) (0.586) 
Cut 2 16.50*** 16.53*** 15.96*** 15.99*** 
 (0.579) (0.581) (0.586) (0.588) 
Cut 3 17.60*** 17.64*** 17.06*** 17.09*** 
 (0.584) (0.586) (0.591) (0.592) 
Cut 4 18.04*** 18.08*** 17.51*** 17.53*** 
 (0.585) (0.587) (0.592) (0.594) 
N 17,653 17,653 17,653 17,653 
Log pseudolikelihood -15606.69 -15604.87 -15643.09 -15641.78 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses.  
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Interpreting the substantive effect with ordinal logit estimations presents complications.  
Such interpretation gives the substantive effect of an independent variable of interest for each 
level of dependent variable, and it is not intuitive to draw conclusions.  Thus, I switch the ordinal 
dependent variable to a binary variable, indicating 1 if it is a specific recommendation and 0 
otherwise.  I then estimate the logit model based on the same model specification in column (1) 
of Table 5-3.  Since my theoretical focus concerns the specific recommendations, this logit 
estimation may still capture the essence of my theoretical claim.  Figures 5-2 and 5-3 display the 
substantive effects of my two independent variables.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Predicted probability of HRC member status on issuing specific 
recommendations 
NOTE: Results are based on the logit estimation of model (1) in Table 5-3, with binary 
dependent variable, indicating 1 if specific recommendations and 0 otherwise. 
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First of all, the predicted probability that autocratic states with HRC memberships issue 
specific recommendations is 21 percent while that of autocratic states without HRC membership 
is 15 percent as shown in Figure 5-1.  This difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level.  Figure 5-2 demonstrates that the predicted probability that a dyad of reviewing and 
reviewed states in the 75th percentile for absolute distance in ideal points (e.g. states with 
adversarial relations) issue a specific recommendation is 55 percent.  In comparison, the 
predicted probability that a dyad of reviewing and reviewed states in the 25th percentile for 
distance in ideal points (e.g. states with friendly relations) issue a specific recommendation is 11 
percent.  This difference is again statistically significant with p-value of 0.000.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Predicted probability of distance in ideal points on issuing specific 
recommendations 
NOTE: Results are based on the logit estimation of model (1) in Table 5-3, with 
binary dependent variable, indicating 1 if specific recommendations and 0 
otherwise. 
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Other control variables behave mostly as expected. Wealthy or powerful autocratic states 
are more likely to issue costlier recommendations.  Contrary to existing studies that focus on all 
states’ recommending behaviors, my study shows that autocratic recommenders do not shield 
states from the same region.  Such recommenders are likely to be more familiar with the human 
rights practices of states from their same region because their proximity not only allows for more 
frequent interactions but also places them in an advantageous geographical position from which 
to monitor the reviewed state.   
Contrary to my expectation, as an autocratic state’s degree of globalization increases, it is 
less likely to issue serious recommendations to peer states. Autocratic states that are more open 
to the outside world may fear the unintended consequences of criticizing other states’ human 
rights conditions.  Such behavior may upset bilateral relations with a given state under review or 
invite unwelcome international attentions to the domestic human rights situations of those 
autocratic recommending states themselves.  Such attention bears the additional danger of 
emboldening human rights activists at home.   
With respect to actual human rights performances, autocratic states that respect human 
rights are likely to issue more serious recommendations.  Likewise, reviewed states are more 
likely to receive more serious recommendations when they violate human rights.  Prior 
commitment to international human rights treaties are indeed positively related with 
recommendations requesting higher costs.  In particular, if an autocratic recommender ratifies 
more human rights agreements, the likelihood of its issuing more serious recommendations 
increases.  Similarly, the more a reviewed state ratifies human rights treaties, the more likely it is 
to receive recommendations with higher expected costs although the statistical significance 
disappears depending on model specifications.     
!
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Domestic unrest in autocratic recommending states has no correlation with the propensity 
of making serious recommendations.  This variable never achieves statistical significance at any 
conventional levels.  Being part of the troika for a given reviewed state’s interactive dialogue 
session does not impact the state’s level of recommendations.  
 
5.6 Robustness Checks  
I check whether the main results of Tables 5-1 through 5-3 are robust to accounting for the 
possible alternative explanation of domestic institutional sources of autocratic foreign policies 
(See Colgan 2013; Vreeland 2008; Weeks 2012; Way and Weeks 2014), controlling for different 
measures of human rights practices, the power of the reviewed state, and alternative coding of 
the level of recommendations.  In addition to the results presented here, Tables 5A-5 through 
5A-10 in Appendix at the end of this chapter provide details.  
 
1. Autocratic sub-regime types and degree of personalism: Autocracies may need extra 
international legitimacy to consolidate their power at home, depending on autocratic sub-regime 
type (von Stein 2014; Way and Weeks 2014).  To account for the variety of autocratic 
recommending states, I include autocratic sub-regime type dummies and a measure of 
personalism from Magaloni et al. (2013).  Magaloni et al. (2013) classify autocracies into four 
groups: Multiparty, Single Party, Military, and Monarchy (Table 5A-4).  They “measure the 
dimensions of personalism for all non-democracies” separately, pointing out that personalism is 
present in “all forms of autocratic rule in varying degrees” (9).  I concur with this approach.  For 
this analysis, I rely on the measure of non-democracies in Magaloni et al. (2013) instead of on 
the Polity scores (Marshall and Jaggers 2002), thus limiting my sample to non-democracies that 
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do not meet the criteria for democracies in Magaloni et al. (2013).  In line with the domestic 
unrest variable in Tables 1-3, domestic institutional variables (e.g. multi-party or personalist 
regimes), which existing studies have claimed to be the underlying motivation for autocrats 
seeking extra international legitimacy, are negatively associated with meaningful 
recommendations in the UPR.  Main results are robust to this (Tables 5A-5 through 5A-7). 
2. Different measures of human rights practices: I include the PTS scores (Gibney et al. 2012) 
and the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (Cingranelli et al. 2014) for alternative measures of 
actual human rights practices. The main results stay the same (Table 5A-8). 
3. Power of a state under review:  I include a measure for a state under review’s power to 
determine whether autocratic states issue less serious recommendations to states with greater 
power.  For this purpose, I use a CINC index of the year 2007 from the National Material 
Capability dataset of the Correlates of War (V 4.0, Singer et al. 1972 and Singer 1987). The main 
results stay the same (Table 5A-9). 
4. Alternative coding of the level of recommendation: Table 5-3 uses the ordered dependent 
variable, ranging from 0 (no cost) to 4 (highest cost), based on the rescaled coding scheme with 0 
for no recommendations, 1 for “minimal action and continuing action,” 2 for “general action,” 3 
for “considering action,” and 4 for “specific action.”  On the other hand, Table 5A-10 uses the 
ordered dependent variable, ranging from 0 (no cost) to 5 (highest cost), based on the original 
coding scheme developed by the UPR Info dataset (minimal action<continuing 
action<considering action<general action<specific action) (McMahon 2012).  Regardless of 
alternative coding rules of the outcome variable, the results stay the same. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examines why some autocratic reviewing states participate in the UPR’s interactive 
dialogue more actively and meaningfully than their autocratic peers.  The findings suggest that 
they do so only when they need to enhance their image before an international audience, either 
on their own or in relation to other states.  Authoritarian states are more likely to issue a higher 
number of recommendations as well as recommendations imposing higher costs on the reviewed 
states if they have high profile positions in other human rights institutions, like the HRC.  
Autocratic states are also likely to issue more serious recommendations to their foreign policy 
adversaries.  These statistical results are robust to controlling for alternative explanations or 
alternative measures/coding of control or dependent variables.  
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5.8 Appendix 
 
 
 
Table 5A.1: Summary Statistics for Over-Dispersion 
variable n mean std. dev. min max 
# of recommendations 82 69.59 103.01 0 624 
# of “minimum action” recommendations 82 4.13 6.45 0 40 
# of “continuing action” recommendations 82 22.04 31.27 0 182 
# of “considering action” recommendations 82 5.73 14.73 0 102 
# of “general action” recommendations 82 24.85 42.09 0 243 
# of “specific action” recommendations 82 12.83 21.98 0 108 
 
 
 
Table 5A.2: Examples of Action Category Recommendation 
Action Category Examples 
1 “Minimal Action” •! “Seek contributions from the international community in the 
Government’s efforts to promote rights (Ghana to Botswana, 
Session 3)” (McMahon 2012: 14) 
•! “Share its experience and best practices with other countries in 
establishing national legislation and mechanisms and pursuing 
international cooperation to curb human trafficking 
(Philippines to United Arab Emirates, Session 3)” (14) 
2 “Continuing Action” •! “Continue its efforts to develop the work of its national 
institution for human rights, as an effective human rights 
watchdog (Egypt to Bangladesh, Session 4)” (14) 
•! “Continue the efforts to combat trafficking in persons with a 
special emphasis on women and children (Canada to Japan, 
Session)” (14) 
3 “Considering Action” •! “Consider subsequent measures towards the complete 
abolition of the death penalty (Switzerland to Cuba, Session 
1)” (15). 
•! “Consider becoming party to the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (Azerbaijan to Mauritius, Session 
4)” (15). 
4 “General Action” •! “Further improve the professionalism of the police force 
(Netherlands to Barbados, Session 3)” (15). 
•! “Take the necessary steps to reduce discriminatory practices 
and violence against women (France to Mali, Session 2)” (15).  
5 “Specific Action” •! “Abolish the death penalty (Chile to Burkina Faso, Session 3)” 
(15). 
•! “Adopt legislative measures to outlaw domestic violence if it 
has not done so already (South Africa to Russian Federation, 
Session 4)” (15). 
 NOTE: This information is directly taken from the tables of McMahon (2012: 14-5). 
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Table 5A.3: Distribution of Autocratic Recommendations by Level 
Action level N Percent 
0 (no recommendation) 13,393 70.42 
1 (minimal and continuing action) 2,132 11.21 
2 (general action) 2,014 10.59 
3 (considering action) 469 2.47 
4 (specific action) 1,012 5.32 
Total 19,020 100.00 
 
 
 
Table 5A.4: Distribution by Regime Types  
Regime types  N Percent 
Non-democracy Military 2,236 13.17 
 Monarchy 2,121 12.49 
 Multiparty 10,585 62.33 
 Single Party 2,040 12.01 
Total  16,982 100.00 
NOTE: Data from Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013) 
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Table 5A.5: Number of Recommendations: sub-regime types and personalism 
# of recommendations  (1) 
HRC 0.511* 
 (0.276) 
Military -0.911 
 (0.564) 
Multiparty -0.377 
 (0.411) 
Single party -0.661 
 (0.751) 
Personalism -0.449 
 (0.290) 
Log of GDP 0.612*** 
 (0.157) 
Latent HR scores  0.013 
 (0.164) 
Globalization -0.023 
 (0.020) 
N of ratified HRAs -0.057 
 (0.127) 
Domestic unrest 0.030 
 (0.031) 
Africa -0.668 
 (0.642) 
Asia -0.428 
 (0.578) 
East Europe 0.218 
 (0.718) 
Constant -8.453*** 
 (3.104) 
N 70 
Log-likelihood -337.14 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust 
standard errors in parentheses. N includes states who 
are not “Democracy” according to Magaloni, Chu and 
Min (2013). 
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Table 5A.6: Number of Recommendations by Action Category:  
sub-regime types and personalism 
# of  
recommendations 
Minimal 
Action 
Continuing 
Action 
Considering 
Action 
General 
Action 
Specific 
Action 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HRC 0.311 0.277 0.405 0.607* 0.797** 
 (0.270) (0.269) (0.439) (0.322) (0.325) 
Military -0.410 -1.073* -1.385 -0.700 -1.028* 
 (0.574) (0.594) (0.909) (0.614) (0.544) 
Multiparty -0.647 -0.142 -0.612 -0.566 -0.621 
 (0.412) (0.439) (0.779) (0.464) (0.445) 
Single party -0.491 -0.124 -1.505 -0.984 -1.539** 
 (0.641) (0.918) (1.217) (0.703) (0.690) 
Personalism -0.576** -0.188 -1.027** -0.594* -0.523 
 (0.277) (0.319) (0.489) (0.329) (0.345) 
ln GDP 0.505*** 0.454*** 0.556*** 0.762*** 0.677*** 
 (0.135) (0.162) (0.201) (0.150) (0.154) 
Latent HR  0.066 0.047 -0.139 -0.007 -0.199 
scores (0.179) (0.178) (0.279) (0.160) (0.215) 
Globalization -0.030 -0.008 0.015 -0.033 -0.030 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.039) (0.021) (0.019) 
N of ratified  -0.072 -0.102 -0.231 0.018 0.039 
HRAs (0.137) (0.141) (0.261) (0.136) (0.134) 
Domestic -0.005 0.057* 0.035 0.001 0.023 
unrest (0.034) (0.031) (0.063) (0.035) (0.040) 
Africa 1.194*** -1.032 -0.062 -0.656 -0.973* 
 (0.414) (0.985) (0.745) (0.556) (0.581) 
Asia 0.697* -0.788 -0.632 -0.121 -0.925 
 (0.402) (0.912) (0.730) (0.509) (0.567) 
East Europe 0.381 -0.387 0.810 -0.625 0.023 
 (0.776) (1.001) (0.910) (0.657) (0.672) 
Constant -9.125*** -6.315* -10.63*** -12.91*** -11.44*** 
 (2.863) (3.670) (4.284) (2.952) (3.114) 
N 70 70 70 70 70 
Log-likelihood -162.84  -266.52 -151.19 -259.38 -209.77 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses. N includes states 
who are not “Democracy” according to Magaloni, Chu and Min (2013). 
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Table 5A.7: Issuing Recommendations Requiring Higher Costs:  
sub-regime types and personalism 
lv of recommendations  (1) 
HRC 0.147** 
 (0.073) 
Distance in ideal points 0.359*** 
 (0.055) 
Military  -0.049 
 (0.130) 
Multiparty -0.099 
 (0.104) 
Single party 0.080 
 (0.129) 
Personalism -0.756*** 
 (0.063) 
Log of GDP 0.567*** 
 (0.026) 
Common region  0.718*** 
 (0.059) 
Globalization -0.002 
 (0.004) 
Latent HR scores (recommending state) 0.030 
 (0.041) 
Latent HR scores (state under review) -0.139*** 
 (0.024) 
N of ratified HRAs (recommending state) 0.111*** 
 (0.030) 
N of ratified HRAs (state under review) 0.020 
 (0.027) 
Domestic unrest -0.004 
 (0.005) 
Troika 0.199 
 (0.187) 
Candidate 0.422*** 
 (0.118) 
Cut 1 15.07*** 
 (0.587) 
Cut 2 15.86*** 
 (0.590) 
Cut 3 17.01*** 
 (0.596) 
Cut 4 17.49*** 
 (0.597) 
N 15,718 
Log pseudolikelihood -13736.04 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses. N includes states who are not 
“Democracy” according to Magaloni, Chu and Min (2013). 
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Table 5A.8: Issuing Recommendations Requiring Greater Costs:  
Different Measures for Human Rights Practices 
lv of recommendations  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HRC  0.473*** 0.471*** 0.447*** 0.453*** 
 (0.076) (0.070) (0.075) (0.071) 
Distance in ideal points 0.408*** 0.387***   
 (0.051) (0.049)   
S scores   -0.942*** -0.740*** 
   (0.110) (0.114) 
Log of GDP  0.530*** 0.575*** 0.548*** 0.597*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Common region  0.620*** 0.654*** 0.621*** 0.621*** 
 (0.064) (0.058) (0.063) (0.057) 
Globalization  0.001 -0.008** -0.000 -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Political terror scale (recommending state) 0.049  0.049  
(amnesty) (0.036)  (0.035)  
Political terror scale (state under review) 0.051*  0.044  
(amnesty) (0.029)  (0.028)  
Physical integrity rights (recommending state)  0.046**  0.050*** 
(ciri)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Physical integrity rights (state under review)  -0.076***  -0.072*** 
(ciri)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
N of ratified HRAs (recommending state) 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
N of ratified HRAs (state under review) -0.092*** 0.041 -0.077** 0.058** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.032) (0.026) 
Domestic unrest  -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Troika -0.036 0.114 -0.026 0.116 
 (0.195) (0.190) (0.195) (0.190) 
Candidate 0.125 0.114 0.113 0.097 
 (0.113) (0.105) (0.112) (0.105) 
Cut 1 14.89*** 15.76*** 14.10*** 15.28*** 
 (0.572) (0.617) (0.574) (0.629) 
Cut 2 15.70*** 16.53*** 14.91*** 16.04*** 
 (0.576) (0.619) (0.577) (0.631) 
Cut 3 16.89*** 17.62*** 16.10*** 17.13*** 
 (0.583) (0.623) (0.584) (0.635) 
Cut 4 17.30*** 18.06*** 16.51*** 17.58*** 
 (0.584) (0.624) (0.586) (0.636) 
N 13,783 17,561 13,783 17,561 
Log pseudolikelihood -12850.48 -15528.64 -12845.97 -15562.43 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. N 
includes states whose Polity2<7.   
 
 
 
 
!
!
!
138!
Table 5A.9: Issuing Recommendations Requiring Higher Costs:  
Power of State under Review 
lv of recommendations  (1) (2) 
HRC 0.462*** 0.442*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) 
Distance in ideal points 0.379***  
 (0.046)  
S scores  -0.695*** 
  (0.108) 
Log of GDP 0.573*** 0.593*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) 
Common region  0.633*** 0.599*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) 
Globalization -0.007** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Latent HR scores (recommending state) 0.084** 0.089** 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
Latent HR scores (state under review) -0.137*** -0.124*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
N of ratified HRAs (recommending state) 0.129*** 0.111*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
N of ratified HRAs (state under review) 0.016 0.033 
 (0.026) (0.027) 
Domestic unrest -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Troika 0.106 0.109 
 (0.190) (0.191) 
Candidate 0.104 0.087 
 (0.104) (0.105) 
Capability (state under review)  1.913 2.075* 
 (1.220) (1.236) 
Cut 1 15.70*** 15.21*** 
 (0.580) (0.590) 
Cut 2 16.47*** 15.97*** 
 (0.582) (0.592) 
Cut 3 17.57*** 17.07*** 
 (0.587) (0.596) 
Cut 4 18.01*** 17.51*** 
 (0.588) (0.598) 
N 17,580 17,580 
Log pseudolikelihood -15566.97 -15604.48 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses. N includes states whose 
Polity2<7.   
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Table 5A.10: Issuing Recommendations Requiring Higher Costs:  
Alternative coding of DV 
lv of recommendations  (1) (2) 
HRC 0.449*** 0.428*** 
 (0.070) (0.071) 
Distance in ideal points 0.406***  
 (0.049)  
S scores  -0.781*** 
  (0.113) 
Log of GDP 0.578*** 0.600*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) 
Common region  0.642*** 0.611*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) 
Globalization -0.009*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Latent HR scores (recommending state) 0.084** 0.091** 
 (0.040) (0.040) 
Latent HR scores (state under review) -0.147*** -0.137*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) 
N of ratified HRAs (recommending state) 0.121*** 0.102*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
N of ratified HRAs (state under review) 0.046* 0.065** 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
Domestic unrest -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Troika 0.120 0.120 
 (0.190) (0.191) 
Candidate 0.124 0.106 
 (0.105) (0.105) 
Cut 1 15.87*** 15.31*** 
 (0.575) (0.583) 
Cut 2 15.98*** 15.42*** 
 (0.575) (0.583) 
Cut 3 16.63*** 16.07*** 
 (0.577) (0.584) 
Cut 4 16.84*** 16.28*** 
 (0.578) (0.585) 
Cut 5 18.18*** 17.62*** 
 (0.584) (0.591) 
N 17,653 17,653 
Log pseudolikelihood -16476.62 -16511.10 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses. N includes states whose Polity2<7.   
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Autocratic Legal Commitments to UN Human Rights Treaties and 
Higher Monitoring Standards in the Universal Periodic Review 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
I have examined autocratic states’ involvement with international human rights institutions both 
legally in Chapters 3 and 4 and bureaucratically in Chapter 5.  However, states’ human rights 
policies in diverse global human rights institutions are heavily interdependent.  This chapter 
explores the Universal Periodic Review’s engagement with participating states, especially 
autocracies, when those states are simultaneously intertwined with other multilateral human 
rights institutions, such as the nine UN core human rights treaty instruments. 
 After the first cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), some academics and human 
rights practitioners cautiously expressed concerns about this new iteration of international human 
rights monitoring (de Frouville 2011; Nowak 2011).  Despite the intentions of the UPR framers 
to create a break from the politicization of the former Commission on Human Rights by stressing 
objectivity, transparency, non-selectivity, constructive dialogue, and non-confrontation (Human 
Rights Council Resolution 5/1, paragraphs 3 (a)(d)(g)(k) and 6), critics pointed out that this new 
peer review mechanism still functions with a backdrop of politics in Geneva and elsewhere 
(Abebe 2009; Cochrane & McNeilly 2013; McMahon 2012).  Due to structural constraints on 
time allocated for review, some critics argue that the review process is far from comprehensive,
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insufficiently rigorous, and selectively focused on issues that have drawn significant media 
attention in reviewed countries (Smith 2013).  On the other hand, most state delegates from 
Western countries regard the UPR process as a success.  Some Geneva-based human rights 
NGOs applaud the UPR, pointing to states’ actual implementations of accepted 
recommendations from the first cycle as the second cycle of the UPR comes to an end (Personal 
Interviews, January 19-26, 2016).
  
However, those celebratory assessments of successful implementations are based on 
national self-reports submitted by reviewed states.  Moreover, states reform domestic human 
rights policies and laws in response to multiple pressures from sources beyond the UPR, namely 
other international human rights organizations, such as the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Human Rights Council sessions, and other UN human rights treaty bodies as well as 
international and domestic civil societies (Cochrane and McNeilly 2013).  Unless a study 
demonstrates that a state’s review in the UPR Working Group is followed by actual human rights 
improvements, measured by grassroots information from the ground, controlling for similar court 
rulings and suggestions from other multilateral human rights organizations, the UPR mechanism 
will continue to face skeptics. 
Instead of evaluating the direct effect of the UPR on human rights practices and policies 
(Dominguez-Redondo 2012), I examine its interplay with other existing human rights treaty 
mechanisms in the United Nations when states, especially autocracies, draft recommendations to 
peer states under review.  The impact of the UPR can be evaluated on two fronts: 1) the 
bureaucratic participation from states both when reviewing and when under review and 2) the 
actual implementation of accepted recommendations on the ground and real differences in rights 
holders’ human rights conditions.  It may be too early to assess the overall effectiveness of the 
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UPR process on the ground since only two rounds of reviews for all UN member states are about 
to be completed.  Existing studies have examined the former part of this effectiveness question, 
tackling states’ bureaucratic participation in the UPR process (Frazier 2011; McMahon 2012).  
However, those previous studies paid insufficient attention to how states’ recommendations 
differ depending on their involvement with other human rights institutions.  As one of the key 
founding principles of the UPR is to “complement and not duplicate the work of treaty bodies” 
(UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251 on March 15, 2006), this study attempts to offer a 
first-cut analysis of whether the UPR mechanism indeed complements human rights treaty 
instruments, and if so, how.  In particular, this chapter evaluates recommending states’ 
participation in the UPR, depending on regime types, in the broader context of their involvement 
with other UN human rights institutions.    
Briefly recapturing the unique institutional features of the UPR’s interactive dialogue in 
the Working Group session as carefully addressed in Chapter 5 and taking into consideration 
recommending states’ resource constraints, I argue that states’ legal commitments to other 
international human rights standards empowers them to make more meaningful 
recommendations to peer states.  However, suggested actions in such meaningful 
recommendations differ drastically between autocratic and democratic reviewing states.  
Specifically, autocracies that have ratified a higher number of human rights treaties are inclined 
to urge peer states to join, to deepen commitments, or to take specific measures regarding such 
international human rights instruments.  However, those same autocracies do not go further and 
propose that reviewed states carry out specific domestic legal and institutional reforms.  On the 
other hand, democracies that have ratified a higher number of international human rights treaties 
not only urge other states to join, to deepen commitments, and to take specific actions in line 
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with such international human rights instruments but also prescribe changes in national policies 
and law.  
The extremely short time allowed for states to take the floor for each review in the UPR 
Working Group, along with financial and human resource constraints in reviewing states, makes 
referring reviewing states to international human rights treaties an expedient strategy to 
effectively communicate reviewing states’ human rights positions.  As a state commits to a 
higher number of international human rights treaties, it endorses the diverse legal obligations and 
norms regarding human rights contained in those treaty instruments, and it will then promote 
them in other human rights institutions, such as the UPR Working Group sessions.  Such a state 
does not fear reciprocated recommendations when it is up for review both because it restricts its 
recommendations to those it has already ratified and because it is already a member of most of 
the international human rights treaties. 
However, unlike their democratic counterparts, autocratic states do not go beyond 
resorting to those treaties in their recommendations.  After accounting for whether a 
recommendation refers to human rights instruments, only democratic states with higher levels of 
legal commitments to UN core human rights treaties tend to issue meaningful recommendations 
urging specific changes in domestic human rights institutions and laws.  This may suggest that 
autocratic recommending states are more cautious about interfering with other states’ domestic 
human rights policies.    
 Regarding the effect of reviewed states’ legal commitment to international human rights 
treaties on the likelihood of receiving specific recommendations, I need to be cautious to about 
drawing conclusions.  States under review with a higher number of treaty commitments tend to 
escape recommendations involving higher monitoring standards in the UPR both from 
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autocracies and democracies, though the results are sensitive to model specifications in case of 
autocratic recommendations.  This is due to recommending states’ early focus on expanding 
treaty membership, both horizontally and vertically.  In addition, most states view the task of 
holding member states accountable to treaty obligations as the responsibility of the treaty bodies.  
This dynamic may change over time as the UPR process develops.  
 
6.2 Brief Overview of the Interactive Dialogue of the UPR Working Group Session 
The UPR’s interactive dialogue proceeds as follows.  After assessing national reports submitted 
by the reviewed state, a Working Group – composed of all UN member states and chaired by the 
President of the Human Rights Council with the assistance of the troika, which consists of three, 
randomly drawn HRC members from different regional groups – initiates the interactive 
dialogue.  The dialogue takes place for three and half hours for each reviewed state and focuses 
on questions submitted in advance by recommending states (Freedman 2011; McMahon 2012).  
Reviewing states can take the floor to ask further questions and to issue recommendations to the 
state under review for two to three minutes46
 
each (McMahon 2012, 9).  To help with this review 
process, the UPR provides three documents: 1) a twenty-page national report submitted by the 
reviewed state, 2) a ten-page document prepared by domestic stakeholders and NGOs, and 3) a 
ten-page document compiled by the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights with 
help from human rights treaty bodies, special procedures, and relevant UN agencies (UPR-Info 
2014d).  All UN member states are subject to inter-state scrutiny of their human rights policies 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 This has changed from the first cycle to the second cycle.  In the second cycle, the 140 minutes are 
divided by the number of states that wish to make recommendations (UPR-Info 2016).  Each 
recommending state typically takes the floor for about 1 minute and 10 seconds to 1 minute and 25 
seconds per each review (the author’s fieldwork, Geneva, Switzerland, January 17-28, 2016).  
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and practices every four to four and a half years; thus, the UPR offers an open repetitive 
interplay between reviewing and reviewed state before the international community.  
 
6.3 More Committed to Human Rights Treaties, Higher Monitoring Standard in the UPR 
Why would states that commit to more international human rights treaties issue more meaningful 
recommendations in the UPR?  Would such states issue specific recommendations on peer 
states’ human rights policies and practices beyond urging other states to join the reviewing state 
in ratifying the same human rights treaties?  Would states under review find themselves to be the 
targets of more meaningful recommendations as they commit to these human rights treaties?  Or 
would membership in human rights treaties enable states under review to escape more serious 
international scrutiny? 
The existing literature on the effectiveness of human rights treaty membership has 
focused on the direct effect of treaty commitment on states’ human rights situations (Cole 2012b, 
2013; Conrad 2014; Conrad and Ritter 2013; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, 2007; Fariss 
2014; Hathaway 2002, 2003, 2007; Hill 2010; Lupu 2013a; Neumayer 2005; Powell and Staton 
2009).  While the improvement of human rights conditions in treaty member states should be the 
ultimate goal of the relevant treaty regime, the treaty effect may be neither linear nor direct.  
Cole (2012a) shows that treaty ratification has not only a direct long-term positive effect on 
opportunistic ratifiers but also an indirect positive effect on non-ratifiers.  Simmons (2009a) also 
proves that an indirect but positive effect of human rights treaty instruments on the ground 
manifests through enabled civil societies and judiciaries.  
Little academic and policy attention, however, has been paid to the indirect effect of 
international human rights treaty instruments on the ground through member states’ participation 
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in other human rights institutions.  Changes in human rights norms, perspectives, and actual 
practices may not occur immediately; however, human rights instruments may facilitate those 
changes through their agents, such as other treaty member states.  These agents may formulate 
human rights discourses in the international arena, set the agenda in other human rights 
institutions, and pressure non-member states to follow in their footsteps.  Not only sincere 
advocates of human rights norms, such as the Nordic countries, but also those seeking 
membership in human rights treaties with strategic motives, such as non-democratic states with 
poor human rights records, promote other treaty regimes to which they belong (See Voeten 2013 
for a similar logic).  The UPR’s interactive dialogue provides a good test case for investigating 
the aforementioned research questions.   
The unique institutional features of the UPR’s interactive dialogue47 as well as the 
reviewing states’ interests in either overall or particular human rights agendas, strategic relations 
with the reviewed state, and resource constraints all shape each state’s recommendation policy.  
When drafting a recommendation, states’ genuine interests in promoting a particular human 
rights issue as well as their special strategic interests in relation to a given state under review 
should be considered.  For example, during the second cycle, a series of personal interviews 
revealed that France promoted the abolition of the death penalty, Denmark pushed the issue of 
anti-torture harder, Latvia promoted the special procedures, and most non-democratic states 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 I limit my discussion of the institutional features of the UPR to those during the first cycle from 2008 to 
2011, on which I base my empirical analyses.  Some details have changed after the revision of modalities 
by the HRC Resolution A/HRC/RES/16/21 on March 25, 2011.  For example, the UPR review occurs 
every 4.5 years as opposed to 4 years after the second cycle (UPR-Info 2014c).  A list of speakers was 
based on the first-come-first-served principle during the first cycle, and in the second cycle it has been 
determined by drawing the beginning of the list by lot from the arrangement in English alphabetical order 
(See McMahon 2012 for details of the reform process from first to second cycle, pp.10-12).  The overall 
strategic implications of the UPR’s institutional design remain intact.  
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focused on economic, social, and cultural rights (January 19-26, 2016).  States tend to issue more 
serious recommendations, requiring the implementation of specific actions, to their foreign 
policy adversaries (as discussed in Chapter 5) while sensitively adjusting the tone of their 
recommendations for states within their same regional or political groups or for those with 
special military or economic interests (Personal Interviews, January 19-26, 2016). 
States also need to consider their own resource constraints when drafting recommendations in 
the UPR.  States with better economic development may have larger permanent missions not 
only in Geneva, Switzerland, where the Palais des Nations is located and the UPR Working 
Group sessions take place, but all over the world.  Besides universally available information 
from the three main documents of the UPR process, these wealthy states gather more direct input 
from their own missions in the reviewed states and crosscheck with their capitals about the 
content and wording of the planned recommendations.  These states likely have a higher number 
of skilled staff, who take charge of UPR stationing in Geneva for a longer term, much like career 
diplomats focusing on human rights issues or legal attachés.  However, most UN member states 
do not enjoy such resources.  Most states draft recommendations based on those three available 
documents from the UN, and the diplomats or staffs in charge of drafting recommendations 
rotate their missions in Geneva every couple of years or so.  These states tend to give more 
discretion to the diplomats or staffs in charge of drafting recommendations except when the 
reviewed state is of special interest (Personal Interviews, January 19-26, 2016). 
Reviewing states must accomplish all of this within a very short time during which they 
take the floor – two to three minutes in the first cycle and usually less than ninety seconds in the 
second cycle.  Except for a few powerful Western countries, most states tend to observe 
diplomatic formalities when making recommendations, even within this short time frame.  They 
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usually start their recommendations with welcoming remarks and praise for the efforts of states 
under review before listing recommendations and wrapping up with warm wishes for the 
reviewed states’ future endeavors (Author’s site observation of the 24th session of the UPR’s 
interactive dialogue in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland from January 19 to 27, 2016).  
This structure gives most recommending states even less time to discuss the substance of their 
recommendations.  
Given the UPR interactive dialogue’s institutional limitations and recommending states’ 
resource constraints, states that wish to make meaningful recommendations tend to refer to 
existing international instruments.  Doing so provides states with a means of effectively and 
efficiently delivering their general agendas as well as their positions on a reviewed state’s  
human rights situation.  First, by referring to a specific treaty, recommending states send a 
condensed message to the international community as well as to reviewed states about how they 
assess the reviewed states’ human rights situation.  A human rights treaty addresses various 
aspects of a certain right.  For example, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) contains provisions on women’s political rights, 
which can be used to increase promotion of women to high offices in government, as well as to 
women’s rights to their bodies, which can be used to condemn female genital mutilation. 
Next, basing the recommendations on international human rights treaties offers states extra 
legitimacy and authority.  Prior to the establishment of the UPR’s interactive dialogue, states that 
condemned other states’ human rights practices, even in the context of multilateral institutions, 
were often subject to criticisms of being subjective and biased.  International human rights law 
offers a common international standard that member states agree upon through multiple rounds 
of negotiation, and as more states join, it gains more legitimacy and works even towards 
! 149!
customary international law (Goldsmith and Posner 2005; Simmons 2009 and see Domínguez-
Redondo 2012 for the UPR as an evidence of opinion juris).  
Last, recommendations urging participation in international human rights instruments allow for 
easier follow-up in the next round.  At the point, reviewing states need only check whether states 
joined suggested international instruments, provided that the state accepted such 
recommendations.  
At the same time, reviewing states can minimize the potentially incurred costs of such 
recommendations by referring to only those human rights treaties of which they are already 
members.  Otherwise, reviewed states can reciprocate by issuing the same recommendations to 
the previously recommending states when they come up for review in the next cycle (Personal 
Interviews, January 19-26, 2016).  Treaty ratification is domestically costly to implement.  In 
democracies, state leaders need to garner political and social supports for ratification from their 
domestic constituents, and in non-democracies, state leaders need to grant certain rights to 
citizens that they would otherwise not (Simmons 2009a).  Thus, reviewing states would not want 
to issue recommendations that could provide a focal point for both domestic stakeholders and 
international human rights advocates to mobilize around.  
On top of such instrumental reasons, states with higher legal commitments to human 
rights treaties issue more meaningful recommendations out of normative motivations.  Once 
states are members of human rights treaties, they become agents of the human rights norms 
prescribed by those treaties regardless of what motivated them to ratify.  Most states join human 
rights treaties either because they already embrace the corresponding treaty principles or because 
of other strategic reasons (Simmons 2009a).  Two state delegates to the UPR from autocratic 
states explained that they recommend that other states join or adhere to the Convention on 
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) because they themselves both believe in the 
norms contained in the ICESCR and have already ratified it.  Thus, they are more than willing to 
promote the ICESCR in the UPR (Personal Interviews, January 19-26, 2016).  As a state ratifies 
more human rights treaties and, consequently, embraces more human rights norms, those treaty 
norms become taken for granted beyond legally-binding obligations.  Such a state is more likely 
to engage meaningfully in international human rights discourses and institutions (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Voeten 2013).  Therefore, states with a higher 
number of human rights treaty ratifications tend to issue more meaningful recommendations 
beyond referring reviewed states to specific treaties.  Such recommendations may detail specific 
action plans for domestic policy and legal reforms in reviewed states. 
Established democratic states with a record of respecting human rights on the ground are 
likely to be sincere agents of human rights norms in most human rights treaties.  With no need to 
fear reciprocated recommendations when they are up for review, they suggest detailed action 
plans for reviewed states to reform domestic law, institutions, and policies without even referring 
to international instruments.  Such states sincerely care about improving human rights conditions 
in other states.  On the other hand, autocratic states with higher legal commitments to human 
rights treaties but varying human rights records tend to be sketchy in promoting human rights 
norms beyond encouraging other states to join human rights treaties the reviewing states have 
already ratified.  In doing so, they seek to avoid reciprocated recommendations requesting 
specific reforms to their domestic human rights policies and to diffuse potential criticisms from 
peer states of being too intrusive and subjective.  They still aim to improve other states’ human 
rights conditions, but cautiously and strategically.   
The theoretical discussion above leads to the following hypotheses:  
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H6-1: States that ratify a higher number of existing human rights treaties are 
likely to issue specific recommendations irrespective of recommending 
states’ regime types.  
 
H6-2a: Autocratic states that ratify a higher number of existing human rights 
treaties are less likely to issue specific recommendations requiring 
domestic policy and legal changes beyond asking for participation in or 
for changes related to those existing human rights treaty instruments of 
which the autocratic recommending state is already a part. 
 
H6-2b: Democratic states that ratify a higher number of existing human rights 
treaties are likely to issue specific recommendations requiring domestic 
policy and legal changes beyond asking for participation in or for changes 
related to those existing human rights treaty instruments of which the 
democratic recommending state is already a part.  
 
 
How does the level of commitment to international human rights treaties affect peer 
states’ monitoring of reviewed states in the UPR?  I argue that reviewed states with a higher 
number of human rights treaty commitments are likely to avoid receiving specific 
recommendations.  The UPR is a new process, created back in 2007, and states have experienced 
only two rounds of review to date.  Therefore, recommending states focus on inviting non-
member states into the human rights treaty regimes in the beginning.  Alternatively, human rights 
treaty ratification alone provides legitimacy to reviewed states, making it harder for reviewing 
states to demand further actions beyond treaty ratifications as the “ratification-as- smokescreen-
argument” would claim in Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) and Cole (2012c).  This status may 
change over time as states become more confident with the UPR process, but long-term change 
is not within the scope of the current study.  This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H6-3: States that ratify a higher number of human rights treaties are less likely to 
be targets of specific recommendations both from democratic and 
autocratic states.  
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6.4 Research Design 
To test the hypotheses, I created a new directed dyadic dataset, which extends the UPR-Info’s 
database on UPR Recommendations (2014b).  The directed dyadic analysis captures strategic 
interactions between recommending and reviewed states in the UPR’s interactive dialogue, as 
discussed in Chapter 5.  The new dataset contains information on 20,910 recommendations 
issued during the first cycle of the UPR, spaning the years 2008 to 2011.  Autocracies issued 
5,627 recommendations while democracies issued 15,283 recommendations.  As in Chapter 5, I 
exclude recommendations from the second cycle (2012-2016) because the complete information 
is not available yet, and the focus of the review is substantively different from that of the first 
cycle.  Also, some recommending states have standardized their recommendation policies after 
the first cycle.  To compare autocratic recommending behaviors to those of democracies, I 
conduct the identical empirical analyses with two separate samples based on recommending 
states’ regime types.  The same empirical analyses with the entire sample will be also provided.  
The unit of analysis is a recommending state-reviewed state-recommendation.  The specific 
number of observations depends on the data availability of control variables.  I also use robust 
standard errors clustered on a dyad to address the possible non-independence of observations 
within the same dyad.  
 
Dependent Variable  
To account for a recommending state’s decision to engage in international human rights 
discourse in the most meaningful way within the context of the UPR, I estimate a series of 
models in which the dependent variable is a binary variable, indicating 1 if specific 
recommendations and 0 if not (UPR-Info 2014a; McMahon 2012).  I focus on the specific 
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recommendation among many other categories of recommendations from the UPR-Info dataset 
because a recommendation that incurs the highest costs both to reviewing states and states under 
review can be considered the most meaningful.  In particular, two types of recommendations are 
within this specific recommendation category.  The first type of recommendations refers to 
existing international human rights instruments mostly by inviting states to join, withdraw 
reservations, or accept extra monitoring, or occasionally urging states to comply.  The second 
type of recommendations urges states to conduct domestic legal, policy, or institutional reforms 
according to detailed action plans.  Table 6.1 provides a few examples of specific 
recommendations. 
Table 6.1: Examples of Specific Recommendations 
Recommending state to Reviewed State Specific Recommendations 
Afghanistan to Belgium - Establish an independent national human rights 
institution in compliance with the Paris Principles. 
Afghanistan to Hungary - Ratify OP-CAT (Optional Protocol of the 
Convention against Torture). 
Chad to South Korea - Adopt an anti-discrimination law to replace the 
law that was suspended in May 2008. 
China to United States - Ratify ICESCR, CEDAW, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities and other core human 
rights treaties as soon as possible. 
- Quickly close down Guantanamo prison and 
follow the provision of the United Nations Charter 
and the Security Council Resolution by expatriating 
the terrorist suspects to their country of origin. 
Russia to Georgia - Conduct a thorough and objective investigation 
into the facts of the cruel treatment of 
demonstrators by police in Tbilisi in November 
2007 and May 2009, to hold accountable those 
responsible, and to take all necessary measures to 
restore the violated rights of the victims, including 
paying appropriate compensation. 
- Develop and implement a national plan of action 
to combat poverty. 
NOTE: Data from UPR-Info.org (2014b).  
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Independent Variables  
The variables of my main interest concern reviewing and reviewed states’ number of 
commitments to international human rights treaties.  Based on the site observation of the UPR 
working group session, recommending states seem to focus their human rights treaty-based 
recommendations on the nine core United Nations human rights treaties and their corresponding 
optional protocols.  In this study, I use ratification stock of these nine core human rights treaties 
at the time of review during the first cycle of the UPR (2008-2011) for recommending and 
reviewed states, respectively.  States’ ratification records of these agreements are based on the 
United Nations Treaties Series database (2016).
  
This ordinal variable ranges from 0 (no 
commitment to international human rights treaties) to 9 (the highest commitment to international 
human rights treaties).  
 
Control variables  
Following Achen (2005), Clarke (2005), and Ray (2003), in this chapter, I take the minimalist 
approach for model specifications and thereby limit control variables to those that might affect 
both the propensity to have a greater stock of human rights treaty memberships and the 
likelihood of issuing specific and meaningful recommendations.  This approach is more 
appropriate for examining causal relationships than for surveying correlations between variables.  
I also exclude possible control variables that might be partially affected by the stock of human 
rights treaty commitments, such as actual human rights practices, to account for posttreatment 
bias (Angrist and Pischke 2008).  For robustness checks, I add a series of control variables, 
which account for reputational and strategic relational causes of states’ recommending behaviors 
in the UPR, to survey the correlates of the UPR recommendations as in Chapter 5.  
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First, regime type might affect both states’ recommendations and the likelihood of having 
a higher stock of ratified human rights treaties, though the stock of ratified human rights treaties 
does not entirely cause each state’s regime type.  Differences in recommendations across regime 
types have been noted in early works on the UPR (McMahon 2012).  Although democracies are 
likely to issue more specific recommendations, autocracies are likely to issue more specific 
recommendations than anocracies (McMahon 2012).  In the meantime, established democracies 
and transitional democracies tend to be frequent ratifiers of international human rights treaties 
(Hathaway 2007; Simmons 2009a; Smith-Cannoy 2012).  I use Polity2 scores (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2002) for both reviewing and reviewed states’ regime types. 
Next, economic development can be a good predictor for both states’ recommendations 
and their commitments to human rights treaties.  Again, the stock of ratified human rights 
treaties alone does not cause a state’s economic development.  Current literature on the UPR 
demonstrates that the level of economic development affects states’ recommendations via either 
a bureaucratic capacity path or a bilateral power relations path (Abebe 2009; McMahon 2012).  
Poor countries are less likely to issue costly specific recommendations than wealthy countries, 
mostly due to a lack of resources.  Alternatively, countries with more economic power are 
expected to issue costlier specific recommendations to their peers because they need not fear 
possible retaliatory recommendations from targeted states under review.  In the meantime, treaty 
ratifications are also found to be associated with economic development.  Ratifications require 
states’ legal and financial resources to bring domestic laws and policies in line with the 
international standards to which they claim to subscribe (Cole 2015).  Thus, I include the 
recommending state’s log of GDP (in current US dollars) from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2014).  This variable is drawn from the Quality of Government dataset 
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(Teorell et al. 2015).  
Additionally, to tease out the differences between recommending behaviors of 
autocracies versus democracies, I add an extra control variable to indicate whether a 
recommendation refers to any international human rights instrument.  This variable is drawn 
from the UPR-Info Database (2014b).  I expect that even after controlling for the 
recommendation’s substantive content urging specific actions related to international human 
rights instruments, a democratic state with more commitments to international human rights 
instruments is still likely to issue costlier specific recommendations on domestic human rights 
legal and institutional reforms.  To the contrary, I expect that an autocratic state with more 
commitments to international human rights treaties is not necessarily likely to comment on 
specific plans for domestic law and policy changes.    
 
6.5 Empirical Analysis 
Table 6.2 presents the main results, which provide strong empirical evidence to support the main 
argument.  Columns 1-3 concern only autocratic recommendations while columns 4-5 are based 
on only democratic recommendations.  Results in columns 6-7 are from all recommendations.  I 
start with a basic model only including my main explanatory variables, such as numbers of 
ratified human rights agreements by an autocratic reviewing state as well as by a reviewed state 
(Column 1).  The results support my expectation.  A higher number of ratified human rights 
treaties is strongly associated with the likelihood of issuing specific recommendations by 
autocratic states at the 1 percent level.  However, a state under review with a higher number of 
ratified human rights treaties is not associated with the likelihood of receiving specific 
recommendations from autocratic recommenders at any statistically significant level.   
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In Column 2, I add possible confounding factors, like regime types of recommending and 
reviewed states and economic development.  The effect of the commitment to human rights 
treaties by autocratic recommenders on issuing specific recommendations remains statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level.  And the effect of such a commitment by reviewed states on 
receiving specific recommendations from autocracies is negative at the 10 percent level.  These 
effects are substantively meaningful. 
 
Table 6.2: Number of Commitments to Nine Core UN Human Rights Treaties and  
Issuing Recommendations Requiring the Highest Costs 
specific  
recommendations 
autocratic  
recommendations  
democratic 
recommendations  
all  
recommendations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N of ratified  0.099*** 0.064** -0.003 0.145*** 0.075*** 0.094*** 0.024 
HRAs_rs (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) 
N of ratified 0.030 -0.065* -0.043 -0.068*** -0.053*** -0.069*** -0.052*** 
HRAs_sur (0.031) (0.034) (0.037) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
polity_rs  0.036*** 0.027*** 0.279*** 0.306*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.027) (0.027) (0.006) (0.00576) 
polity_sur   0.087*** 0.079*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
log of GDP    0.075** 0.089** 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.102*** 0.104*** 
  (0.037) (0.038) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
HR instruments    1.733***  1.223***  1.303*** 
   (0.102)  (0.050)  (0.045) 
constant -2.332*** -3.748*** -4.107*** -5.712*** -5.790*** -4.181*** -4.112*** 
 (0.272) (0.978) (0.990) (0.537) (0.538) (0.371) (0.371) 
N 5,627 4,870 4,870 13,017 13,017 17,887 17,887 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-2638 -2182 -2028 -8550 -8185 -10913 -10403 
NOTE: Logit results with robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 demonstrates that a change from no UN core human rights commitment to the 
highest number of treaty commitments increases the probability of autocratic recommending 
states issuing specific recommendations by about 8 percentage points with p-value of 0.013.  By 
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contrast, the same change decreases the probability of receiving specific recommendations from 
autocratic recommenders by about 9 percentage points with p-value of 0.071. 
 
 
(a)!autocratic recommending states 
 
 
(b)!states under review 
 
Figure 6.1: Predicted probabilities of issuing/receiving specific 
autocratic recommendations. 
NOTE: Results based on Column (2) in Table 6.2.    
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Control variables behave as expected.  Autocratic recommenders with a higher Polity 
score are positively associated with the likelihood of issuing specific recommendations at the 1 
percent level.  Interestingly, autocratic recommenders tend to issue specific recommendations as 
polity scores of states under review increase at the 1 percent level.  Autocratic recommenders’ 
economic development is also positively associated with issuing specific recommendations at the 
5 percent level. 
In Column 3, I control for whether a given recommendation mentions human rights 
instruments.  Strikingly, the effect of the number of ratified human rights treaties by autocratic 
recommending states on the likelihood of issuing specific recommendation disappears.  The 
effect of the number of ratified human rights by reviewed states also disappears.  Together with 
the results in Column (2), these results suggest that the substantive content of specific 
recommendations is different in autocratic recommendations.  In particular, autocratic 
recommending states that commit to a higher number of international human rights treaties only 
urge peer states to take specific measures regarding international human rights instruments.  
They do not necessarily encourage states to take specific action plans to redress domestic human 
rights laws, institutions, and policies.  In addition, autocratic recommending states do not target 
such specific recommendations concerning international human rights instruments when 
reviewed states have already committed to a high number of international human rights treaties.  
There is no statistical relationship between the number of commitments to human rights treaties 
by reviewed states and the likelihood of receiving specific recommendations requesting domestic 
legal, institutional, or policy reforms. 
Results from columns (4) and (5) provide an interesting comparison between autocratic 
and democratic recommending behaviors.  Democratic recommenders with a higher number of 
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human rights treaty commitments tend to issue specific recommendations urging both actions 
regarding international human rights instruments as well as changes in domestic human rights 
law, institution, and policies.  This effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level across 
all model specifications.  On the other hand, once states commit to a higher number of human 
rights treaties, they tend to escape all types of costly specific recommendations from democratic 
recommenders.  This effect is again statistically significant at the 1 percent level across all 
models.  Their substantive effects are also larger.  A change from no UN core human rights 
commitment to the highest number of treaty commitments increases the probability of 
democratic recommending states issuing specific recommendations by about 27 percentage 
points with p-value of 0.000.  By contrast, the same change decreases the probability of receiving 
specific recommendations from democratic recommenders by about 15 percentage points with p-
value of 0.000.   
As shown in Table 6A.1 in Appendix at the end of this chapter, these results are not 
sensitive to adding possible correlates of specific recommendations except for the effect of the 
number of ratified human rights treaties by reviewed states on the likelihood of their receiving 
specific recommendations from autocratic recommenders.  The effect disappears although the 
sign of its coefficient stays negative.    
 
6.6 Conclusion 
Viewing the UPR in the context of other multilateral human rights mechanisms reveals that the 
UPR is a complementary monitoring process, reinforcing existing human rights treaty 
monitoring mechanisms within the UN.  This research specifically implies that states’ legal 
commitments to UN human rights treaties facilitate and strengthen state-to-state monitoring in 
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the UPR’s interactive dialogue by enabling recommending states to use higher monitoring 
standards when drafting recommendations.  Particulars of such specific recommendations differ 
between autocratic and democratic recommenders, however.  Autocratic recommenders with a 
higher stock of ratified human rights treaties are likely to issue specific recommendations, but 
only those urging reviewed states to take measures concerning international human rights 
instruments.  On the other hand, democratic recommenders committed to a higher number of 
human rights treaties suggest that peer states to conduct specific changes concerning not only 
human rights instruments but also domestic law, institutions, and policies.   
Changes in human rights norms, perspectives, and actual practices may not occur 
immediately; however, human rights instruments may facilitate those changes through their 
agents, namely treaty member states.  These agents may formulate human rights discourses in the 
international arena, set agendas in other human rights institutions, and pressure non-member 
states to follow in their footsteps.  They encourage other member states to further commit to the 
relevant treaty by voluntarily accepting optional protocols and withdrawing reservations.  They 
also refer to treaty obligations when reviewing other member states’ human rights policies and 
practices.  Additionally, treaty member states promote the norms of relevant treaties by urging 
non-member states to join.  Not only sincere advocates of human rights norms, such as the 
Nordic countries, but also those with strategic motivations for seeking membership in human 
rights treaties, such as non-democratic states with poor human rights records, promote the 
treaties they have ratified in the UPR’s interactive dialogue.  
However, with respect to reviewed states, legal commitments to existing human rights 
treaties seem to enable them to avoid further serious scrutiny from the international community. 
The UPR process is new and states face numerous institutional constraints, such as time and 
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resources, to draft and issue recommendations.  Thus, it is possible that states focus on whether 
reviewed states are non-members of existing human rights instruments.  Referring to particular 
human rights treaties can be the best strategy to effectively communicate all the relevant human 
rights issues that the recommending state would like to address within the limited time allowed.  
Given that state recommendations are the key to the success of the UPR mechanisms, my 
findings also suggest that UPR-related human rights NGOs may encourage states to draft 
recommendations with higher standards to meaningfully evaluate the human rights situations of 
states with a higher number of human rights treaty commitments.  Treaty membership status can 
be a focal point for human rights activists mobilizing to exert pressure on governments regarding 
their recommendations in the UPR.  
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6.7 Appendix 
 
 
Table 6A.1: Number of Commitments to Nine Core UN Human Rights Treaties and  
Issuing Recommendations Requiring the Highest Costs with Additional Controls 
specific  
recommendations 
autocratic  
recommendations 
democratic 
recommendations 
all  
recommendations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
n of ratified HRAs_rs  0.060** -0.005 0.231*** 0.159*** 0.182*** 0.112*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.016) 
n of ratified HRAs_sur  -0.006 0.016 -0.057*** -0.042*** -0.046*** -0.030** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) 
polity_rs 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.082** 0.093*** 0.043*** 0.036*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.033) (0.034) (0.006) (0.006) 
polity_sur  0.039*** 0.037*** -0.004 -0.003 0.006* 0.007* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
latent HR scores_rs  -0.014 -0.043 -0.004 -0.011 0.020 0.017 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) 
latent HR scores_sur  0.066 0.018 -0.001 -0.020 0.025 0.002 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
log of GDP   0.008 0.018 0.014 0.015 0.010 0.011 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
globalization -0.002 -0.001 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
HR instruments  1.715***  1.239***  1.323*** 
  (0.106)  (0.050)  (0.046) 
reputation + strategic dyadic relations 
HRC member 0.241** 0.264** 0.160*** 0.118** 0.138*** 0.095** 
 (0.105) (0.108) (0.050) (0.050) (0.044) (0.044) 
Distance in ideal points 0.465*** 0.452*** 0.330*** 0.313*** 0.427*** 0.414*** 
 (0.062) (0.066) (0.033) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) 
Common region 0.084 0.107 -0.020 -0.016 -0.046 -0.033 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.068) (0.069) (0.058) (0.058) 
constant -2.776*** -3.102*** -5.184*** -5.323*** -4.095*** -4.121*** 
 (1.073) (1.068) (0.534) (0.535) (0.413) (0.409) 
N 4,870 4,870 13,017 13,017 17,887 17,887 
Log pseudolikelihood -2129 -1984 -8409 -8045 -10603 -10100 
NOTE: Logit results with robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
Much attention has been paid to rights-affirming democracies in human rights literature from 
quantitative methodological angles.  Extant studies have enlightened us on what drives these 
liberal democracies to join international human rights institutions more actively than rights-
violating autocracies.  Autocracies are unlikely to behave like democracies without systemic 
regime changes, which are rare from a practitioner’s point of view.  Qualitative studies have 
focused on a few extreme outliers – the most oppressive, often autocratic, regimes, but it bears 
nothing that not all autocracies are not equally disinterested in international human rights 
institutions.  To have a chance at improving the dismal human rights situations in repressive 
states, we must find out why some authoritarian countries are active and serious about UN 
human rights institutions while other autocracies remain less enthusiastic or even avoid them. 
 In my dissertation, I have examined autocratic participation in various United Nations 
human rights institutions, both legally and non-legally.  I have shown that autocrats seeking good 
reputations on human rights proactively involve international human rights institutions.  
Specifically, I argue that autocratic leaders with different support bases from those of their 
predecessors ratify multiple human rights treaties to win the popular support necessary for them 
to deter potential challenges from new regime insiders.  Membership in various human rights 
treaties helps autocrats signal to the masses that their autocratic leaders’ governance is based on
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“broad interests” and laced with liberalization policies.  Without a public and widespread lack of 
faith in the legitimacy of the governing regime, political elites find coup attempts substantially 
hampered by coordination problems.  To lend credibility to their promises of rights concessions, 
such autocrats accept a higher level of monitoring and/or enforcement obligations.  However, 
they accept extra monitoring and/or enforcement procedures of only those treaties concerning 
general rights, rather than minority, rights.  Even when agreeing to accept extra 
monitoring/enforcement from monitoring bodies of treaties about physical integrity rights 
protections, these autocrats prefer procedures allowing more state control over initiations and 
proceedings.  While physical integrity rights concern the general population, they also essentially 
concern a key authoritarian policy tool – violence.  In general, they prefer to accept extra 
monitoring and/or enforcement procedures that allow for more state control. 
 Additionally, I argue that autocratic states seeking a good international reputation on 
human rights proactively participate in the UPR’s interactive dialogue.  Those with high profile 
positions in other international human rights institutions tend to issue more recommendations as 
well as more meaningful recommendations to peer states.  Those seeking such leadership 
positions in human rights institutions are already likely to be proactive about human rights 
issues.  Alternatively, they enjoy better diplomatic, financial, and human resources in Geneva to 
take part in the UPR’s interactive dialogue.  After accounting for these two possible 
explanations, I find that autocratic Human Rights Council members still issue more meaningful 
recommendations to peer states.  Moreover, autocratic states issue more meaningful 
recommendations, highlighting areas of improvement for their foreign policy adversaries, in 
order to achieve a good international reputation in relation to states under review in bilateral 
conflict.   I also have shown that autocratic states engage international human rights institutions 
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as they commit to a higher number of other international human rights institutions in the context 
of interactions between core UN human rights treaties and the UPR. 
 I conducted a series of empirical analyses using the following: 1) the newly created 
dataset on records of individual autocrats’ ratifications as well as acceptance of extra 
monitoring/enforcement procedures of core UN human rights treaties, and 2) the newly extended 
UPR-info’s dataset on UPR Recommendations with a directed dyadic structure.  To add 
anecdotal evidence from qualitative data analysis, I also conducted fieldwork in the Palais des 
Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, from January 18-27, 2016, which consisted of an on-site 
observation of the 24th Working Group Session of the UPR and elite interviews with state 
delegates and NGO staffs.  
  This research provides numerous implications for the literature on human rights and 
international institutions.  Concurring with recent studies on autocratic ratifications of 
international human rights treaties, this dissertation examines domestic politics as an underlying 
motivation for autocrats seeking membership in international human rights treaties. Although 
most quantitative scholarly works on human rights focus on regime types or autocratic sub-
regime types, we often hear terms like “enlightened” (Schmitz 1999, 65) or “benevolent” used to 
describe autocrats who care about or appear to care about “the general interests” beyond their 
own rent-seeking (Gilson and Milhaupt 2011, 229; Roll and Talbott 2003, 80).  Such peculiar 
autocrats initially make progress toward opening their countries to international human rights 
discourses and standards, either underestimating the effect of such liberalization or 
overestimating their capability to control its consequences (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Tripp 
2010).  Systemic understandings of these autocrats, however, seem to be lacking in current 
scholarship.  This research is a first attempt to examine autocrats’ individual political attributes, 
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apart from domestic institutions, as motivating their legal commitment to international human 
rights agreements. 
This study is also a first attempt to systematically examine such states’ behavioral 
patterns in bureaucratic participations within the context of international human rights 
institutions.  Thus, this study lends support to the recent movement toward developing a distinct 
theory for understanding the global human rights policies of autocracies, which are often 
understood to be disingenuous participants in international human rights institutions (Conrad 
2014; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011, 2012; Simmons, 2009a; Smith-Cannoy 2012; Vreeland 
2008).  Furthermore, this study deepens our understanding of autocratic foreign policy regarding 
international human rights.  Chapter 5 reveals international motives in autocratic foreign policy 
decision making, adding one more wrinkle to the recent literature on autocratic participation in 
international human rights institutions, which has put relatively more emphasis on domestic 
sources (Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; Vreeland 2008; von Stein 2014).  My research confirms 
that autocratic states see international human rights institutions as foreign policy tools to advance 
their own political aims and not necessarily as a means of solely promoting human rights.  
Active and serious autocratic recommending states may initially be strategically motivated.  
However, such engagement may signal a small step for the international community toward 
having autocracies sincerely engage in global human rights discourses over time.  Recognizing 
that a repressive regime’s use of human rights language may long precede any actual changes in 
its behavior (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), this project examines when and how those 
encouraging small changes occur among autocracies. 
This dissertation provides numerous avenues for future research.  I plan to examine in-
depth the micro-mechanisms of autocratic leaders’ decisions to pursue multiple human rights 
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treaty memberships.  Also unexamined is whether a change either from autocratic predecessors 
or democratic predecessors drives the relationship between autocrats with new support bases 
distinct from those of their outgoing leaders and multiple ratifications of human rights treaties.  
As I mentioned in Chapter 4, I also plan to look into the complete and exhaustive range of 
autocratic states’ treaty commitments by expanding the current setting of optional acceptance of 
monitoring/enforcement procedures to include optional refusal or acceptance of extra substantive 
treaty obligations.  For a richer discussion of the interplay between states’ legal commitments to 
international treaty instruments and their recommendations in the UPR, we may also need to 
construct a detailed variable of commitment to human rights treaties, encompassing whether a 
state added caveats to its commitment through reservations; whether a state voluntarily accepted 
higher monitoring standards such as individual complaints, state complaints, inquiry, or the ICJ 
jurisdiction; or whether a state committed further, substantively or procedurally, by accepting the 
optional protocols of the nine core human rights treaties of the UN.        
 Regarding autocratic states’ recommending policies in the UPR, I need to look into 
states’ preferences based on bilateral relations with reviewed states.  States may want to improve 
their reputations in relation to their foreign policy partners and competitors.  For example, if a 
reviewing autocracy is in the middle of a competition for external economic benefits, such as 
preferential trade agreements and foreign aid, with a state under review, that reviewer is likely to 
issue costly recommendations.  The reviewing state can affect the reviewed state’s reputation 
with human rights conscious third-countries with which the state under review has significant 
trade relationships.  Western European countries often tie trade relationships to their partners’ 
human rights practices in concluding Preferential Trade Agreements (Hafner-Burton 2005).  
Officially recorded and condemned human rights situations can be used as a yardstick for these 
! 169!
human rights caring trade partners when renewing such preferential treatments.  In a related 
study, Lebovic and Voeten show that when the former UN Commission on Human Rights used 
resolutions to condemn a state’s human rights practices, the targeted state received less foreign 
aid (2009).  However, the reviewing state can still impose greater marginal costs on the reviewed 
state when the reviewed state is in bad standing in the UPR than when it is in good standing. 
Next, we may want to expand the time frame to include states’ recommendation patterns 
during the second cycle (2012-2016) when that data becomes available.  By necessity, this study 
is limited to the analyses of the first cycle of the UPR from 2008 to 2011. A significant number 
of states modified their approach to issuing recommendations after their experience with the first 
cycle. For example, one Western European country adopted a standardized policy of issuing only 
two recommendations for all UN member states after the first cycle.  
Last, this research shows that the UN core human rights treaty instruments positively  
interact with states’ monitoring in the UPR’s interactive dialogue; this dynamic is a starting point 
for an examination of the interplay among multiple human rights institutions.  My future 
research may assess the positive interplay between the UPR and treaty bodies, examining how 
many human rights treaties states ratify upon receiving recommendations urging them to do so. 
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